Cartel Proclamation

Donald Trump issued a proclamation in conjunction with his Shield of the Americas initiative.

(1)  Criminal cartels and foreign terrorist organizations in the Western Hemisphere should be demolished to the fullest extent possible consistent with applicable law.

There is nothing new here, except maybe the use of the word "demolish" to be dramatic.

(2)  The United States and its allies should coordinate to deprive these organizations of any control of territory and access to financing or resources necessary to conduct their campaigns of violence.

This is already a goal, even with countries not part of the initiative. If there is enhanced regional coordination that would be great.

(3)  The United States will train and mobilize partner nation militaries to achieve the most effective fighting force necessary to dismantle cartels and their ability to export violence and pursue influence through organized intimidation.

In general this is not new. How it gets carried out may well be. More coordination isn't necessarily a bad thing, though I don't know if that's what they have in mind (to be fair, they may well not know what they have in mind). But you can't help but think about Operation Condor kind of stuff.

The biggest problem here is that this is pure military, in a way that echoes the worst parts of the Cold War. No mention of civilian authorities, democracy, governance, etc. So what will the training consist of? If it means blowing up boats, it can get dicey. In any event, blowing up boats doesn't do anything to dismantle cartels or reduce violence.

There are longstanding debates about the role of the military in Latin America, which I've been part of and don't need to rehash here. Suffice it to say that military autonomy when it comes to using force is problematic. But I also know the administration doesn't see it as a problem.

(4)  The United States and its allies should keep external threats at bay, including malign foreign influences from outside the Western Hemisphere.

This is straight-up Cold War, so what's old is new again. Obviously this is aimed at China, though secondarily to Iran and its allies, which are an age-old boogeyman for the U.S. right. The difference with the Cold War is that China has been deeply involved in Latin America for almost 30 years, which was certainly not the case with the Soviet Union.

And I'll say, over and over, that if the U.S. wants to keep China at bay it needs to offer itself as an alternative, which is in conflict with an "America-first" attitude.

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The Venezuelan Opposition and Presidential Election

When the U.S. announced its re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Venezuela, it included mention of a "phased process" toward "a peaceful transition to a democratically elected government." Meanwhile, there is an opinion piece at Caracas Chronicles that calls for a primary to determine a single opposition candidate.

The twist is that María Corina Machado is clearly the opposition leader with the most political momentum (though she is now out of the limelight) but Trump consciously sidelined her and brought Enrique Márquez, another opposition leader who also ran in the 2024 election and was an opposition member of the CNE for several years, to the State of the Union. That gives us two high visibility candidates, which is exactly what Delcy Rodríguez would want and the regime wanted for many years before that--opposition division. So a single candidate makes sense if they can agree to it.

But there is also the question of what their platform will be. People will want to know what the opposition will do better and be reassured that the social services they have won't be removed. The country is already selling oil to the U.S. and Delcy talks very nicely about Donald Trump so you can't promise better relations. You can't really promise trials or accountability. You can talk about free market capitalism but you'll want to be very careful with that.

Delcy Rodríguez did a verbal 180, or close to it, so it's hard to be her opposite, whereas just in December it would've been easy. So it gets easier for people to choose her and avoid the unknown.

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Shield of the Americas Summit

Donald Trump is pulling an Hugo Chávez. Chávez thought the OAS was too pro-U.S. so he created CELAC, which was more leftist. He also created UNASUR, which did a few things and then disintegrated. Right-wing governments created PROSUR, which as far as I know hasn't done much of anything and likely barely exists. CELAC still exists but mostly disagrees, which frankly is a lot of what the OAS does as well.

So now Trump is creating the Shield of the Americas, a disparate group of countries whose sole thing in common is that their current government is on the right*. The formal announcement comes Saturday so we don't yet know details but it is hard to imagine it being significantly different from all the others. He just learned that Kristi Noem will be the U.S. "special envoy," which means ideology will be front and center, and reality several steps behind. It also signals this institution is not super important to him because he's putting someone in that he just fired.

Part of the new institution's goal will be to push back on China. As I and plenty of others have argued, however, the U.S. needs to be a reliable partner to make this happen, and impromptu tariffs combined with reneging on past agreements make that challenging. Maybe you can push out Chinese investment to some degree if U.S. investors are ready but what about trade? 

I recommend Adam Ratzlaff's take on it. An additional point to make based on the experience of the other existing multilateral institutions is that governments change and a new leftist government will have considerably less interest. If it becomes ideologically obnoxious they may just leave it. That's the core problem of ideologically based institutions. Ideologies change. A Chilean president helped created PROSUR and a Chilean president suspended the country's participation in it. That's how it goes.

* Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Paraguay, El Salvador, Ecuador, Argentina, Honduras, Costa Rica, Bolivia and Chile. And I believe Panama.

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Rebellion in Cuba and Venezuela?

Rut Diamint and Laura Tedesco have an essay in Foreign Affairs about Cuba, arguing that the long-standing revolutionary model is ending and that we don't know what will replace it. There is one part that I wonder about:

To be sure, many Cubans would likely perceive their government’s acquiescence to U.S. demands as an erosion of Cuban sovereignty, even a reversion to the island’s pre-revolutionary status as a U.S. client state. A rebellion by the military and parts of society cannot be ruled out.

Is this true? In both Venezuela and Cuba we have a strong revolutionary past that has long ceased serving its own citizens. Further, the people in power aren't the original leaders, who had strong personal followings. Instead, there are annointed leaders who mostly make their citizens' lives worse. These revolutions are long dead.

