Uribe and a third term Part 2

I've done several posts on Uribe's likely push for a third term (here is the last one). Now in an interview Andres Oppenheimer tried to pin him down on the issue, and he refused to answer directly, but his answers (just as past statements) strongly suggested he would.

I told him that I have seen many popular former Latin American presidents, such as Argentina's Carlos Menem and Peru's Alberto Fujimori, lose their way as they got blinded by power. They sought third terms in office, and they ended badly.

''Don't worry,'' Uribe said, indicating that it wouldn't happen to him. Comparing himself to a peasant who is used to many hardships and rough roads, he said that ``a hard-working peasant can resist a long and abrupt road without losing his way.''

The guy is from a wealthy family and went to Harvard. Calling himself a peasant is very much like George W. Bush cultivating an image of a simple Texan. But the thing is, Bush is actually stepping down after two terms...

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Primaries in Charlotte

The campaigns in NC are all over the place now. We’ve received about three robo-calls from each side, though Obama himself wasn't in any of them (his wife was in one, and others were just staff members).

Governor Mike Easley has now endorsed Clinton, but since he’s a largely invisible governor and I am willing to bet many voters (especially newly registered ones, of which there are many in the state) have never heard of him, I can’t see that mattering very much. She needs a boost, as a recent poll has her behind 52%-42% (with 4% unsure and 2% other, and a 4% margin of error).

Early voting has already begun here, and I had planned to go yesterday. With the baby’s arrival that did not happen…

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Elizabeth and me

My daughter Elizabeth was born this morning at 8:18. She and Amy are both perfectly happy and healthy--it could not have gone more smoothly (especially since she is our third, it also happened pretty fast).

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U.S. policy toward Ecuador

The L.A. Times offers up a solid editorial on U.S. policy toward Ecuador, counseling “respectful engagement, not Cold War bluster.” It also brings up an issue I had just discussed in my U.S.-Latin American Relations class on Wed., namely the importance of distinguishing between nationalism and hostility toward the U.S. government. For example, the Manta base in Ecuador is unpopular, and other presidential candidates similarly called for its closure. Yet when Correa moves ahead with it, the U.S. frames the decision as an ideological move that puts Correa in league with Chávez.

This is an age-old problem. During the Cold War, the U.S. was all too often blind to domestic realities, so nationalists were most often labeled either communists or dupes of communists. The unfortunate result is that we made (and continue to make) enemies of people who need not be so.

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Prize money

The Cato Institute has decided to give $500,000 to Venezuelan student activist Yon Goicoechea for the “Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty.” Think tanks are certainly free to give their money to whomever they wish, but my immediate reaction was that this prize could permanently derail his political career and end up having the opposite effect the Cato Institute and others who hate Chávez want.

In Venezuela and in the international media, from now on he will be known as the “guy who is having money funneled to him from the U.S.” He wants to create a foundation to train young people who want to go into politics, and that foundation will also be labeled as the “foundation created with U.S. money to attack Chávez.”

His response:

''The government already says we're financed by the CIA. It already says we're paid by the empire. So if they say it one more time, it really isn't that important,'' he said.

True, but the real effect will be on Venezuelans, not just the government. Even Venezuelans who aren’t enamored of Chávez won’t necessarily be so happy to follow a young leader whose activities are all openly funded with U.S. money.

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Correa and the military in Ecuador Part 2

So what’s a good strategy once you’ve really challenged the armed forces and fired the leadership? Buy them lots of new stuff.

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Military legacies in Chile

The Chilean Congress is starting to debate the removal of military representatives from the National Television Council, which itself is a product of the latter part of the Pinochet government and was meant to act as a television moral watchdog. Three things come to mind.

First, this is a matter of very low salience to the armed forces so I'd be surprised if they offer any resistance.

Second, to my knowledge over the past 18 years the military has made no effort to affect any decision the organization has made (I wonder if officers even attend regularly) but it is the type of law that could easily be abused under certain circumstances. Every country, but especially those with dictatorship-era laws still on the books, should do the equivalent of a computer virus scan to make sure all obscure and potentially nasty laws are discovered and removed.

Third, it is really absurd that it took 18 years to do this. Better late than never.

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Right on time?

There are reports that more Cubans have been leaving the island since Fidel stepped aside. At the same time, there are rumors that the Cuban government is going to lift requirements for citizens to receive exits visas.

