I am an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. I am the editor of the academic journal The Latin Americanist.
Roberto Micheletti has one key goal at the moment, which is to ensure that Mel Zelaya does not re-enter Honduras for as long as possible. Every day that goes by is one more that the world might start losing interest and there will be less and less pressure to ever prove the allegations they make.
After successfully blocking the runway, Micheletti then announced that he was willing to have a dialogue with the OAS, which gives him at least a day or two more of breathing room. As is now the norm, however, with either Insulza or Micheletti, the willingness to talk was accompanied by conditions the other side would immediately reject. In fact, Micheletti rejected "negotiation," as he did not need to negotiate with anyone but the Honduran people.
Faced with thousands of people marching in Zelaya's favor, the only response is that they must be financed.
As this case gets stranger and stranger, we await to see exactly where Mel Zelaya's plane lands. The Honduran authorities say it will be El Salvador.
I have been trying unsuccessfully to think of another Latin American case where a president was overthrown, and then kept trying to come back while the new government was truly desperate to ensure that said president could not re-enter the country to be arrested and tried. Indeed, one curious aspect of this crisis is the strong intent never to allow any sort of trial to take place.
At least in (relatively) recent memory, when a president is overthrown the most common outcome is that he/she flees or is granted safe passage through the intervention of other countries (Salvador Allende's death in 1973 is an exception). From a variety of ideological positions, Jacobo Arbenz appealed to Mexico in 1954, Juan Perón barely escaped with his life in 1955, Joao Goulart headed to Uruguay in 1964, and Anastasio Somoza bounced from Miami to Paraguay in 1979.
None of them said, "Hey, I am going back right now!"
Zelaya appears still to have enough confidence in Honduran institutions that he feels returning to the country can result in some outcome he will accept. I do not want to stretch, but this is a positive sign--at the very least, I would think it means he does not think he will be summarily killed, which with many coups is a real and legitimate fear.
But it also highlights the fact that, despite the many charges (I believe eighteen, at last count) levied against Zelaya, the coup government really does not want to proceed with formal charges against him. I agree that avoiding bloodshed is critical, but certain guarantees could be made that would avoid a massive confrontation at the airport once Zelaya arrived.
After much speculation about timing, according to the Miami Herald Zelaya will be returning to Honduras this afternoon. Without providing sources, the article also suggests that no other president will go with him, and Insulza might not either. If that is true, I don't know what changed--Rafael Correa had previously confirmed he was going, adding melodramatically that Honduras "would be a good place to die."
At this point it is a game of chicken, and something will have to give. The coup government, along with the Catholic Church, has made very clear that they want to start pretending that Zelaya never existed. Have new presidential elections and start believing they dreamed it all.
We can only hope there is more discussion going on behind the scenes than is being reported.
Update: La Prensa'sTwitter page says television stations have announced that Zelaya will go to El Salvador, not Honduras. There is just no way of predicting what will happen from one moment to the next.
Through Cardinal Oscar Rodríguez, the Catholic Church in Honduras has issued a statement about the crisis (only in Spanish). It concludes that no coup occurred, that Zelaya should not return to the country, and that the presidential elections should not be moved up.
It does call for dialogue where everyone listens calmly to each other, but given the above I am not quite sure what the basis would be for dialogue. It is rather like the flip side of Insulza traveling to Honduras to talk while saying beforehand that he wouldn't negotiate.
One of the more interesting developments of the past day or so is the redefinition of "unilateral," which is also mentioned in the statement. If every single country in the world is united against a particular action, it is "unilateral."
Roberto Micheletti wasn't too happy after José Miguel Insulza's trip to Honduras, which was intended primarily as a finger-wagging exercise. So he announced Honduras is pulling out of the OAS (As boz notes, Micheletti actually is doing what Chávez kept saying he would do). Oddly enough, he was angry about the "unilateral" nature of the multilateral organization. Insulzia was, however, given a large number of documents so maybe for the first time we can actually discover the precise wording of the accusations and orders.
Apparently not noting the irony, the president of the Colegio de Abogados in Honduras said he believed Honduras should have the right to defend itself against the OAS charges.