I am dubious about the "reversion" argument because it's over 60 years ago so very few people experienced it. I can see military leadership feeling threatened (as targets) but would rank-and-file Cubans want to fight for this revolution? What would the goal of such a rebellion be? Put some authoritarian technocrat back in power?

Nationalism matters. A lot. U.S. protectionism will wear thin, perhaps quickly. But people want solutions to immediate problems. The Venezuelan revolution was starting to fail before the U.S. government turned the economy screws on it. The Cuba revolution had suffered the embargo for many years but is a dependent revolution so was hurt even worse by the fall of the Soviet Union and the gradual decline of Venezuelan oil production. Obviously the Trump administration made things worse but they were already bad.

Venezuelans and Cubans will certainly fight for their countries but I am not convinced they'll fight for these governments. I especially wonder because up to this point Trump has avoided occupying forces that could become targets. An occupying force would change everything but that's not where we are up to this point.

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What if María Corina Machado Returned?

María Corina Machado says she plans to return to Venezuela in a few weeks. The big question, of course, is what the regime will do about it. We have this:

“With respect to her life, we do not understand why there is so much commotion,” Rodríguez said. “As for her return to the country, she will have to answer before Venezuela. Why did she call for a military intervention? Why did she call for sanctions against Venezuela? And why did she celebrate the actions that took place at the beginning of January?”

It's a pretty funny statement when you think about it since everyone knows why MCM called for those things. Military intervention is what got this ball rolling.

What fascinates me are all the political calculations going on. I assume there are all kinds of discussions, including between MCM and Marco Rubio. The thing is, I don't see how they could arrest her without creating mayhem, which would lead to repression and some kind of U.S. response. I also figure the U.S. would prefer not to have to respond because it's clear Trump himself has zero interest in Venezuelan democracy. So there's a good chance she doesn't come back until she's received some kind of green light. On the other hand, she could chance it and just go.

But if they let her in without imprisoning her, then things will accelerate. She will have rallies and they will be large as people feel emboldened. The call for elections will get louder. That would not be allowed just a short time ago and it's unclear how the regime would respond to it now.

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Anti-Terrorism Courts in Venezuela

The International Commission of Jurists just released a report on the use of anti-terrorism courts in Venezuela to, frankly, terrorize the population. The anti-terrorism code got going 20ish years ago under Hugo Chavez and conveniently did not define the term. So it simply came to mean regime opponents, same as many other Venezuelan laws intended to attack the population. Subsequent laws provided some more definition, but it could mean anything the regime wanted since the courts did whatever it wanted.

The anti-terrorism laws were used extensively after the fraudulent 2024 election, with references to "treason" and "conspiracy" that had no real meaning. They also used the term "hate" since it had its own vague law.

The report notes at the end that it was largely written before the U.S. invasion and certainly well before the amnesty. It's not clear to me that supposed anti-terrorism charges would automatically be dropped due to the amnesty. All these laws need to be abrogated and anyone even remotely held under suspicion by the government should be allowed unconditional freedom (and ability to return to the country).

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Dynamics of the Venezuela Amnesty (Part 2)

Here is a link to the full text of the amnesty. Earlier this week I was thinking about how people who haven't been formally charged with anything could fall through the cracks. There's a lot that is open to interpretation.

La amnistía objeto de esta Ley abarca a toda persona que se encuentre o pueda ser procesada o condenada por delitos o faltas, cometidos y acaecidos en el marco de los hechos objeto de amnistía, siempre que esté a derecho o se ponga a derecho luego de la entrada en vigencia de esta Ley. 

The wording here is anyone "who is or could be prosecuted or convicted." So does the "could be" refer to people who the government is threatening but not formally charging? It sounds good but it's not entirely clear. For those people what is the "tribunal competente"?

Here are some examples of what's excluded from the law:

Estarán igualmente excluidos de la amnistía prevista en esta Ley, las personas que se encuentren o puedan ser procesadas o condenadas por promover, instigar, solicitar, invocar, favorecer, facilitar, financiar o participar en acciones armadas o de fuerza contra el pueblo, la soberanía y la integridad territorial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, por parte de Estados, corporaciones o personas extranjeras.

Does the infamous Hate Law fall under this? For example, you make fun of Nicolás Maduro on social media and get put on a list for it, meaning you get visited (often more than once) by colectivos who call you out. Perhaps even more to the point, you tell people (or write on social media) that you support sanctions against Venezuela. Is that "fuerza contra el pueblo"?

There is also the problem of the 13 time periods allowed by the law. Protests in 2018 are left out, for example. Or if you were protesting in 2022, are you out of luck?

Millions of Venezuelans left their country and many did so out of because they felt threatened. We can only hope this amnesty is interpreted broadly so they can choose to go home without getting attacked.

Update: I had missed that Jorge Rodríguez announced that the Hate Law would be "reformed." It should be completely scrapped but this is better than nothing.

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Countering Chinese Influence in Latin America

R. Evan Ellis, who has written a ton about Chinese influence in Latin America, is concerned that the headline-grabbing denial of certain investments to China makes us ignore the bigger picture. I think he's right.

The central point is that the U.S. is playing a very short game. You can strong-arm China out of specific deals but China is still engaging on an ongoing basis in countless ways. Even more importantly, the U.S. is not providing any alternative. If you don't want a country to trade with China, you can't impose tariffs and expect that to happen. He notes the need for "sustained economic engagement, institutional strengthening, transparency initiatives and coordinated diplomacy with like-minded partners." That's not happening much.