The timing is notable, because this has happened every 14-15 years. Fidel has used refugees three different times—1965, 1980, and 1994—as a way to deal with his own internal problems and to affect U.S. policy (a “weapon of the weak”). There’s a recent article that analyzes the 1994 balseros crisis, putting it into historical perspective.*

It remains to be seen if the same is occurring now, but in the past it has begun with a signal that an exodus may occur, which is expected to prompt dialogue between the two countries on certain issues (in 1994 it was mostly immigration policy but normalization of relations is always an accompanying goal). If dialogue is rejected, then the exodus occurs, and the dialogue happens anyway but in the context of crisis, which a U.S. president must address quickly or be hurt domestically:

“[T]he appearance of loss of control over US borders, coupled with the perception inside the US that Floria might be overrun, would be viewed by US leaders as politically costlier than the alternative of dealing with him. Thus if Castro could transform his own domestic problems into the US’s problems via exploitation of refugees, he could coerce its leaders into helping him solve them” (p. 48).

One difference from the past is that there is no defiant speech, which was Fidel’s way of signalling. If a similar situation is happening, then this may just reflect a different strategy, because Raúl doesn’t make fiery speeches.

*Kelly M. Greenhill, “Engineered Migration and the Use of Refugees as Political Weapons: A Case Study of the 1994 Cuban Balseros Crisis,” International Migration 40, 4 (September 2006): 133-164.

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Paraguayan presidential election

If you follow Latin American politics at all, then you know that Fernando Lugo won the Paraguayan presidential election with 41% of the vote (no runoff required) thus ending over six decades of Colorado Party rule. It is certainly nice to see that party (like the PRI) finally allow competitive elections.

President Duarte was gracious, perhaps more than you might expect given the heated campaign rhetoric against Lugo:

Sitting President Nicanor Duarte hailed the democratic process: "For the first time in our history, one party will transfer power to another without a coup, without bloodshed and without fighting among brothers," he told a news conference.

True enough.

However, there were also legislative elections, which include all 45 members of the Senate and all 80 members of the House of Deputies (both use proportional representation, with five year terms). The Colorado Party had a plurality in both from the 2003 elections.

I haven’t seen the results of yesterday’s elections, which are obviously very important for understanding how much Lugo can do. (This is the government’s official site for results, which up to this point only shows the presidential race). Remember that once the PRI lost the presidency, it worked successfully to block presidential initiatives in the legislature.

It will be also be interesting to see how he addresses regional issues, such as Venezuela’s entrance into Mercosur (which is being held up in the Paraguayan and Brazilian legislatures) and the U.S. obsession with the Triborder Area. As far as I can tell, no one in the U.S. government has yet said anything about the election. Lugo seems quite moderate but expect media attention about “leftists,” “pink tide,” etc. to lump him together with all other Latin American leaders who aren’t conservative.

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Laws are just nuisances anyway

I ran across this political cartoon, which addresses the problem of the Bush Administration voiding laws it doesn't like in order to build a border wall.

There is now a suit to end that process, arguing that it is unconstitutional. But you have to read this to believe it:

The Defenders of Wildlife and the Sierra Club first brought the suit against the Bureau of Land Management, challenging the legality of border fence construction in the San Pedro Riparian National Conservation Area in Arizona.

Though they eventually lost the case, the environmental groups won a restraining order from Huvelle in October 2007 that temporarily stopped border wall construction and instructed DHS to investigate the local environmental impacts of the project.

Chertoff responded by using the waiver authority; in November, he circumvented the restraining order by waiving 19 federal statutes. He followed that up this month by authorizing two waivers — involving some 30 laws — in order to complete construction of the fence and other protective measures in California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas.

In other words, if you don't like a restraining order, then you waive federal law so you can ignore it. I am tempted to use the cliché that it "boggles the mind" but in fact with the administration my mind cannot be boggled any further.

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Writing book proposals

Notorious Ph.D. offers some good advice about writing book proposals. I've reviewed a number of pretty bad ones, and so her emphasis on clarity--which seems obvious but is too often neglected--should always be kept in mind. But I also like her discussion of making it interesting.

Be interesting quickly. I suck at this. It's why online dating didn't work out for me. Maybe my proposal needs a push-up bra. I'm not sure how I'm going to get there in my own proposal, but I do know that I've got to get it out there in the first paragraph, rather than embrace my own tendency to meander.

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Latinos are not swing voters

David L. Leal, Stephen A. Nuño, Jongho Lee, and Rodolfo O. de la Garza, “Latinos, Immigration, and the 2006 Midterm Elections,” PS: Political Science and Politics XLI, 2 (April 2008): 309-317.

There’s no abstract, but full text is available.

As the title suggests, the article takes a close look at the 2006 midterm elections and compares conventional wisdom about Latino voters to the actual results.

