Thursday, April 02, 2020

Podcast Episode 73: Serving as an Expert Witness in Immigration Cases

In Episode 73 of Understanding Latin American Politics: The Podcast, I talk with Jonathan Rosen, Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Holy Family University. Jonathan has served as an expert witness in almost 100 immigration cases, most involving Central American migrants fleeing violence and fearful of return. Really interesting stuff, with an insider's view into the process.

Incidentally, I last talked to Jonathan on episode 61 back in December 2018, where the topic was exiting gangs in El Salvador. I recommend that one as well.

You can find this podcast at iTunes, Google Play, Spotify, and anywhere else podcasts can be found. If there is anyplace I've missed, please contact me. Subscribe and rate!


Teenage Parents in Central America

Teenage pregnancy is a challenge for poverty-stricken areas, because it reduces the chances the mother and child can escape that poverty. The mothers, of course, take on a disproportionate share of the responsibility, thus sacrificing other opportunities they might have. Teenage pregnancy is a huge issue in Latin America, and Honduras has one of the highest rates of the world. So why is this the case? My dad is co-author of a new study that examines it.

Holly B Shakya, Gary L Darmstadt, Kathryn M Barker, John Weeks, and Nicholas A Christakis, "Social normative and social network factors associated with adolescent pregnancy: a cross-sectional study of 176 villages in rural Honduras," Journal of Global Health 10, 1 (2020). Full text here.

This was a cross-sectional study looking at adolescent childbirth amongst women ages 15-20 years (N = 2990) in rural Honduras, using reproductive health data on all individuals ≥15 years of age (N = 24 937 of 31 300 population) including social network contacts, all of whom were interviewed as part of the study. The outcome, adolescent childbirth, was defined as having had a child < age 20 years. Predictors included whether a woman’s social contact had an adolescent childbirth and the social contact’s reported perception of community support for adolescent childbirth.
The idea here is that a girl's social networks are all telling her this is normal and good. If, however, a government wants to decrease teenage pregnancy rates--as they typically do--then you walk a very fine line.
 If, as this evidence suggests, a strong driver of adolescent childbirth is the frequency of the occurrence of adolescent childbirth both within the greater community and within a girl’s proximal social network, the challenge for intervention strategies is to encourage norms that prevent adolescent childbirth without stigmatising those who have had an adolescent childbirth. Programmatic efforts to counter prevailing norms that limit a woman’s role to motherhood, and that support and encourage strong norms for girls’ education may play an important role in addressing this situation.
As is often the case, education is essential. They note later that education must also apply to the fathers--norms of positive and supportive fatherhood would also be beneficial in the case of pregnancy. Contraception, by the way, would also be nice, but perhaps next to impossible in some cultural contexts.


Wednesday, April 01, 2020

Review of Rob Neyer's Power Ball

Rob Neyer's Power Ball: Anatomy of a Modern Baseball Game (2018) is ostensibly about a game between the A's and Astros on September 8, 2017. That is just a vehicle for discussing the state of baseball itself and how much it has changed and continues to change. With chapters organized by half inning, Neyer follows tangents related to what's happening in the game (Baseball versus baseball) as this single real one goes along, and it's a fun and wandering journey.

So, for example, pitcher Jharel Cotton gets some ground balls hit back at him, which leads to a discussion of injury and headgear. Marwin Gonzalez coming up leads to analysis of utility players. Mention of Win Expectancy shifts to how broadcasters mention new stats without contextualizing them. Khris Davis coming up starts with his power and then moves to his writing about having the throwing yips and then on to players using social media. You get the idea.

And I love this quote toward the end about what might change in baseball.

All we know is that Baseball will do something, in response to something, and that whatever Baseball does, there will be unintended consequences. Because Baseball is inherently a human enterprise, and humans don't know any other way" (p. 272).
Baseball and U.S. foreign policy!

His conclusion is also a bit wandering, and comes down to the fact that everyone should think of ways to bring in more fans. But, I think, those ways will create new controversies that will require new tinkering. And that's not a bad thing. I loved reading his thoughts on them.

Just a few quibbles. There is a lot in italics. A lot. A noticeable large number of sentences start with "Hell" for emphasis. And ouch, he mentions Yuli Gurriel pitching for over a decade in Cuba yet having "essentially zero professional experience" (p. 80).