If you look at U.S. policy now and consider what Latin America might look like in 10 years, you see Latin American autonomy playing out in different ways given U.S. unpredictability. China will be right there because it's deepening ties while the U.S. hurls insults.

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Dynamics of the Venezuelan Amnesty

The recently passed Amnesty Law in Venezuela is generating almost as much controversy as relief. There have already been over 1,500 requests for amnesty that have been filed. I want to focus on just one problematic aspect. The following points to it:

Amnesty is not automatic under the law: petitioners must ask the court handling their cases.

The problem is that many Venezuelans who have sought political asylum in the United States don't have a court hearing any case. They are people who were targeted by the Venezuelan government for participating in protests or even just pointing out government deficiencies or criticizing it. They would be beaten up, detained, their phones taken, and sometimes colectivos would follow them or show up at their homes. They don't have a registered "case" and haven't been charged with a formal crime. They have been terrorized to keep their mouths shut and to avoid protesting.

So this amnesty appears not to help them. As I've mentioned before, we don't currently know what the colectivos are doing. We don't know if it's safe for people to return to the country. There are many thousands of Venezuelans who committed "crimes" just by speaking their minds and were attacked for it. The government knows who they are but hasn't filed formal charges. So there's no amnesty for them.

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Venezuelan Public Opinion in the Aftermath

Yesterday I watched an Atlantic Council panel on public opinion in Venezuela, which I definitely recommend. You can watch it here. Mark Feierstein's discussion of his firm's poll results (which were taken in January) was particularly interesting (as was the occasional polite disagreement from Venezuelan panelists).

I won't rehash it, but there is one point that didn't get much attention that I think is definitely worth keeping in mind. It's about what has sometimes been called the "ni-nis," meaning people who are neither with the government nor the opposition. They are a plurality in Venezuela. I screenshotted this from the presentation:

Independent: 42%

Opposition: 37%

Chavista: 17%

I think it's reasonable to assume that independents want free and fair elections, and may well have voted for González/Machado, but aren't tied to MCM ideologically. There was a discussion about when she should come back to Venezuela and I will be interested to see what happens when she shifts from what she's against (the dictatorship) and what she's for. I would guess the latter will be focused largely on the economy, which according to the poll is the highest priority for Venezuelans. But there is a lot of other stuff to deal with as well.

Anyway, just a friendly reminder that Venezuela is not a binary government/opposition. And a friendly reminder that MCM does not perceive Venezuela as safe to return to, though it is also entirely possible she wants to return and test repression but the Trump administration is convincing her to wait.

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What is Repression Like in Venezuela?

Something I am particularly interested in is the effect of the political change in Venezuela on repression. We have scattered signs of protests happening and individuals saying they feel less threatened, but we also have the re-arrest of one prominent political prisoner and others who are not being released. There are so many questions. For example, is the government still monitoring those protests, keeping track of who participates? We know they routinely do that and colectivos later show up at people's doors to threaten them. Where are the colectivos right now? With no evidence, it does not reasonable to assume they just gave up the whole endeavor.

We don't have answers. My impression is that Venezuelans themselves don't know. Some are testing the waters to see what happens and only time will tell us more. But I recommend an article that Human Rights Watch just released. They call on the government to dismantle the repressive apparatus. Venezuelan repression is based on a wide variety of laws intended to criminalize all free speech.

These laws date back over 15 years and actually overlap. The 2014 Hate Law alone allows the government to criminalize practically anything. After the fraudulent 2024 presidential election, more laws were put in place just to remind Venezuelans they were not allowed to make any statements critical of the government, not even humorously.

What this means is that the government can unleash violence at any time. By this time, such violence is a natural reflex when people criticize the government and especially when they protest in the streets. It is entirely correct that no one can be truly safe until those laws are revoked. Interestingly, HRW says "amend or repeal" though I cannot imagine how these can be amended without remaining undemocratic. All countries need laws governing security but Venezuela should draft new ones, not use dictatorial remainders.

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China's Web of Relationships in Latin America

R. Evan Ellis has an interesting article about China's relationship with Guatemala. Here is the takeaway, which I think is essential for understanding what's going across Latin America:

China and China-based companies have made substantial progress in advancing their position through a web of business and personal influence relationships, opening the door to Beijing’s influence and digital access. 

Note that this isn't about specific trade deals, or port deals, or investments. It's about the painstaking process of building personal relationships over two decades or so. It's the long game. What that means is that even when a high profile deal is squashed, plenty of other quiet ones still happen. In fact, a lot of deals were squashed in the past without U.S. pressure. That's business.

During prior administrations, China-based companies unsuccessfully sought to acquire land on both the Atlantic and Pacific for port facilities. Chinese ZPMC cranes, scanners, and other digital equipment are reportedly used by Guatemala’s private port operators, such as APM and Chiquita Brands. 

The lesson here is not to be immediately swayed by headlines. There is a lot going on under the surface. 

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Annulling the Monroe Doctrine

 A group of 18 House Democrats introduced a resolution entitled, "Calling for the annulment of the Monroe Doctrine and the development of a "New Good Neighbor" policy in order to foster improved relations and deeper, more effective cooperation between the United States and its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors."

Its introductory part, with all the "whereas," is actually one of the most concise yet comprehensive histories of U.S. intervention in Latin America. Kudos to them for that.

The core of the resolution, that "the Department of State should formally confirm that the Monroe Doctrine is no longer a part of United States policy toward Latin American and the Caribbean" is obviously just symbolic and actually a bit silly. As the intro notes, John Kerry already proclaimed it dead once and it didn't matter all that much.

