Thursday, June 05, 2014

Academic Productivity Habits

I really like this blog post by Brandon Valeriano at RelationsInternational, where he links to an 6-point article on productivity making its way through the interwebs and says he would do the opposite of every single point. So would I. I also advised people that the most important rule about blogging is to ignore rules.

1. Manage your mood. Your mood is not just generated automatically. You can try to be positive but you also deal with other people and situations that affect it. If you were up all night with a vomiting child and wonder if the stomach bug will hit you in the middle of class, your mood just won't be chipper.

2. Don't check email in the morning. This doesn't work for me. With a cup of coffee and about 15 minutes, I get my day going productively by dealing with immediate emails. If I don't do that, then there are just more emails to do deal with throughout the day. You have to deal with them at some point and I don't see why afternoon is inherently better. Like everyone else, I like to complain about email but it's just not that big a deal to me.

3. Before you try to do it faster, ask whether or not it should be done. This puzzles me. I cannot remember doing anything I didn't need to. Why would I assign myself meaningless tasks? If someone higher up gives me something to do, then by definition I have to do it.

4. Focus is nothing more than eliminating distractions. This is tautological. If you are focusing then you have eliminated distractions, and vice versa. We all define "distraction" differently. I cannot work in silence, for example, and write well when I can break it up with internet forays.

5. Have a personal system. The way this is described seems rather OCD to me. I work well in the morning, for example, but I don't have a routine and I would find a strict routine oppressive. I know some people literally block off time during the day for certain things, which I would not like.

6. Define your goals the night before. Brandon: "This has to be the absolute worst part of the article.  Defining your goals before sleep sounds like the best way to have nasty dreams, worry all night, and stay up watching Antiques Roadshow (or is that just me?)."  I absolutely turn off work before sleep and normally read something completely unrelated to work.


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Wednesday, June 04, 2014

Fidel Is Out of the Loop

CNN reported that Fidel Castro wrote publicly that he had no idea that Eugenio George, a famous volleyball coach, had died until he read about it in the newspaper. Here is the original message Fidel wrote in Granma. That was prompted by people asking him why he hadn't sent flowers.

That no one took the initiative to tell him is not particularly noteworthy. What's more interesting is that he chose to make a public statement about it, in large part to avoid losing face. But the fact that the founder of the revolution was reduced to whining publicly is, as far as I know, novel.

h/t Joenie Hilfer on Twitter

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Tuesday, June 03, 2014

Bad News for Rousseff

Wow, look at these numbers from PewResearch. They show broad and deep dissatisfaction with Dilma Rousseff on, well, just about everything. The conclusion is that the World Cup has been a real loser for her.



Brazilians aren't happy and they aren't thrilled with the World Cup.



Brazilians don't like how Rousseff is handling things:



Her only good news is that Brazilians still see her as preferable to any other candidate:




The presidential election is in October so it's premature to say much beyond the obvious point that the outlook for Rousseff is a lot less rosy than it was, say, one year ago. The World Cup begins in a mere nine days and lasts a month, which means her government will be in the global limelight for a long time. As with the Winter Olympics in Sochi, Twitter and the mainstream media are awash in pictures, snide remarks, and stories about Brazil not being ready. Unlike Vladmir Putin, however, Rousseff actually faces real elections.

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Piketty and Latin America

Andrés Velasco has a short piece commenting on the relevance of Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century for Latin America. His main point is that Piketty's key policy prescription--a tax--would alter almost nothing in the region.

Three main tools are available for improving the pre-distribution of income. First, education reform – with a strong emphasis on technical training – would endow low-income citizens with new skills that they could supply in the labor market. Second, targeted industrial policy would create the demand for those workers and their newly acquired skills. And, third, modernization of labor markets would lead to more efficient matching of workers’ skills and firms’ special needs in a context of growing heterogeneity. 
These policies are not substitutes but complements: they must all be undertaken at the same time. Doing so is not easy. In Latin America, center-left political leaders, concerned as they are with economic and social justice, will have to fashion their own country-specific approaches. There is no ready-made recipe awaiting them in a French economist’s magnum opus.