As an aside, there is an interesting Latin America question--the game has globalized a lot but why aren't there more Mexicans in MLB (p. 179)?


Thoughts on Trump's Transition Demands for Venezuela

Here is the text of the State Department's "Democratic Transition Framework for Venezuela." Some of it is highly specific, which would normally come as the result of negotiation. In this case, it is purely imposition. In that regard, it resembles the many Cuba "plans" that have been put together over the years, forgotten after the Cubans ignored them.

See David Smilde's Twitter thread on why it is likely to fail. It's about creating fissures in the regime and, as always, encouraging the military (including publicly once again). One of a number of problems are the new Manuel Noriega-styled drug indictments, which suddenly constrain what negotiations can even take place. You can't stop and say, "Oh, those drug charges were no big deal even though we harped on them for years so we're dropping them." You're locking in, and Maduro et al have visions of Panama and federal prison in their heads. That automatically reduces their interest to zero. Mike Pompeo and others might not care, assuming they're really just talking to the military anyway.

The overall strategy is to use the Coronavirus crisis to force regime change, to make life as bleak as possible so that the military will take action. If you're wondering, none of the points mention emigrants at all, and certainly not any U.S. action to help them.

Incidentally, Jorge Arreaza called it a "pseudo interventionist proposal of a tutelary government." It is indeed quite tutelary. And the U.S. doesn't have so many options after this--it has mostly emptied its policy gun. Mostly what they have left is repeated calls to the military.

1. Full return of all members of the National Assembly (AN); Supreme Court (TSJ) lifts order of contempt and restores all powers to the AN, including immunities for deputies; National Constituent Assembly (ANC) is dissolved. The U.S. lifts sanctions imposed on ANC members due to their membership in the ANC.

A carrot to members of the ANC.

2. All political prisoners are released immediately.

Pretty straightforward, though of course the government disputes what "political" exactly is.

3. All foreign security forces depart immediately unless authorized by 3/4 vote of the AN.

That's quite a supermajority. Is the Trump administration afraid too many in the opposition will want them to remain? I also have to wonder whether it assumes that U.S. troops don't count as "foreign."

4.  AN elects new National Electoral Council (CNE) and TSJ members who are acceptable to all parties or coalitions of parties representing 25% or more of AN membership. (This would give both the PSUV and the multi-party Guaidó coalition a veto over personnel for any of these posts.) Upon the selection of a new CNE and TSJ, the U.S. lifts sanctions imposed on former CNE and TSJ members due to their membership in those bodies.

A carrot for Maduro supporters, who can veto those they view as hostile. It's funny how they felt they needed to use parentheses to explain the rationale, which is not something they do anywhere else. See, see, it's a carrot!

5. AN approves “Council of State” Law, which creates a Council of State that becomes the executive branch. Each party or coalition of parties with 25% or more of AN membership selects two members of the Council of State, one of whom must be a state governor. The four members of the Council of State then select a fifth member, to be Secretary General, and who serves as Interim President until the elections and is not permitted to be a candidate for president in the elections.  Council members may not be members of the AN or TSJ. Decisions of the Council of State will be reached by majority vote. One member of the National Armed Forces of Venezuela (FANB) will serve as Military Adviser to the Council of State.

I guess if you are imposing rules, then you might as well tell them what laws to pass (with a high level of specificity). There's something quite Platt Amendmentish about this one. And there is a nod--albeit a formally powerless one--to the military.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think the "25%" rule effectively translates into two "pro-government" and two "pro-opposition." Assuming that's correct, I wonder how they would break a tie to find the fifth member.

6. All of the powers assigned to the President by the Constitution will be vested exclusively in the Council of State. The U.S. and the EU will lift sanctions on those who claimed Presidential authorities which were imposed due to their holding their previous positions once the Council of State is functioning and those individuals renounce any further claims to hold executive positions and acknowledge the Council of State as the exclusive executive power.

Who wrote this? The wording is terrible, but the idea is that you're OK if you claimed a position as long as you renounce it now. This read like writing by committee, where you wrangle and then everyone finally says, "Fine, fine, let's move on even though it sounds bad."

7. Once the Council of State is established and foreign security forces have departed (unless approved by 3/4 vote at the AN), U.S. sanctions on the Government of Venezuela, PDVSA, and the oil sector are suspended.