The other part of the resolution calls for a "New Good Neighbor Policy," I think forgetting that part of the Good Neighbor Policy entailed the installation of some really terrible dictators and then letting them do what they wanted (Nicaragua is still dealing with the aftermath!). I would suggest a different name instead of being stuck forever in the past.

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Government Intervention in the Economy

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent was in Brazil discussing trade and this quote popped out at me.

Despite diplomatic controversies caused by Trump’s economic agenda in Brazil, Bessent supported the use of tariffs as part of a broader effort to reindustrialise. He noted that while tariffs generate short-term revenue, the long-term goal is to encourage companies to move production to the United States, shifting government revenue towards domestic economic activity.

This should sound familiar to anyone who has looked at Latin America from the 1950s-1980s. Import substitution industrialization was a large-scale effort to industrialize, encourage local production, and shift government revenue to domestic economic activity, all through the use of tariffs. As Mike Allison and I wrote in U.S. and Latin American Relations:

The idea was that to reduce dependency on imports, the state would direct, encourage, and subsidize targeted domestic industries, whose products would substitute for foreign goods (p. 136).

It's so similar, but not identical. At least as yet, we're not seeing the same level of state investment in industry (e.g. ownership, even if partial). The irony is that Latin America was doing it in large part to protect itself from the United States, which in turn exerted tremendous pressure to liberalize and open markets up to U.S. products. Now the script is flipped.

The irony is extended further since in the same interview, Bessent said we had a “generational opportunity to strengthen ties with governments that support market-oriented reforms.” At the moment, however, the U.S. is not such a country. "Market-oriented" means that the market determines outcomes with a minimum of government manipulation. Recent reforms in terms of government intervention in the economy is decidedly not market-oriented. In fact, Latin American countries have been pursuing free trade agreements elsewhere.

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Americans Don't Care Much About Venezuela

There is a new Pew survey showing Americans* don't have much faith in Donald Trump when it comes to "wise decisions" toward Venezuela, that they're split on U.S. access to Venezuelan oil and the use of force to remove Nicolás Maduro, and that the splits run a lot along partisan lines. Politically, I don't think it matters much because the poll does not measure intensity.

About a month ago, I gave a surprisingly lengthy interview for local TV news. I ended up getting a lot of positive feedback because so many people just didn't have any idea what was happening. But what occurs to me is that the appetite for knowing more has mostly evaporated. What people really pay attention to is the use of U.S. force that might involve U.S. casualties. In my opinion, although people might be aware of killing people on boats and commandeering oil tankers and many might even oppose those actions, they don't assign much importance to them. If we ever get to a point where U.S. troops enter Venezuela, then that can change quickly.

What that means is that until that time, U.S. public opinion likely won't have much impact on U.S. policy toward Venezuela, which will continue to go along the president's whims.

*Yes, I am aware of the problematic nature of the term but it's much easier shorthand than "people in the United States." I wish we had something better.

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How Latin American Presidents Deal With Trump

In an article about Senator Katie Britt, a New York Times reporter noted something that caught my attention:

She seldom challenges Mr. Trump. When she does, she believes that, to be effective, any outrage must be felt quietly, any response conducted through back-channeled phone calls and peppered with words of admiration for the president.

This is a great way to way to frame oppositional Latin American presidents' response to Donald Trump as well. It was widely reported that Trump took offense to Nicolás Maduro dancing around in response to U.S. threats. So after the Venezuela invasion, Gustavo Petro switched from highly inflammatory to a White House visit where he had Trump sign The Art of the Deal. Claudia Sheinbaum has been similarly careful albeit perhaps less effusive, but manages to get Trump to say positive things about her publicly.

I am sure everyone has noticed that co-dictators Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo are very quiet. Nicaragua was not on the list of countries being decertified as not cooperating in anti-narcotics efforts (Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela were) so are less likely to get his attention. So they stay vewy vewy quiet and stay off Trump's radar. 

Miguel Díaz-Canel doesn't exactly go this route but his personality is very un-flamboyant so he greatly resembles it. He'll never visit the White House but he's not in the news much and does not make fiery speeches. But Cuba is Cuba, so he's on the radar no matter what. 

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Cuba Has a Secret Plan

From Granma: Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel says Cuba has lots of support and plenty of governments and institutions ready to help it, but he can't talk about it.

Apuntó que, además de esas manifestaciones de solidaridad, «hay más cosas, cosas que no podemos hoy explicar abiertamente, porque el enemigo está en una persecución de todas las luces que se le pueden abrir a Cuba, de todos los caminos que se le pueden abrir a Cuba; pero sí les puedo asegurar, con todo sentido de responsabilidad, que Cuba no está sola.

«En un momento como este hay mucha gente, gobiernos, países, instituciones, empresas que están dispuestos a trabajar con Cuba y que ya nos han hecho llegar vías, mecanismos, intenciones de cómo podemos hacer.

So sure, you wouldn't want to publicize any of this, but it's difficult to supply anything secretly to Cuba. The trick is that Cuba badly needs oil and the U.S. has promised tariff retaliation for selling to Cuba. You can't get oil there without anyone knowing.

Both Mexico and Russia have publicly said they'll keep sending it (even though Donald Trump said Mexico would stop). However, Claudia Sheinbaum suggested that she might not want to suffer the tariffs. The loss of Mexican oil would be huge. Russia's supply is much smaller but every bit counts because Cuba cannot produce enough for its own needs.