For the past few days, the Honduran military has been surprisingly forthcoming. It is not terribly common for top military brass to admit to criminal wrongdoing, yet now they have. As I noted yesterday, it was entirely illegal to remove Zelaya from the country, and the military's lawyer now acknowledges that fact (h/t Steven Taylor). That's good.
But there is more to Colonel Bayardo's interview.
First, no one knows why no one ever considered even taking Zelaya to court. The decision to get him out of the country was a last minute one taken by the military authorities. The civilian authorities seem to have had no idea what they were doing, and allowed the military to do whatever it wanted. The Attorney General's office has to launch an investigation to even know why a trial was not considered.
This week, Deputy Attorney General Roy David Urtecho told reporters that he launched an investigation into why Zelaya was removed by force instead of taken to court.
Thus, the argument that normal institutional channels were followed is really unraveling.
Second, Bayardo says he (and many other officers) did not like Zelaya only because he was leftist, making reference to the Cold War.
''We fought the subversive movements here and we were the only country that did not have a fratricidal war like the others,'' he said. ``It would be difficult for us, with our training, to have a relationship with a leftist government. That's impossible. I personally would have retired, because my thinking, my principles, would not have allowed me to participate in that.''
So all these years later, "leftist" is still seen as synonymous with "subversive," despite elections.
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Roberto Micheletti says he is willing to discuss holding early presidential elections as part of a political solution (see Eric Farnsworth at Americas Quarterly for a discussion about that possibility).
This is not as simple as it sounds, because the OAS would play a central role, yet the OAS itself has stipulated unequivocally that Zelaya must be returned to the presidency. So who would be in charge until the new elections were held? If not Zelaya, then the OAS tossed its entire resolution out the window.
Further, Insulza is going to Honduras today, but insists he will not meet with Micheletti or negotiate at all. Yet he must know there has to be some sort of negotiation because no one (not even Chavez, no matter what he says) will use force to re-install Zelaya.
After quite a few posts and many comments on this blog, not to mention countless articles and blog posts elsewhere, many of them contradictory, several key points have started to stick in my mind about the coup in Honduras.
1. According to the constitution, taking Zelaya out of the country was illegal. Period.
2. Zelaya is charged with trying to amend the constitution to allow re-election of the president (which would be illegal), yet no one has ever provided evidence to that effect. It is illegal to amend seven particular parts of the constitution, but the wording of the proposed vote did not mention any of them.
I do not care if you are positive he wanted to, as that does not constitute evidence. He said before the coup that he would leave office in 2010. Maybe he was lying, maybe not. But it deserves more investigation before overthrowing him. Ousting a president requires more than just assumptions about intent.
3. At various times, commenters have mentioned Venezuela as intruding (such as with the plebiscite materials) but I have never seen the Supreme Court or Attorney General mention evidence.* Until I do, I think Venezuela is irrelevant. That Zelaya liked Hugo Chavez is not relevant to his standing as president. That Chavez says ridiculous things about invasion is not relevant to Zelaya's case either.
4. Zelaya was unpopular (even with his own party) and many people in Honduras are glad he's gone. This is irrelevant to the law. Surprisingly, I have not yet seen anyone make an argument for how a parliamentary system might have mediated the situation better--Honduran political institutions are so weak it might not have mattered.
As I've discussed, calling Honduras a "military coup" entails cutting off aid. Now the U.S. has decided to "hit the pause button" on the funding that would be cut off. The buzzword these days seems to be "pause" as a warning before the "cut."
MR. KELLY: Yeah, I do have an update for you on that if you’ll just hold on a second.
The legal review is ongoing. We’re trying to determine if Section 7008 of the Foreign Assistance Act must be applied. In the meantime, we’ve taken some actions to hit the pause button, let’s say, on assistance programs that we would be legally required to terminate if it is determined – if the events of June 28 are determined to have been, as defined – I’m sounding more and more like a lawyer here – as defined, under the Section 7008 of the Foreign Assistance Act, as defined as a military coup.
I also want to emphasize, though, that we’re continuing assistance programs that would not be subject to legal determination – I’m sorry, to legal termination, and this is in order to continue to help the Honduran people. And of course, these programs include democracy assistance and humanitarian programs, which of course would be excluded under this particular section of the Foreign Assistance Act.