I will let you determine where the fine line is between deal making and extortion.

8. Council of State appoints new cabinet. The U.S. lifts sanctions on former cabinet members due to their holding their previous positions. The U.S. also lifts sanctions on members of the FANB that are based on their position in the institution.

A key detail here is "position in the institution," which means you are still a target if the U.S. government specifically deemed you one.

9. The international community provides humanitarian, electoral, governance, development, security, and economic support, with special initial focus on medical care system, water and electricity supply. Existing social welfare programs, now to be supplemented with international support, must become equally accessible to all Venezuelan citizens. Negotiations begin with World Bank, IMF, and Inter-American Development Bank for major programs of support.

This makes me think of George W. Bush's Committee for Assistance to a Free Cuba, which involved the U.S. government and private industry getting involved in every aspect of Cuban economic development in a hypothetical post-transition period. The "international community" will be overwhelmingly U.S., of course, and U.S. business will be right there. That's an underlying assumption of any deal.

10. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission is established with the task of investigating serious acts of violence that occurred since 1999, and reports to the nation on the responsibilities of perpetrators and the rehabilitation of victims and their families. The Commission has five members, who are selected by the Secretary General of the United Nations with the consent of the Council of State. The AN adopts amnesty law consistent with Venezuela’s international obligations, covering politically motivated crimes since 1999 except for crimes against humanity. Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru withdraw support for the International Criminal Court referral.

Hmm. This sounds a bit like Chile, though in Chile names were not named. The idea, though, is that you have a commission that comes to conclusions that cannot actually be prosecuted. There is a caveat, though, about "crimes against humanity." That seems like a fairly gaping hole to me, and would be interpreted by all senior members of the government as something they would likely be found guilty of (and they would probably believe they'd be found guilty for political reasons).

11. The Council of State sets a date for simultaneous Presidential and AN elections in 6-12 months. Any Venezuelan citizen eligible in accordance with the 1999 Constitution can compete in the election.

Another carrot, to allow any Chavista to run, probably on the assumption they would lose anyway in a free election.

12. Presidential and AN elections are held. With a consensus of international observers that elections were free and fair, remaining U.S. sanctions are lifted.

This sounds identical to Helms-Burton.

13. Bi-partisan commission within the AN is developed to create long term solutions to rehabilitating the economy and refinancing the debt.

This one seems aimed entirely at getting the Russians and Chinese out of Venezuela and shifting it back to international institutions the U.S. helps direct. Otherwise it's unnecessary--do you think such a body would not address the economy and debt immediately? The U.S. just wants it done in a way that reasserts U.S. economic hegemony.


1. The military high command (Defense Minister, Vice Defense Minister, CEOFANB Commander, and Service Chiefs) remains in place for the duration of the transitional government.

You gotta throw a bone to the military, a little incentive to push and make this whole thing happen. María Puerto-Riera summarizes that nicely in a tweet.

2. State or local authorities remain in place for the duration of the transitional period.

What happens to state and local authorities afterward is not addressed. #12 looks only at the national level.


Monday, March 30, 2020

Podcasting Latin American Civil-Military Relations

Over at the Washington Office on Latin America podcast, I talked with Adam Isacson about Latin American civil-military relations. I thought we had a nice, if not exactly uplifting, chat.

One point that came up that in my opinion merits more attention is the use of social media. Latest example: when the U.S. imposed sanctions on Nicolás Maduro and others, there was quickly a tweet of army support. It's just an assumed response at this point.

Also, we recorded on Friday afternoon in our respective homes and had a beer as we talked. I'd never had a beer while podcasting and I recommend it.


Saturday, March 28, 2020

NC Republicans Say We Need Mexican Immigrants

Unemployment claims recently hit record levels at both the national and state levels. People need jobs. This would be the time when they would work in agriculture, right? It's steady work and easy to find. Right?


North Carolina conservatives successfully called on the federal government to unfreeze visa restrictions for immigrant workers. There is, in fact, a "labor shortage" at the a time of rapidly rising unemployment. There can be no better proof that there is no "stealing" of jobs going on here. Americans would rather be unemployed than work in agriculture.