I am in the middle of reading Piketty right now (someday when I finish I'll write a review) and this seems pretty harsh. I have not reached the prescription part but he never says anything is easy or "ready-made." Quite the opposite--he notes how difficult it is to alter the system, to the point that only World War I did so as inequality built up over the late 19th century. He also talks a lot about the importance of education. Did Velasco read the book or just read reviews of it? I am finding the latter often to be superficial when compared to what I actually see in the book. It's ironic because he makes fun of people who are Piketty boosters but haven't read the book, yet I think he misrepresents it.

At any rate, Piketty mentions developing countries but his focus is really on the United States and Europe. Where I am now, the developing world comes in largely in terms of how colonizers made profits from their holdings abroad, which of course involved gross exploitation of Africa in particular but also Latin America. Therefore I'm not sure his analysis is so easily translated to Latin America where, unlike the United States, inequality never decreased. It's been a constant.

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Monday, June 02, 2014

Left and Center-Left Presidents in Latin America

For the 2nd edition of U.S. and Latin American Relations I am writing an entirely new chapter on the efforts to counter U.S. hegemony in the region. I thought it would be useful to have a table showing all the elections of left or center-left presidents since Hugo Chávez got the ball rolling. The list is pretty long and a reminder about how diverse the "left" really is. Even defining "center-left" can be tricky. If I have left something out, let me know.

Elections of Left or Center-Left Presidents in Latin America, 1998-2014

Year
President
Country
1998
Hugo Chávez
Venezuela
1999-2000
Ricardo Lagos
Chile
                     2000
Hugo Chávez (re-elected)
Venezuela
2002
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
Brazil
2003
Néstor Kirchner
Argentina
2004
Tabaré Vázquez
Uruguay
2005
Evo Morales
Bolivia
2005
José Manuel Zelaya
Honduras
2005-2006
Michelle Bachelet
Chile
2006
Rafael Correa
Ecuador
2006
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (re-elected)
Brazil
2006
Daniel Ortega
Nicaragua
2006
Hugo Chávez (re-election)
Venezuela
2007
Álvaro Colom
Guatemala
2007
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner
Argentina
2008
Fernando Lugo
Paraguay
2009
José Mujica
Uruguay
2009
Mauricio Funes
El Salvador
2009
Evo Morales
Bolivia
2010
Dilma Rousseff
Brazil
2011
Ollanta Humala
Peru
2011
Daniel Ortega (re-election)
Nicaragua
2011
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (re-election)
Argentina
2012
Hugo Chávez (re-election
Venezuela
2013
Michelle Bachelet (re-election)
Chile
2013
Nicolás Maduro
Venezuela
2014
Salvador Sánchez Cerén
El Salvador
2014
Luis Guillermo Solís
Costa Rica

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El Salvador and Petrocaribe

In El Salvador, newly inaugurated president Salvador Sánchez Cerén announced he's setting up a deal with Petrocaribe. It would entail getting $1.2 billion of oil but only paying $600 million with 1% interest over 25 years.

I've made the argument before that Nicolás Maduro would have to back off Petrocaribe given his own economic problems. So does the El Salvador deal refute that? Not quite. In 2013 Guatemala pulled out because it never got the promised preferential deal. This year Honduras said Venezuela was changing the rules as it went. The Dominican Republic is getting less oil than it was promised. The Planning Minister of Trinidad and Tobago has said publicly that Petrocaribe is too risky to be a sustainable source of energy.

So the real question is whether El Salvador will actually see that oil at that price on those terms.

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Sunday, June 01, 2014

Thoughts on FDI in Latin America

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean issued a new report with new data for FDI in 2013.

--interestingly, U.S. FDI dropped for Brazil and Mexico but increased for Central America. I don't have a good explanation for that and they don't seem to try and account for it.

--at the same time, Mexico saw an increase largely because of U.S. companies interested in beer.

--despite all the talk about China taking over, its FDI has remained unchanged (at about $10 billion) since 2010. For Asian countries it is only third, behind Japan and South Korea.

--the largest contraction was in Chile but I think only because it had grown so much in such a short time so I think 2012 was just an unusually high amount in comparison. In addition, the report notes that it was a tough year for mining.

--Bolivia saw a 35% increase over 2012 and higher than any amount since 2008. Because of course it's a evil socialist place where capitalism is dead. Or something like that. On the flip side, it's almost all hydrocarbons so doesn't represent any diversification.

--Brazil is sucking down FDI like nobody's business. President Rousseff gets plenty of flak but clearly she has made Brazil a place people want to invest.