QUESTION: Would you say that this pause button applies to most of the aid that we would normally be providing them, or any idea?
MR. KELLY: You know, I think that’s fair to say, yeah. But I don’t have a dollar figure.
The U.S. is putting off any decision about cutting aid to Honduras until Monday.
"We will wait until the secretary-general has finished his diplomatic initiative and reports back ... on July 6 before we take any further action in relationship to assistance," a senior Obama administration official told reporters.
"We think that President Zelaya's decision to postpone his earlier decision to return to Honduras on Thursday was a wise one," the official added, saying it was important to give the OAS time to craft a solution so Zelaya can return peacefully.
My first impression is that this could very well ease Zelaya's arrival on Saturday. It is a public warning that aid may well be suspended if things go badly over the weekend. Like if the Honduran police tackle Cristina Fernandez and Rafael Correa in order to grab Mel Zelaya. It is also a signal that the U.S. likes how Zelaya has responded thus far, and expects Micheletti to be nice too.
U.S. aid is contingent on whether or not a coup is a "military coup." So we have this wording from a "Senior Administration Official." The funny thing is that he/she even reverts to Spanish ("golpe de estado") to avoid the term "military coup." Then it's all diplomatic dance.
QUESTION: And so this is properly classified as a military coup?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Well, I mean, it’s a golpe de estado. The military moved against the president; they removed him from his home and they expelled him from a country, so the military participated in a coup. However, the transfer of leadership was not a military action. The transfer of leadership was done by the Honduran congress, and therefore the coup, while it had a military component, it has a larger – it is a larger event.
Then later:
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: In regard to the coup itself, I think it would just – it would be best to say that this was a coordinated effort between the military and some civilian political actors. Obviously, the military was the entity that conducted the forcible removal of the president and has acted as the securer of public order during this process. But for the coup to become more than an insurrection or a rebellion, you have to have an effort to transfer power. And in that regard, the congress – the congress’s decision to swear in its president, Micheletti, as the president of Honduras indicates that the congress and key members of that congress played an important role in this coup.
In my last post, I asked about the rushed decision to take Zelaya out of the country and whether it was legal--the constitution answers my question. Otto at Inca Kola News notes a legal action in favor of Zelaya based especially on Article 81:
Toda persona tiene derecho a circular libremente, salir, entrar y permanecer en el territorio nacional.
Every person has the right to circulate freely, leave, enter, and remain in the national territory.
Also Article 102:
Ningún hondureño podrá ser expatriado ni entregado por las autoridades a un Estado extranjero.
No Honduran can be expatriated or handed over by the authorities to a foreign state.
Yesterday I mentioned an interview with the army commander, and now the army's lawyer, Colonel Bayardo, is also talking. But he raises more questions than he answers. For example:
We said, ‘Sir, we have a judicial order to detain you.’
And
At about 11 p.m. Saturday, the detention order reached the army’s top command, Colonel Bayardo said. It was carried out early the next morning.
The interview keeps mentioning "detention." If that was the case, under whose authority was his presidency stripped? The arrest and the sentence were done simultaneously.
Like the army commander, Bayardo says Zelaya was taken out of the country to avoid more bloodshed. But was it legal to do so? Bayardo says it was a "last minute decision," which suggests the law was not necessarily paramount.
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Here is the relevant part of the latest OAS resolution on Honduras.
RESOLVES:
To condemn vehemently the coup d’état staged against the constitutionally established Government of Honduras, and the arbitrary detention and expulsion from the country of the constitutional president José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, which has produced an unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order.
To reaffirm that President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales is the constitutional President of Honduras and to demand the immediate, safe, and unconditional return of the President to his constitutional functions.
To declare that no government arising from this unconstitutional interruption will be recognized, and to reaffirm that the representatives designated by the constitutional and legitimate government of President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales are the representatives of the HonduranState to the Organization of American States.
To instruct the Secretary General to undertake, together with representatives of various countries, diplomatic initiatives aimed at restoring democracy and the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, pursuant to Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and report to the Special General Assembly on the results of the initiatives. Should these prove unsuccessful within 72 hours, the Special General Assembly shall forthwith invoke Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter to suspend Honduras’ membership.