So perhaps there are plans afoot to get some critical goods to Cuba, which can slightly ease the pain inflicted by the embargo and threats. Certainly, the Cuban government enjoys a level of international respect that Venezuela lacked (or once had, then lost as it became clear that Maduro and much of the regime wasn't even slightly revolutionary). But it may well be that the most important assistance will have to be public because it's in bulk.

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The Key Problem with Maria Corina Machado

Marco Rubio's announcement that the Venezuelan regime will have to submit a monthly budget, which will then release money from a Qatari account*, just underlines a key reason that democratic transition in Venezuela is a problem for the Trump administration. Democratically-elected (or even just democratically-minded) leaders could not accept such an arrangement. No one in Venezuela gets a say in the country's most precious natural resource.

If María Corina Machado were to return, there would be myriad challenges, but let's focus on this one for now. The U.S. could not say they would overthrow or kidnap her if she didn't follow its orders. She would have independent legitimacy that Delcy Rodríguez completely lacks. With that legitimacy she could dictate terms even though she might feel indebted to the U.S. for getting her back in the country. She would have the right to say no. She would not want to ask permission from a foreign power to spend her own country's money.

This will come as no surprise to people who know Latin American political history, but it's far better for the Trump administration to have a pliable, vulnerable, and undemocratic president in Venezuela. It carries its own problems, but it's better. The U.S. might not even need any military force to remove Rodríguez if she doesn't act as Marco Rubio wants--just whisper to political rivals that she's out of favor. Remote control authority doesn't work with democracy (it's not clear how well it works with dictatorship, but it's easier).

The administration has made abundantly clear that democracy is definitely not a short-term goal and is only hazily a long-term one. Aside from the obvious problem of having groups that detest each other, democracy in the best of times is messy and unpredictable. For a foreign country wanting access to oil and money, messy and unpredictable is no good. 

*The term "slush fund" is not out of order here.

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Controlling Another Country's Money

 I was reading through Lars Schoultz's In Their Own Best Interest and found a fun citation in the Foreign Relations of the United States documents. It is Secretary of State Philander Knox speaking to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1911. The topic is Honduras but it could be Venezuela today.

We can not blink the fact that there is no hope for peace and prosperity for Honduras except through the United States. All she now asks is, Will you assist us to make the security good which we offer for the debt we are incurring, at a reasonable rate of interest, by helping us to secure an honest collection of our revenues, or will you, by withholding that assistance, drive us back upon the usurers and plunderers who have brought us to our present stagnation?

How will this be done?

The convention has been drawn for the purpose of giving security. That is, for the purpose of assuring the regular payment of interest and sinking fund upon the debt. Its provisions, briefly, are:

1. Honduras engages to place the loan in the United States.

2. Honduras pledges her customs receipts for the payment of the interest and sinking fund.

3. Honduras agrees to appoint a receiver from a list of names prepared by the fiscal agent and approved by the President of the United States.

4. Honduras agrees to afford protection to the receiver and that if necessary the United States may give such protection.

5. The receiver is under obligation to report to the fiscal agent of the loan and to either Government regarding the discharge of his duties.

6. Honduras further agrees not to alter the customs receipts during the existence of the loan.

In essence, Honduras hands its economy over to U.S. officials.

The convention would have the effect of affording security to the bondholders; of assuring to Honduras the punctual and complete discharge of her obligations practically without cost to the Government; the enjoyment of continued peace, and the consequent internal development; and to the United States the saving in expense to this Government would alone seem to be a sufficient inducement.

Good for everyone. Except Hondurans.

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Trump's Policy Toward Latin America and China

I wrote a guest blog post for the University of New Mexico Press, which published my book on autonomy. It's not a new story for anyone reading this blog. Not even the Venezuela invasion will suddenly push China aside. Indeed, Latin America doesn't want to it pushed aside. Go read it and give them some clicks.

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Latin America's Response to Mark Carney's Speech

I was watching a webinar put on by the Canadian Council for the Americas, which naturally touched on Mark Carney's speech. Robert Funk, a Chilean professor (but also Canadian) noted how unusual it was to have people talking about a Canadian Prime Minister's speech in casual conversation. And I don't blog very much about Canada.

It resonated elsewhere and Claudia Sheinbaum praised it. Carney will spend a lot of the year traveling, which already includes Brazil and I imagine will include plenty more of Latin America. This isn't exactly new, but the sense of urgency is intensifying.

A question came up in the webinar about whether Canada would lead some sort of group of middle powers, which I think misses the core point. This isn't a "movement" per se but rather just the rational response by sovereign countries with options. There doesn't have to be a leader, which suggests common political views, policies, and the like.

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Delcy Rodriguez's Public Face

Delcy Rodriguez is widely quoted as saying she's had "enough" of U.S. interference and orders. Telesur, which I hadn't looked at in forever, really gets into it but it's getting play in all the major U.S. outlets as well. It is in fact getting so much play and so little official pushback that it feels planned. In that sense, Telesur is (unwittingly or not) following right along with U.S. policy.

She's obviously facing intense pressure from within the regime, but the rest of Venezuela didn't suddenly lose their sense of nationalism. They wonder whether the U.S. is simply sucking the oil and profit out of the country. She has to be allowed to give fiery speeches every once in a while to bolster an image of nationalism and sovereignty. This has plenty of precedent in Latin American history more broadly. Fidel Castro himself was consistently involved in quiet talks with the U.S. while explaining he had to give a certain kind of speech publicly. That could well be what's happening here.