Not only that, but immigrants are--as the Republican lawmakers say--an essential part of this country's food supply chain. I would think that would put them in an exalted category, something to be honored. Right?


Thursday, March 26, 2020

Covid-19 and Latin American Multilateralism

Mac Margolis has a thoughtful article on Covid-19 and multilateralism in Latin America. Right now governments are closing their borders precisely at a time when they need to join together to address this common threat. Alone they can't do it effectively. Regional institutions now are so ideology-based that governments move in and out of them, thus rendering them weak.

I agree with his assessment, but he does not mention one serious obstacle: the United States. We are already seeing a problem with Venezuela going to the IMF (which itself is quite amazing) because the U.S. insists only Juan Guaidó can do that. The Trump administration also has opposed UN and OAS efforts to combat corruption in Central America. The "America First" approach is built upon a paranoia of the multilateral institutions that Latin America needs.

Latin America already has a long history of failed attempts at multilateralism and unity. Hugo Chávez's latest version was founded on oil money and ideology and now is in tatters. It's always been an uphill climb, and now it's worse. It's like someone pushing back against Sisyphus, whose already carrying the damned rock.


Wednesday, March 25, 2020

Covid-19 and Latin American Militaries

Long before Covid-19, Latin American militaries were once again taking prominent places in politics. Sometimes this was clearly antithetical to democracy (as in Bolivia and El Salvador) and other times just a mixing of military and police functions (as in Chile) that might have negative long-term impacts.

And now the pandemic has put the military on the front lines and in large numbers. Some recent examples:

Argentina: the army is building hospitals.

Bolivia: on the streets to enforce quarantine.

Brazil: an operations center for soldiers to deal with airports, ports, borders, etc.

Chile: over 20,000 soldiers deployed to enforce curfew.

Ecuador: deployment in Guayas province (not sure if elsewhere) where there have been a lot of cases.

El Salvador: enforcing the quarantine.

Mexico: mobilization of upwards of 250,000 soldiers for a variety of purposes.

Peru: military patrols (and one dead).

Using the military in a time of natural disaster is neither unusual nor, on its face, alarming. A big difference with the current crisis is that the duration. Like it or not, a major military presence in major Latin American cities for months might well become normalized. That's not a healthy combination with presidents--Bukele comes to mind, of course--who have already shown a proclivity for using the military as a political weapon.


Tuesday, March 24, 2020

How Long Can A Crazy President Stay Popular?

Mother Jones, not exactly a fan of Donald Trump, has an article explaining why AMLO is even worse when it comes to responding to the coronavirus. Trump seems to teeter between acceptance and denial, focused as always on whether he is being praised. AMLO is squarely in denial, even as his own executive branch takes actions. For AMLO, "phase 1" of the pandemic actually means "spread it even more!"

“Don’t stop going out—we’re still only in phase one,” López Obrador said. “If you have the means to do it, continue taking your family out to restaurants and diners. That’s what will strengthen the economy.” 
This brings me to a question I've had ever since he took office: how long can he stay popular? Misstep after misstep, combined with total obeisance to Trump, left me convinced that his high approval ratings were going to crash at some point. And yet here he is. The late February numbers clearly showed a decline, with 59% approval and 35% disapproving. Those numbers, of course, do not reflect the intensity of the crisis. But those aren't bad at all. A drop, yes, but keeping up at 70-80% is rare. In Latin America, staying above 50% is practically a miracle.

This is Teflon that even Ronald Reagan would be envious of. I won't even bother predicting what the March numbers will look like. I mean, Trump himself has solid approval for how he's handled the crisis despite a host of bad decisions and contradictions. We live in strange times.

UPDATE: literally minutes after publishing, here is a poll showing 37% approval vs. 45% disapproval for how AMLO is handling the crisis. That is not the same as overall approval--let's see if that crashed or not as a result.


Monday, March 23, 2020

Home For The Semester

Like millions, I am home indefinitely. I am extraordinarily lucky, being salaried and tenured, stocked with food in a home with my favorite people. My job right now is to help keep the College of Liberal Arts & Sciences going--there are both knowns and unknowns in that regard. At the moment, my interactions are through emails, WebEx, and Skype. I am glad for meetings just to remind me that specific days and times still actually exist.

This is tough on faculty and students alike, and I feel terrible for graduating seniors who can't savor their accomplishment as much as they deserve. My own son is a graduating high school senior and he is just seeing the year sort of fizzle out.