To extend this special session of the General Assembly until July 6, 2009.
Meanwhile Micheletti says Zelaya cannot return to the presidency. Europe is also getting involved, as Spain has withdrawn its ambassador.
Everyone is digging in, but something will have give at some point.
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Spiriting Zelaya out of Honduras has turned out to be a bad move. Perhaps more than any other single action, it screams out "coup" (though storming his house is right up there). Army General Romeo Vasquez, who was in charge of the operation (despite being officially fired), has an interesting take. He actually says he likes Zelaya personally, and claims taking him out of the country was intended to avoid bloodshed:
''He is an excellent boss. He is a good person. I tried to have a friendship with him, but the friendship ends with duty,'' Vásquez said. "We had to get him out of the area to avoid worse things. We felt that if he stayed here, worse things were going to happen and there would be bloodshed.
I've studied the Latin Americna military for a long time. I do not remember any general making such a statement, discussing personal friendship alongside his perceived duty as he overthrew him. It is another unusual part of a highly unusual story.
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The question of whether to call the situation in Honduras a coup keeps popping up. In comments to a previous post, Matthew Shugart mentioned seeing the importance of the term "military coup." The specific wording comes from section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriation Act (see here for a U.S. embassy site discussing it). Anyone can call it a coup, which makes no difference. Apparently adding "military" is the key. I suppose someone could argue it is not a "military" coup if the military does not rule, even if the military was responsible for the physical act of overthrowing the president.
"None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree: Provided, That assistance may be resumed to such government if the President determines and certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that subsequent to the termination of assistance a democratically elected government has taken office: Provided further, That the provisions of this section shall not apply to assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes: Provided further, That funds made available pursuant to the previous provisos shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations."
The World Bank has announced it has "paused" its lending to Honduras. In these situations, especially with Honduras' weak economy, money talks, though the amount involved ($80 million for development projects this fiscal year) may not hurt the coup government. Notably, the U.S. government has not initiated any such "pause."
The "replacement government" (the BBC puts it nicely) has said that Zelaya will be jailed if he returns to Honduras, as he says he will on Thursday. If that is the case, why was he not simply jailed on Sunday? There is still no evidence of any legal avenue for forcibly exiling him.
President Zelaya is scheduled to address the UN General Assembly today at 11 a.m. EST. Let's see what tone he strikes. Right now he has everyone condemning the coup, but he needs to maintain that support, so he has to strike a balance between showing outrage while not being inflammatory.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, let me first of all speak about the coup in Honduras, because this was a topic of conversation between myself and President Uribe.
All of us have great concerns about what's taken place there. President Zelaya was democratically elected. He had not yet completed his term. We believe that the coup was not legal and that President Zelaya remains the President of Honduras, the democratically elected President there. In that we have joined all the countries in the region, including Colombia and the Organization of American States.
I think it's -- it would be a terrible precedent if we start moving backwards into the era in which we are seeing military coups as a means of political transition rather than democratic elections. The region has made enormous progress over the last 20 years in establishing democratic traditions in Central America and Latin America. We don't want to go back to a dark past. The United States has not always stood as it should with some of these fledgling democracies, but over the last several years, I think both Republicans and Democrats in the United States have recognized that we always want to stand with democracy, even if the results don't always mean that the leaders of those countries are favorable towards the United States. And that is a tradition that we want to continue.
So we are very clear about the fact that President Zelaya is the democratically elected President, and we will work with the regional organizations like OAS and with other international institutions to see if we can resolve this in a peaceful way.
It is nice at least that he openly calls it a coup, and is clear about not recognizing any other government.
The U.S. has been careful not to call for Zelaya's return, however, which keeps the options open for some sort of negotiated solution that does not involve him remaining president. It is very hard to see how that work in practice. Update--see comments, as this is not accurate.Read more...
Ousted President Manuel Zelaya says he wants to return to Honduras this week accompanied by the head of the Organization of American States.