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Don't Make Sweeping Generalizations About Latin American Politics

Michael Reid, who is a highly experienced observer of Latin American politics, should know better than to make sweeping generalizations about it, but he did. He says that the rightward trend in Latin America is different from past pendulums and is likely here to stay. Here are his two main reasons and the problems with them.

1. Latin American voters have been afraid of a repeat of Venezuela so vote for the right instead. The problem here is obvious--in 2022 neighboring Colombia voted in not just a leftist (the first in their history!) but a former guerrilla. The same year, neighboring Brazil chose Lula over a Jair Bolsonaro, who was both incumbent and close to Donald Trump. So this reason doesn't pass muster.

2. "Since the Covid-19 pandemic, which hit the region hard, voters’ focus has changed to the basics of life: finding stable work, putting food on the table and, perhaps above all, keeping safe." The entire first part of this puzzles me because Latin American voters have always, and I mean always, centered on finding stable work and food. That's what gave rise to Hugo Chávez in the first place. And it absolutely relates to incumbency because when the right or left can't fulfill those promises, voters look elsewhere. That said, his point about how drug violence has spread more than in the past is definitely true. But even in countries with serious drug trafficking (take Honduras or Mexico) voters have moved to the left and right.

After making the point that anti-incumbency is less likely now and so the right might well dominate, he hedges:

"In the end, the durability of Latin America’s latest shift will turn on how successful these leaders are in improving the lives of ordinary citizens, in making them safer and less poor and offering them better services like health care, education and public transport."

In other words, if incumbents don't fulfill promises, voters look elsewhere.

He does make the critical point that the current Latin American right is heterogeneous. Different approaches, different personalities, and different priorities. This is the most important takeaway of the piece because it tells us that sweeping generalizations will always lead you astray. What happens in Argentina--always so idiosyncratic--may or may not have significant impact elsewhere. If there is a regional or global recession (let's say the AI bubble bursts badly) then we might soon be talking about a resurgence of the center-left.*

* I do think the revolutionary left is so badly discredited that it will take decades for people to forget about its disasters. But they always do eventually!

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Mark Carney's Speech and Latin America

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney's speech at Davos is all about autonomy and fits exactly with my own argument with regard to Latin America.

[M]any countries are drawing the same conclusions that they must develop greater strategic autonomy, in energy, food, critical minerals, in finance and supply chains.

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Allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty.

They'll buy insurance, increase options in order to rebuild sovereignty – sovereignty that was once grounded in rules, but will increasingly be anchored in the ability to withstand pressure.

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We are calibrating our relationships, so their depth reflects our values, and we're prioritizing broad engagement to maximize our influence, given and given the fluidity of the world at the moment, the risks that this poses and the stakes for what comes next.

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The past few days, we've concluded new strategic partnerships with China and Qatar. We're negotiating free trade pacts with India, ASEAN, Thailand, Philippines and Mercosur.

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[T]he middle powers must act together, because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu.

This is all exactly right and Latin America has been doing it since the 1990s, with acceleration once the first Trump administration demonstrated the United States could not longer be relied upon. Note the "past few days" comment. In the first year of this second term, governments are working overtime to forge new partnerships.

The United States remains extremely powerful and is always a partner, but just not to the same extent that it used to be. Governments have to hedge, they just have no choice, especially when tariffs are announced based on person dislike. Those tariffs might never materialize, and often don't, but plenty of times they do.

Watch for more trade and investment announcements. They'll be coming for sure.

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Colombia and China

In the midst of all the "Donroe Doctrine" hype I am staying focused on how Latin America maintains and deepens ties with extrahemispheric countries, which would supposedly violate the doctrine. For example, Colombia is deepening technology ties with China with a ministerial visit, following up on Gustavo Petro's visit last year. This includes connectivity, data infrastructure, and AI, plus satellites.

China's relationship with Latin America is embedded within countless contracts and agreements. Chinese and Colombian companies are working together--this isn't just talk between two governments. And it's necessary when the United States is openly an unreliable partner and reneges on agreements. Latin America has no choice but to play the field and at this point they've been doing it for a long time.

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Five (Problematic) Assumptions We're Making in Venezuela

There's a really good piece in Foreign Affairs by a former Bush administration who was in Iraq right after the invasion. She points to mistakes that need to be avoided in Venezuela. Go read that but I want to turn it on its head a bit and lay out what assumptions the Trump administration is making that seem fine in this honeymoon period but need to be watched carefully.

1. Venezuelans don't care about having control of oil. This assumption seems core and it contradicts the entire political history of Venezuela, no matter what political party you're talking about. But it also raises the question of what Venezuelans do as it sinks in that the United States has no interest in their well-being and only wants oil.

2. Venezuelan bureaucracies will work just fine. There is no well-functioning civil service. In its place is a highly politicized institutions that control distribution of just about everything.

3. The threat of U.S. force will prevent criminal groups from operating. I don't think there's much historical precedent for this anywhere.

4. Venezuelans don't mind the dictatorship continuing. Venezuelans hate this government and the repression it unleashes daily. How that translates into behavior isn't clear.

5. The dictatorship is a bloc that will be fine with change. The point O'Sullivan makes in the article is that if drug trafficking and other illicit activity drove allegiance then that will evaporate if the goodies stop flowing. Then you end up with chaos.

We're in the honeymoon period and the article shows how similar optimism on similar points prevailed in the early days of Iraq. There's oil and all we need to do is harness that--we get rid of the leader and the country will start running itself effectively. Right?

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Contradictions in Venezuela Policy

 There are some apparent contradictions, or at least dilemmas, that litter the current situation in Venezuela.