The idea that someone in authority is even floating the possibility of 30% unemployment is terrifying. Our national leadership is weak, which is deeply frustrating, though at least the governors are stepping up. We need testing and it's not coming nearly quickly enough, which is also deeply frustrating. People are panic buying, which is bad for everyone. Those without health insurance and the growing number of unemployed are facing eviction and hunger without intervention.

The Latin American response to the crisis transcends ideology, with AMLO and Bolsonaro leading the way in being buffoons in denial on different ends of the spectrum, though at least Brazil's governors are also picking up the slack. People in favelas don't have access to clean water or hand sanitizer, yet their president mocks the whole thing. Nicolás Maduro is taking it seriously, but so many years of incompetence and corruption leave the entire population--not to mention emigrants abroad--terribly vulnerable. There is better leadership elsewhere, like Martín Vizcarra in Peru and others (Boz has some interesting charts on Latin American spread of the virus). But we are learning what can happen when you vote just to "kick the bums out" and then a crisis hits.

In my own small slice of the world, there are positive things to focus on as well. People are trying to help those who can't get out, help local businesses, share tips on online teaching, share info on where to find essential goods (stop buying massive amounts of toilet paper!) and just trying to spread some humor. Sometimes there's not much else you can do.


Saturday, March 21, 2020

Joe McGinniss' The Selling of the President 1968

Trapped in our homes by the coronavirus, now more than ever is a time for reading. It has actually been slower than I anticipated because I've been too tempted to keep up with the constantly changing news. But we need something else to occupy us. As The Police said, "When the world is running down/You make the best of what's still around."

At the last UNC Charlotte library sale, I picked up Joe McGinniss' The Selling of the President 1968. I went through a serious Nixon period in the early 1990s as the anniversary of his resignation neared, and read a ton on him and Watergate, and that interest never went away. This book is a breezily written and entertaining account of how consultants used TV to transform an often unlikable candidate into a winning image, devoid of substance but full of nostalgia. It's also depressing, because you can see how vacuity became a political goal.

As one of the filmmakers hired to do some commercials said, "Nixon has not only developed the use of the platitude, he's raised it to an art form. It's mashed potatoes. It appeals to the lowest common denominator of American taste. It's a farce, a delicious farce, self-deception carried to the nth degree" (115).

Hostility toward the common person was evident. You wanted enough "Negroes" in ads or staged events, but definitely not more than one because you would offend the "Yahoo belt" of the South. And they wondered why they were unwelcome in Harlem. They didn't even want to advertise with college students--it might offend people. Roger Ailes (only 28 at the time) plays a big role and is as offensive as you would expect, with references to "broads" and the like.

Hostility toward the press undergirded the entire effort, precisely as Twitter does now for Donald Trump. The leftist press would never give Nixon a fair shake, so TV gave him the opportunity to do things his way without their filter. More precisely, he could appeal to people's worst instincts without interference.

Overall there was, as one consultant put it, "the basic problem of Nixon's personality" (161). The whole point was to avoid showing the real him. McGinniss closes with the funny irony that Nixon believed that image didn't matter at all.


Thursday, March 12, 2020

Nicaraguan Emigration

We have heard a lot about Venezuelan emigration, but the UNHCR reminds us that the problem is increasing in Nicaragua, for a similar reason: a corrupt and incompetent authoritarian government.
Nearly two years after Nicaragua was plunged into a serious political and social crisis, more than 100,000 people have fled reported persecution and human rights abuses in the country, seeking asylum abroad. 
Even after the initial surge of violence in April 2018 subsided, Nicaraguan students, human rights defenders, journalists and farmers continue to flee their country at an average rate of 4,000 people every month. With no resolution to the internal crisis in sight, UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, expects these numbers to grow.
The rapid spread of the coronavirus makes all refugees more vulnerable to illness, with no infrastructure to help them. The majority of Nicaraguans are going to Costa Rica, which can barely handle healthy migrants, much less ones stricken with the virus.

U.S. attention, and the attention of all governments, is elsewhere, so this will get worse.