The most important conclusion is that despite conventional wisdom, Latinos were not swing voters. Their partisanship was relatively solid, and any changes (e.g. a drop in support for Republicans) were similar to that of other voters. Here’s a great quote:

Some pundits, journalists, and political consultants may repeat the myth for professional reasons. It would produce much more interest, as well as create suspense, if a substantial share of the Latino electorate was said to frequently switch its support for political parties and candidates. Such a portrayal would help generate more demand for those who provide interpretation of, commentary about, and outreach to the Latino electorate (p. 313).

They note that 23.5% of Latinos are undecided about party affiliation, which I think is a topic that deserves more attention. I’ve blogged about that before, and in a previous post had some interesting discussion in comments.

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Fujimorismo

I was about to put this in my Shared Items, but it was disturbing enough that I thought I would post it. The blog Fujimori on Trial shows how Alberto Fujimori has become much more popular after being extradited to Peru and put on trial for human rights abuses. In February 2007 9.8% sympathized with him, and in February 2008 that had risen to 14.7%. In a survey of Lima residents, 31.2% said they would vote for him again. Further, his daughter Keiko is a rising star and is increasingly being seen as a viable presidential candidate.

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Venezuelan oil tax

The Venezuelan legislature approved “windfall” taxes on oil profits. From the BBC:

They face a 50% tax when a barrel of crude is priced at $70 or more, rising to 60% when average prices tops $110.

It is President Hugo Chavez's latest attempt to get greater control over his country's oil.

Two things come to mind. First, windfall taxes do not give the Venezuelan government any more control over oil. They give it more profit, which is different.

Second, the 60% rate is actually identical to what the Venezuelan government was getting in 1959 for all oil profit regardless of price. Coincidentally, I just finished reading a book chapter on U.S.-Venezuelan relations as part of a big Latin American Research Review multi book review I am doing on U.S.-Latin American relations.* Despite its title, the chapter focuses primarily on the 1940s-1960s, arguing that the U.S. government—even in the face of the treatment Richard Nixon received in 1958—accepted Venezuelan nationalism with regard to state control over natural resources. In addition to oil, a 1965 law required majority Venezuelan ownership of insurance companies.

Obviously, the context is quite different. At that time, harsh criticism of the U.S. government came from civil society rather than the presidency (which generally followed U.S. cold war policies). Nonetheless, it is worth keeping in mind. Even in the 1960s, in the wake of the Cuban revolution, the U.S. government and companies accepted the measures.

*Darlene Rivas, “Patriotism and Petroleum: Anti-Americanism in Venezuela from Gómez to Chávez.” In Alan McPherson (ed.). Anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006): 84-112.

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Political Science blogging

I just received the latest issue of PS: Political Science and Politics, which has a supplement. The first page has an article by the APSA Director of Web & Publications, entitled “Informed Publishing in Political Science.” APSA is going to focus more on teaching political scientists “the basics of and trends affecting publishing in political science.” This sounds like a really good idea, and will include a soon-to-be-released book Publishing Political Science: the APSA Guide to Writing and Publishing.

Daniel Drezner is writing the chapter on blogs. He had asked for comments (for some reason I thought I had written one, but looking at his post again I must’ve forgotten to do so). There are certainly a lot of general comments to be made about writing blogs, but I also think there are differences according to subdiscipline. This is the sort of issue that will come up at our LASA workshop (assuming it is accepted--I do not want to jinx myself, and notifications won't come until October). For Latin Americanists vs. Americanists, for example, there is a very different audience, range of issues, and expectations.

Regardless, I’m glad the topic of political science (as opposed to “political”) blogs is getting more professional attention. I must say it still surprises me that so few colleagues really seem aware of them.

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F.C. phone home

When given the chance, Cubans really like the idea of getting cell phones. Also, it appears that Fidel came up with the idea, pushed for it, and simultaneously doesn't like it.

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China and Cuba

President Bush on Cuba (March 2008):

In the face of these abuses, the United States has not been silent, nor will we be silent. (Applause.) We have been consistently joined in condemning the Cuban regime's brutal outrages by a small band of brave nations.
…
They must release all political prisoners. They must have respect for human rights in word and deed, and pave the way for free and fair elections.

President Bush’s National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley on China (April 2008):

Asked whether confronting the Beijing government about Tibet in public was counterproductive, Hadley said: "It's an issue of the Chinese government. It's also an issue of the Chinese people, who are very invested in the Olympics, who see it as a coming of age for China. And so it's a balancing here. We think that it is very important to deal with the Tibet issue. But we think the best way to do that is through the kind of diplomacy we have been undertaking, not by the kind of frontal confrontation that's being suggested by some."

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More on defense

José L. Díaz Gallardo, “Carrera Civil en Defensa: Análisis y Propuestas Para el Caso Chileno.” Security and Defense Studies Review 7, 2 (Fall 2007): 130-144.