1. Venezuelan in the U.S. want the option to go home but fear they won't be allowed back into the United States (this was a point that came up in the Global Americans webinar today). U.S. immigration policy currently works against stability.

2. Donald Trump says that U.S. oil executives will get on board but the State Department also says Americans should get out of Venezuela.

3. The administration wants to restore the oil industry without a political transition, but the oil industry needs transition to make it work.

4. The administration wants to reduce China's influence in Venezuela and elsewhere but the dismantling of USAID and tariffs make that almost impossible.

5. There is a mixed message when the Trump administration talks a lot about protecting Iranian protesters but nothing when Venezuelans continue to be attacked.

It's mind blowing that the invasion occurred 10 days ago and virtually nothing of consequence has changed on the ground. It doesn't matter to Venezuelans who lack freedoms whether Nicolás Maduro of Delcy Rodríguez is the leader.

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U.S. Framework for Venezuela

Marco Rubio has said that the U.S. has a three-point plan for Venezuela. The country is completely controlled by the United States but "it will be up to the Venezuelan people to transform their country.”

1. Stabilization of the country. This basically means keeping the dictatorship in place while the U.S. sorts out the oil to prevent chaos. That will somehow enrich both the U.S. and the average Venezuelan. There aren't details.

2. Recovery. This means sorting out the oil, which in turn means selling it. To what countries and how is not stated. There aren't details.

3. Transition. This political and has zero details. When does it end? No one knows.

Rubio also said, "This is not just winging it" even though this is textbook winging it. It has the feel of a cocktail napkin plan that took no more than 15 minutes to develop.

Donald Trump talked extensively about the grab operation itself, which involved months of planning, but clearly there wasn't much thought given to the aftermath, except that María Corina Machado, who has the Nobel Peace Prize that Trump openly covets, was to be excluded and the dictatorship maintained. 

At least at the moment, there is a lot of talk but nothing has changed except the leadership. The Venezuelan people are being attacked by their own government, all U.S. sanctions remain in place, and oil tankers are being taken without any sense of what happens to them.

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China After the Venezuela Invasion

There are, and will continue to be, fairly breathless analyses about the U.S. invasion of Venezuela has thwarted Chinese ambitions in Latin America. Or wording to that effect. But be careful with broad pronouncements.

Case in point: Argentina. China and Argentina have had mutually beneficial economic relations for a long time. Javier Milei, who is gushingly pro-Trump, just said in an interview that "I’m not going to break the trade links with China." This is the problem with so many takes on China--they assume it's ideological when it's not.

Latin America has been playing the field for several decades now and the Venezuela invasion won't suddenly change that. It's not just China, but rather the whole world. Latin America has strong trade and investment ties all over.

Things change daily, but for now I expect Latin American leaders to mostly stay quiet, stay off Trump's radar, and continue doing business. Since the U.S. has proved itself an unreliable partner, increasingly that business is spread out.

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What Does It Mean for Cuba to be "Next"?

Donald Trump recently said that "“Cuba looks like it is ready to fall." But what does that mean? I don't really know and I have a sense he doesn't either. Here are possibilities:

1. There is a popular uprising that overthrows the regime. This is not likely given the tight control the government has on the population. There is no sign of it happening, at least.

2. Economic collapse leads to democratic transition. Things are bad right now. As I and others have argued plenty of times, the Special Period was disastrous and Fidel Castro held on. Economic deprivation alone does not cause regime change. So it's possible but not likely.

3. Economic collapse leads to Miguel Díaz-Canel resigning and someone more willing to work with the U.S. takes his place. This one would not involve democratic transition. Low likelihood but not impossible.

4. Economic collapse leads to chaos. If even security forces are deprived enough to form their own criminal bands that could even threaten the government, then you end up with a Haiti-type scenario. I suppose this is possible but would be very protracted.

5. U.S. "Snatch and Grab" like Venezuela. In this scenario, the U.S. grabs Miguel Díaz-Canel and chooses a pliable government figure to run the country in a way the U.S. prefers. Possible but not likely. I don't think the Cuban government is as porous as Venezuela's, but I guess you never know. Cuba's entire political framework is built on independence from the U.S. so it would be crazy to see. Plus, I am guessing Cuban security forces are better prepared than Venezuela's to protect the president.

6. Full U.S. invasion. This might be least likely since it's not popular in the U.S. and would face significant resistance in Cuba.

Estimating likelihood is really difficult in any situation but even tougher with Cuba. The Cuban revolution has hung on through invasion attempts, blockades, sanctions, loss of its main patron, economic crashes, you name it. So it's hard to envision how such a thing changes. But low likelihood still means it can happen!

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Venezuela Invasion FAQs

Here are some FAQs I put together as a way to clarify my own thoughts on the rapidly changing situation in Venezuela. They are not exhaustive and some may well change as they are overtaken by events.

1. Is it legal to grab a head of state out of their country?

    --No, and that's problematic, but international law is routinely ignored by powerful countries.

2. Did Venezuela steal U.S. oil and property?

    --No. The 1976 nationalization was uncontroversial and the 2000s expropriation by Hugo Chávez was being repaid until U.S. sanctions basically made continued payment impossible, at least temporarily.

3. Is Nicolás Maduro guilty of the crimes alleged by the U.S. government?

    --He was definitely part of a web of narcotics trafficking and corruption but the U.S. government must prove his direct involvement. For example, the Venezuelan government certainly connected to the FARC and ELN in Colombia, but was it Maduro himself? How well can we distinguish Maduro from "the regime"? He is guilty of many things but it's on the U.S. government to prove these specific charges. All that said, I can't see any scenario that doesn't involve conviction of at least some of the charges.