Wednesday, March 11, 2020

Review of You Never Forget Your First

I read Alexis Coe's recently published You Never Forget Your First: A Biography of George Washington. Several things attracted me to it: it was written by a woman, which is rare for Washington biographies; it intentionally looked at his less-great qualities in order to humanize him; and it had an informal tone (for example, with an irreverent epigraph and early on a discussion of the crazy names he gave his dogs). What you end up with is a highly readable and illuminating book that helps us see him as a human being.

Doing so doesn't detract from his obviously critical role in the creation and preservation of the United States. I would say she has great respect for him but not reverence. You can also respect someone while noting the ways in which they are imperfect. Washington was already being put on a pedestal while he lived and we all imbibe that in U.S. schools.

I do feel like the book became more formal/traditional as it went on. She makes the case for calling Mount Vernon a "forced-labor camp" rather than a "plantation" (p. 43) but then uses the word "plantation" many times thereafter. The profane epigraph finds no match elsewhere in the book. At the same time, she pulls no punches about his attitudes toward his slaves or his thin-skinned reactions to political opponents. The latter contributes to our understanding of why he famously stopped after two terms. He was sick of the constant attacks on him by anonymous authors who he generally believed to be Thomas Jefferson and accomplices.

I enjoyed the book which, as Coe herself points out, isn't intended to be a massive brick of 900 pages full of detail, and I recommend it.


Sunday, March 08, 2020


I have just returned from the 2020 meeting of the Southeastern Council of Latin American Studies, which was in Austin. It went really well, with great panels in a cool city. I ate a lot of tacos and did a lot of running on the path along the river. There were people meeting to run almost every morning. My friend and History colleague Steven Hyland at Wingate University is a master at putting it together. It's a welcoming atmosphere, with a lot of opportunities for graduate students and faculty to chat about professional development.

The 2021 meeting will be in New Orleans, so start thinking about it. The exact date is not set but almost certainly in March. You should come.


Wednesday, March 04, 2020

Avocados Are Not Blood Diamonds

Ioan Grillo has an op-ed in The New York Times about Mexican avocados and violence. In short, they are not the new blood diamond.
After covering Mexico’s drug violence since 2001, I think it is extremely misguided to advocate boycotting avocados to fight cartels. When industrious growers are shaken down by gangsters it is crazy to hit them in their wallets again. We need to pressure Mexican security forces to stop extortion, not punish businesses. 
“It’s not a problem limited to one commodity,” said Falko Ernst, senior analyst for Mexico at the international Crisis Group. “A boycott (of avocados) would drag down thousands of hardworking families that have done nothing wrong.”
I got the same vibe from Nathaniel Flannery's book on Mexico as well, which I reviewed in January. Growers are trying to figure out ways to protect themselves and work hard to make their avocados fit the strict requirements of the United States government. Choosing not to buy their product will hurt them badly and destroy local economies.

He ends by saying a more important issue is stemming the flow of U.S. guns into Mexico. But I would add exploring ways to help Mexico build institutional capacity. A monstrously huge task, obviously, but at least one that does not attack farmers.


Tuesday, March 03, 2020

Publication as Historical Document

As it does periodically, the UNC Charlotte university recently held a book sale for books being withdrawn, and like many other people I cannot resist. I picked up Samuel Flagg Bemis' A Diplomatic History of the United States, 4th edition, published in 1955. Bemis is the historian who published a widely and long-used textbook on U.S. policy toward Latin America, which I blogged about years ago when I was writing my own. Among other things, it's openly (like, really openly) pro-imperialist.

When you think of the countless readers of these volumes, highly educated, male, and white people who would likely go on to be influential in any number of ways, you can see how ingrained bad history could become.

So, for example, at the end of the Latin America section, Bemis writes that "totalitarianism, the shape of international communism, succeeded in intruding itself openly into Guatemala, and covertly into other states and colonies of the Western Hemisphere, without the American republics being yet willing to resort to more than empty words" (p. 786). However, "a successful anticommunist revolution in Guatemala temporarily eased the situation."

This is factually incorrect and a bad interpretation to boot, but there would be no way for anyone (if they happened to be inclined) to know that. Fortunately, that is not true anymore. I've been thinking about how what we write becomes a historical document on its own. So in 50 years, someone writing about U.S.-Latin American relations may take a look at my own textbook and point out how my interpretations reflected the era I lived in, perhaps in ways I've never even considered.


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