Zelaya says he will accept an offer by OAS Secretary-General Jose Miguel Insulza to return to the Central America country with him. Zelaya says he wants to make the trip Thursday.
He spoke Monday in Nicaragua during a meeting of Latin American leaders to discuss Sunday's coup in Honduras.
Insulza had made the offer moments before Zelaya spoke.
Now this would be interesting. Obviously Zelaya would claim to return as president, whereas the powers that be in Honduras claim him as ex-president. Not sure how Insulza would navigate that...
Roberto Micheletti and other coup supporters insist everything was legal. If their actions could be deemed legal by virtue of specific laws, that would bolster their assertion that Zelaya's removal was legitimate. Yet the coup is now about 36 hours old, and to my knowledge no one has explained what law was followed, who issued the court order for picking up Zelaya and flying him out of the country, and what legal basis the new government has for remaining in power until the next presidential election.
“We can’t accept or recognize any government other than Zelaya’s,” Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva said in his weekly radio program today. “If Honduras doesn’t reverse its position, then it’s going to be totally isolated in the middle of an enormous contingent of democracies.”
That could start having practical consequences in terms of trade, investment, participation in international organizations, etc.
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Not surprisingly, there are protests in Tegulcigalpa, and roadblocks. The longer this government insists on remaining in power, the more likely it is that violence will ensue.
So can the OAS do anything useful? Let's see. Chris Sabatini at Americas Quarterly has a good post on the topic, concluding with:
In the case of Honduras, President Zelaya passed over the head of the Congress to call for vote on June 28 that would have allowed a national referendum in October on a series of unspecified-constitutional reforms, including the removal of term limits to allow him to run for re-election. President Zelaya’s plan was constitutionally questionable from the beginning, bypassing the Congress and opposed by the Supreme Court. When the head of the army expressed his disapproval he was removed, even though the Supreme Court called for his restoration.
Each of these actions to tear down checks and balances and consolidate executive power should—in theory—have triggered the consideration of the OAS under the Democratic Charter. But they didn’t. And now we’re left with an OAS that is—rightly—condemning a coup that could have possibly been averted and forced to call for the return of a President who himself had done little to respect his own constitution.
So what does Honduran law say about what Congress and the courts should have done if they believed Zelaya was breaking the law? (I mean, besides kidnapping him in his pajamas.)
The answer is not clear--both Matthew Shugart and Steven Taylor take a look, and get to the point of finding reference to a decree that derogated a relevant part of the constitution, but they cannot find the text of the decree in question. I can't either, and now a Google search for the text of the decree brings up Steven's post that he can't find it!
Here is the constitution itself. I have been critical of the constant constitution writing/amending in Latin America, but I must say this one is ripe for rethinking. It is one of the most confusing constitutions I have read.
So how long will the Micheletti government exist? The OAS makes clear that no one will recognize him and that Zelaya must be returned to office:
REITERATING the principles established in the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter on the strengthening and preservation of the democratic institutional system in member states, andRECALLING CP/RES. 952 (1699/09) of June 26, 2009, relative to the situation in Honduras,RESOLVES:
1. To condemn vehemently the coup d’état staged this morning against the constitutionally-established Government of Honduras, and the arbitrary detention and expulsion from the country of the constitutional president José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, which has produced an unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order.
2. To demand the immediate, safe and unconditional return of President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales to his constitutional functions.
3. To declare that no government arising from this unconstitutional interruption will be recognized.
According to the Guardian, U.S. officials are working to get Zelaya back into the presidency and believe there will be consensus in the OAS to say the coup "cannot stand."
President Barack Obama called Sunday for "all political and social actors in Honduras to respect democratic norms, the rule of law and the tenets of the Inter-American Democratic Charter" as the Central American crisis unfolded.
For those conditions to be met, Zelaya must be returned to power, U.S. officials said.
Knowing trouble was brewing in Honduras over several weeks, the Obama administration warned power players there, including the armed forces, that the United States and other nations in the Americas would not support or abide a coup, officials said. They said Honduran military leaders stopped taking their calls.
Diplomatic recognition is now one of the obstacles to the proclaimed presidency of Ricardo Micheletti. As yet, no government has recognized him as legitimate, and condemnation has been the norm. I would be shocked if any Latin American government recognized him, which means his chances of remaining in power very long are not good.