Full text is available

Following up on a discussion about Ecuador and lack of ministerial expertise, I remembered this article, in the journal edited by the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in DC. It’s a relatively new online-only journal and has published some interesting stuff on civil-military relations and defense. Díaz has written quite a few articles and books on Chilean civil-military relations, both historical and contemporary.

Abstract: Scholars have analyzed participation by civilians in defense ministries in Latin America from a dual perspective: as part of a civilian-military integration and as an instrument of civilian control of the sector. These practices have been adopted in a context of democratic consolidation and, in the governmental sphere, of a demand for rationalization and greater efficiency and effectiveness in the conduct of government.

The case of Chile is a good example of this. Since the restoration of democracy (1990), the inclusion of civilians in the Ministry has been a constant. All of the ministers have been civilians, as have all undersecretaries; however, because the Ministry does not have a permanent staff of civilian professionals, an Advisory Committee has gradually and inorganically developed within the Ministry, which brings in people who provide advisory services on political, politico-strategic, budgetary, international, communications and auditing issues.

The modernization of defense requires a new ministerial organization, which structure must take into consideration the Administrative Law that governs civil public administration. The new law governing the ministry should provide for, as one of its cornerstones, a civil service track for civilian professionals. Finally, the new Undersecretariats, divisions and departments must contribute to improving relations with the Armed Forces.

In Chile after 1990, only 3 of 10 Defense Ministers have had any defense expertise, though at least that was a greater percentage than the 1932-1973 period. However, in the postauthoritarian era the government has been paying more attention to professionalizing the bureucracy (and the Defense Ministry has been undergoing reforms to eliminate duplication of duties). Whether or not that translates into a larger, decently paid, and permanent staff remains to be seen.

But this is the sort of thing is something that all other Latin American countries should pursue because it will pay future dividends. It does no one any good to rely on political appointees with little or no relevant knowledge and informal kitchen cabinets to be the bridge between the president and the military leadership.

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Cementing a relationship

Is the Venezuelan government going to nationalize the foreign-owned cement industry?

Chávez announced nationalization plans, and there was talk of a 60%-40% split. But then he said it would only apply to companies that were previously state-owned and subsequently had been privatized, which would not to apply to the big foreign companies like Cemex.

I can’t find anything clarifying it at the Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias site. On the Venezuelan government site, there is a quote from the Energy and Petroleum Minister from several days ago that “conversations” continued with foreign firms to give up at least 60% control. But he didn’t mention Chávez’s remarks. According to Cemex, Ramirez also informed the company “that other options may be considered during a negotiation period.”

At some point I will follow up on the issue of making threats of nationalization, especially as multiple announcements have been made in the past week or so. But I do want to see what the outcome is of this case. It is hard to imagine Chávez not following through at this point, but for now the government is not clarifying its intentions.

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Correa and the military in Ecuador

The civil-military conflict in Ecuador bears watching. I published an academic article five years ago about the role of Defense Ministries, which included a (now outdated) mention of Ecuador. One of the arguments was that military-dominated ministries represent a long-term obstacle to civilian supremacy over the armed forces. I further argue that naming inexperienced Defense Ministers is also an obstacle. [Not everyone agrees, I should add, and I have sometimes been portrayed as too pessimistic]

Rafael Correa is in a very tough position. The Defense Ministry in Ecuador has traditionally been dominated by the military, and until recently the minister himself was an officer (that shift to a civilian minister is, at least, a positive step). This makes it very difficult to establish civilian authority, as shown by Correa’s constant shuffling (four ministers in fifteen months). This is especially true in a country with a relatively recent history of military political intervention.

Correa is angry, and has a right to be. If the military leadership is withholding or hiding information from the president, they need to be fired. He did so, and the fact that it happened smoothly (at least thus far) is a good sign. He is also investigating the relationship between the intelligence services and the U.S. (the autonomy of military intelligence services is another troubling issue I’ve worked on).

However, naming an activist as minister who has been highly critical of the military will likely not turn out well. I understand the motivation, the message that Correa wants to send to the armed forces, as well as his desire to have a close associate in the position. But the most likely outcome is greater civil-military tension and less respect for the government. The military will do its best to ignore the ministry and will use various means to circumvent it, thus making life more difficult for the president. With any luck, I’m wrong.

The problem all over Latin America is a critical shortage of people from the left or center-left who are knowledgeable about their militaries. This doesn’t mean being sympathetic, or kowtowing, but just knowledgeable about defense policy and the military world. What Correa needs is someone who can bridge the gap by talking to the military leadership and gaining their respect without either doing their bidding or alienating them. I do not know how many people there are in Ecuador who fit that description.

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