4. Was Maduro elected freely?

    --No. Over time he increasingly had to use fraud to win elections and in July 2024 it was egregious. He was a dictator.

5. Is Venezuela a major source of drugs in the U.S.?

    --No. Cocaine trafficking is aimed more at Latin America and Europe. Fentanyl doesn't come from Venezuela at all.

6.. Should we compare the Venezuela invasion to the 1989 Panama invasion?

    --Use care. Superficially, both involved a president indicted for drug trafficking who is grabbed and taken to court in the U.S. But Panama is small and heavily dependent on the U.S., with strong ties to the U.S (Manuel Noriega was a U.S. ally for years). Plus, the U.S. sent troops, who stayed about five weeks.

7. Did the U.S. remove the Venezuelan government?

    --No. Maduro is gone but everything else is intact. Venezuelan security is still on the streets. There is no sign yet that repression is decreasing. Venezuela remains a dictatorship.

8. Who is María Corina Machado and why didn't the U.S. name her president?

    --She is the opposition leader who was prohibited from running in the 2024 presidential election. There was another candidate (Edmundo González) but she is the face of the opposition. She is popular but putting her in power would certainly require U.S. troops, which so far the Trump administration has not been willing to commit.

9. Is Delcy Rodríguez very different from Maduro?

    --She is seen as more pragmatic. What that means in practice is not clear, especially without U.S. troops on the ground. She is a long-time regime member and is deeply implicated in all its abuses. She is a dictator.

10. Should we expect a democratic transition in Venezuela?

    --This is unclear. Given his statements, Trump has little to no interest in democratization and he has referred to a possible future transition but it remains vague.

11. Why won't the Trump administration commit occupying troops?

    --Almost certainly because of domestic political opinion. His core supporters claim to oppose this exact type of military action.

12. How should we expect Russia and China to respond?

    --The message is that you can do what you want in your sphere of influence, your "backyard." That message is not new but it's reinforced.

13. Can the Venezuelan oil industry be fixed quickly?

    --Almost certainly not. There is significant disrepair.

14. What does this mean for Cuba?

    --Both Trump and Rubio have indicated Cuba might be next. How this would work is unclear because the Cuban military is far superior to Venezuela's and so an attack will be riskier and less certain. Cuba will definitely be hit hard by being shut out of Venezuelan oil, though during the so-called Special Period of the early to mid-1990s its economy suffered terribly after the fall of the Soviet Union but the regime held on. It is very clear that Marco Rubio's ultimate goal is Cuba more than Venezuela.

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Viceroyalty Office in Venezuela

The Trump administration is working toward reopening the U.S. Embassy in Venezuela. This is worth paying attention to. There are no U.S. troops in Venezuela, or if they're there secretly they certainly do not constitute an occupying force. Imposition of U.S. will by remote control is going to be tricky and around the world, the embassy (and the ambassador) have been at the center of political control. Orders come from the ambassador.

As Ambassador Early Smith once said of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba:

    Whenever I asked President Batista for Cuba's vote to support the United States in the United Nations,        he would instruct his Foreign Minister to have the Cuban delegation vote in accordance with the United     States delegation and to give full support to the American delegation at the United Nations.

This is the sort of enterprise that takes time. There has been no ambassador since 2010 and no staff since 2019. But it is also the sort of enterprise that can be done quickly if you force it on the country and don't care about things going smoothly for a while.

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U.S. Remote Control by Kidnap in Venezuela

Things are happening and changing at a rapid pace but right at the moment we seem to be heading toward a redux of the 1901 Platt Amendment, buy which the U.S. controlled Cuba and gave itself the right to intervene if it didn't like what Cuban presidents were doing. As with Cuba, control over natural resources was a big part of it (sugar versus oil).

A huge difference is that Trump does not want to occupy the country so it will be remote control, with the idea that if the Venezuelan president (currently Delcy Rodriguez) does not follow orders, then she will be kidnapped. And Marco Rubio has said the same might apply in the future to Cuba. The notion of controlling via kidnap is a new low, I'd say, in a policy of lows. Rubio has noted some of the U.S. demands--kick out the ELN, Hezbollah, Iran, Cuba, don't traffic in drugs--though they're not exactly easy to measure when no U.S. troops are even on the ground. What "compliance" means is either secret or the administration hasn't bothered to specify.

What happens now? I won't even both trying to guess. The Maduro regime has been all about self-preservation rather than chavismo for quite some time but will they bend the knee to the U.S., which was Hugo Chavez's original enemy?

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Maduro and the Art of the Deal

I get the strong sense that Nicolas Maduro is trying to speak to Donald Trump in his own language. He is now basically saying he's ready to make a deal. Does Trump want oil? Then let's talk oil. You concerned about drug trafficking? Let's work together on it!

Can this work? I don't know! But Maduro has every reason to give it a try. It's notable that he is not using insults the way he sometimes has in the past, which was definitely Hugo Chavez's thing. He knows his position is vulnerable and that Trump has a very thin skin so he is staying careful. He knows Trump really does not want to invade but also needs to proclaim victory somehow and he wants to figure out how to do that and remain in power.

Meanwhile, he is intentionally remaining mum on the CIA attack on Venezuela, which remains totally shrouded in mystery. Vaguely we know it was a drone but given the lack of evidence I have to wonder what it actually did. This is all so strange.

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