Check out Laura Carlsen from the Center for International Policy live blogging about the OAS discussion of the Honduran coup at The Huffington Post. For example:
* Roberto Micheletti has been sworn into office as president by the military coup. * OAS countries refuse to recognize him or to negotiate in any form with coup leaders. * OAS countries issue calls for the immediate return and reinstatement of President Manuel Zelaya in his legitimate functions.
Secretary General Insulza reports that Cuban, Nicaraguan and Venezuelan ambassadors attempted to accompany Honduran Foreign Minister when she was forcibly abducted by military coup leaders, but were violently pushed away from the vehicle. They are not being held captive. As others discuss diplomatic actions--clearly needed and appropriate--these ambassadors provided a lesson in real solidarity, by putting their own lives on the line.
As far as I can tell, this coup has no support anywhere. I cannot imagine any government recognizing Micheletti.
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Short and sweet from Hillary Clinton. I am glad to see this type of response and hope the administration is working from behind the scenes to put pressure on the coup participants. It makes no difference what you think of Zelaya--no freely elected president should be overthrown.
The action taken against Honduran President Mel Zelaya violates the precepts of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and thus should be condemned by all. We call on all parties in Honduras to respect the constitutional order and the rule of law, to reaffirm their democratic vocation, and to commit themselves to resolve political disputes peacefully and through dialogue. Honduras must embrace the very principles of democracy we reaffirmed at the OAS meeting it hosted less than one month ago.
UPDATE: From the BBC, Zelaya said in an interview that he knew of a plot against him, which was foiled only because the U.S. embassy refused to back it:
In an interview with Spain's El Pais newspaper published on Sunday, Mr Zelaya said a plot to topple him had been thwarted after the US refused to back it.
"Everything was in place for the coup and if the US embassy had approved it, it would have happened. But they did not," Mr Zelaya said.
Honduran President Zelaya was arrested by the military, apparently by a court order (it is not clear what court or what judge) and is now in Costa Rica. If it was a regular court order, it makes no sense for him to be removed from the country, which is one reason why I am already using the term "coup." I have not yet seen who is currently chief executive.
There are many troubling aspects to this situation, but in particular it is discouraging that the Honduran courts, legislators, etc. still turn to the armed forces to act as political arbiters.
This is going to make the situation far, far worse than any other solution the opposition could have devised.
Hondurans go to vote today on the non-binding "public opinion poll" about whether to have another vote to rewrite the constitution. Opponents (including some in President Zelaya's own party) are asking people not to vote, so turnout will be a key factor in determining how binding the non-binding vote should be viewed.
If you can read Spanish, it is instructive to take a look at the lead articles in different Honduran newspapers--there is nothing like a crisis to bring out the slant of each paper.
Honduras continues moving toward open conflict, as President Zelaya pushes for a vote on the constitution, which both the Supreme Court and Congress have indicated is illegal, and the military does not support. See Matthew Shugart for an analysis of the numbers in the legislature (and whether to call the vote a plebiscite or referendum--he opts for the former). And Boz has background here and here. It is an unusual situation, with Zelaya insisting that it is just a "public opinion poll."
Hugo Chávez has expressed his strong support for Zelaya, though interestingly in a statement he even acknowledged that "everybody is against it."
“In short, what is happening in Honduras is that the Congress is against the electoral consultation, the Supreme Court too, the General Attorney, the Church and the bishops are against it, the bourgeoisie is against it; that is to say, everybody is against it, any resemblance with our reality is not a coincidence.
Presumably someone is for it, though his approval rating is only about 30 percent.
Regardless, this is yet another example of constitution-itis in Latin America. There has been a slew of entirely new constitutions written in recent years (though this is by no means a new phenomenon). Honduras is currently on its 16th constitution, from 1982. It is a poor country based largely on agricultural exports (e.g. coffee and bananas) controlled by foreign investors and constantly beset by natural disasters. A new constitution will not change those realities, just as previous constitutions did not.
