RAJ at Honduras Coup 2009 touched on something I had not thought about, but which in fact has been a source of considerable research (at least in political science) in the past decade or so. That is informal politics in Latin America:
In retrospect, the main problem with the attempt to negotiate the San Jose Accord may have been that taking place away from Honduras impeded the kind of informal contacts that clearly helped promote an agreement.
In 2003 I published a book on Chilean civil-military relations, and I argued that informal contacts were not conducive to civilian supremacy over the armed forces. The military was able to use informal contacts to get what it wanted, all the while circumventing legally established channels.
However, that cut against the grain of most analyses, which viewed informal channels as often positive for getting things done (e.g. see Helmke and Levitsky's Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America). Informal contacts could reinforce formal institutions.
Since then, my research has evolved in other directions, but it would be very interesting to study the role of informal contacts in the Honduran crisis. What horse trading went on outside the formal negotiations? In what ways was physical presence in Honduras essential to informal contacts?