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The Bolivian government has given an arms wishlist to the Russians, who are providing credit for the purchase. This comes on the heels of the Chileans buying F-16s from the Netherlands on top of anti-submarine planes from France. Maybe now Bolivia will have to buy the submarines for the Chileans to fight. Or maybe the Chileans think Venezuela will send its brand new Russian subs southward?
It is depressing to see more and more countries circling around Latin America, looking for good conventional weapons markets. There just aren't real threats--even when Hugo Chávez blustered about sending tanks to the Colombian border, no one took it seriously. In addition, the global economic crisis is hitting developing countries quite hard, and this money should be channeled elsewhere. In the Chilean case, proposals to reform the copper law keep popping up, but have yet to gain traction.
The latest push for immigration reform is just getting underway, and Senator Chuck Schumer is in the thick of it. He notes various things Democrats must do in order to get the necessary conservative votes.
Apparently one is to use the term "illegal" rather than "undocumented" immigrant.
I've told the advocates we have to come down hard on illegal immigration," Schumer said. "I say illegal immigrants. Two years ago Democrats said undocumented workers, which made people say, 'Hmm, maybe Democrats don't think it's bad to be an illegal immigrant."
I am trying to think of any other policy example where dispute over naming something became part of the debate, and using your opponents' choice of language became a strategy for passing the bill.
It strikes me as an example of how the politics of symbolism trump substance all too often in the debate over immigration reform.
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Barry McCaffrey published an op-ed in the Miami Herald about U.S. policy toward Cuba, advocating the scrapping of just about everything, including handing the entire Guantánamo base back to Cuba. It is a very well-written piece that pulls no punches (referring, for example, to the "regimented dullness of that Marxist state") and concludes, very reasonably, that "the status quo is a loser."
Modifying punitive economic and travel policies should not be viewed as making concessions to an authoritarian regime. Instead, they should be viewed as a belated recognition that our past policies were ineffective and will not promote democratization in Cuba.
Such ideas won't likely be translated into policy anytime soon, but conventional wisdom is slowly transforming.
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The book provides an excellent descriptive account of Latino immigration to the U.S. South.In an introduction that provides a very useful overview, Odem and Lacy lay out the book’s purpose: to “present in-depth analyses of how immigration from Latin America is changing the U.S. South and how immigrants adapting to the southern context” (p. ix).It focuses on five very broad themes: immigrant transnationalism, economic incorporation and impact, place-making and community building, changing racial dynamics, and southern responses to Latino immigration.
One of the book’s strengths is that seven of the nine chapters are state-specific, thus providing geographic nuance.Combined they contain a rich collection of information that should prove valuable for researchers. At the same time, the chapters address a wide range of issue, including religious expression, refugee politics, union organizing, economic impact, which at times reduces the coherency of the collection.
One of the critical questions that arises—though not always explicitly—in the chapters is the degree to which the southern experience with Latino immigration is different from other regions of the country.
In his chapter on Alabama, Raymond Mohl concludes that “Dixie appears to be on the cusp of a long-term process of Latinization, mirroring what has already happened in other parts of the United States” (p. 65).Similarly, James H. Johnson Jr. and John D. Kasarda argue that changes in North Carolina are “[p]aralleling national trends” (p. 70).But is it necessarily a mirror?
Angela C. Steusse, for example, notes the importance of progressive churches for organizing social movements in the South, something far less common in traditional gateways.Even here, though, the comparison may need to delve into the differences between different religions. For example, Mary E. Odem shows how the Catholic church in Atlanta did not necessarily embrace the Latino population, whose style of worship was quite different from the suburban middle class.
Further, virtually all of the chapters note the importance of race, which takes a unique form in the South.Race has always been viewed in Black-White terms, and desegregation is still very much in recent memory.It is worth exploring whether the racialized discourse in the South takes a different form than, say, in Los Angeles.
Overall, then, the volume offers much to ponder.It would work very well in a classroom, as it raises a number of interesting and important questions that scholars have only begun to explore.
Just yesterday I wrote about the professional benefits of blogging, which included more contact with the media, which universities like. Today Mike Munger links to an article he just published in the Chronicle of Higher Education about why faculty should come out of their shells and talk to the media more. And he has some tips.