--In case you had any doubts, few see Venezuela as a place where they want to risk any money.

--For FDI, currency fluctuations seemed to have an impact only in Argentina and Venezuela, where investors lost.

I'm going to incorporate some of this into my U.S. and Latin American Relations 2nd edition.









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Friday, May 30, 2014

U.S. and Latin American Relations writing (part 7)

The last time I updated this was three weeks ago. I am behind, though not by a lot. All of the rush of the end of the semester--which is even greater when you're chair--is now done and June should be much more productive.

Chapter 1 (Theory) - Done
Chapter 2 (Historical) - Done
Chapter 3 (Rise of US Hegemony) - Done
Chapter 4 (Intervention/Good Neighbor) - Done
Chapter 5 (Early Cold War) - Done
Chapter 6 (Cuba Revolution)- Done
Chapter 7 (Communist Threat) - have comments done & am adding them
Chapter 8 (Challenge to US Hegemony)- writing (16 pages out of ~45) Four pages a week
Chapter 9 (Political Economy)- have comments but not yet revised Finish by May 28
Chapter 10 (Immigration) - printed and started writing comments Finish by June 16
Chapter 11 (Human Rights) - printed and thinking about all the outdated parts Finish by July 4 
Chapter 12 (Drug Trafficking) - printed and thinking about all the outdated parts Finish by July 23

Finishing Chapter 7 will not take much time. Typing in the changes to Chapter 9 will take longer because they require more updating. Those were supposed to be done 2 days ago.

Chapter 9 writing goals:

May 16 - 12 pages
May 23 - 16 pages
May 30 - 20 pages
June 6 - 24 pages
June 13 - 28 pages
June 20 - 32 pages
June 27 - 36 pages
July 4 - 42 pages
July 11 - 44 pages
July 11-25 - revise and polish

It is May 30 and I have written 16 pages, which means I am 4 pages (i.e. one week) behind.

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Thursday, May 29, 2014

Immigration Chapter Needs Major Updates

"As more Hispanic immigrants and their children gain the right to vote in the United States, it has become clear that neither the Republican nor Democratic parties have an obvious edge. For example, although the Republican Party in California has been a voice for immigrant restriction, many recent Latin American immigrants with strong Catholic backgrounds gravitate toward its conservative social message (209-210)."

--Gregory Weeks, U.S. and Latin American Relations (2008)

Holy cow, talk about a poorly thought out sentence. I am starting work on the immigration chapter for the second edition and just came across it. But it's also a fascinating glimpse into how much has changed since the end of the Bush administration. I am guessing I wrote that sentence around 2006, a time when a conservative Republican president was fighting unsuccessfully--sometimes against conservative Democrats--for immigration reform. Some conservative Republicans were actually trying to hammer out plans that would include legalizing undocumented workers. Members of the RNC argued that Republican voters supported reform. Latinos had voted for Bush in large numbers. I overestimated the strength of those signals.

So there will be some serious rewriting in this chapter.

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Thoughts on Venezuela Sanctions

News of the House passing targeted sanctions against Venezuela as well as an open letter from some members of Congress (all Democrats) opposing them have been circulating around.

Some observations:

1. There are already targeted sanctions on Venezuela that as far as I know have had no measurable effects (thanks for Steven Bodzin for pointing out their continued existence, though he makes a different point).

2. U.S. legislators disdain Latin American organizations even while claiming to want partnership. Like it or not, the region is opposed to sanctions.

3. Final passage is likely because U.S. legislators don't care whether the sanctions will really work--they just want to look "supportive" and/or "tough." Plus, there is no cost of any kind to bear for voting in favor.

4. Approving sanctions to show moral or ethical support even when they'll likely have little to no effect is bad policy.

5. Unilateral sanctions are ineffective, even more so when they are actively opposed by everyone else.

6. Sanctions are being driven by a very small minority of Congressmembers and wealthy Venezuelan-Americans.

7. Assuming passage, President Obama will likely enact them but can pick and choose who are the "human rights abusers" in the Venezuelan government. Supporters want some big fish but it is not likely that will happen.

8. The net effect of all this will be of the "tempest in a teapot" variety.







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Wednesday, May 28, 2014

Don't Do Stupid Stuff in Latin America

As I've written quite a few times, I like the general thrust of President Obama's policy toward Latin America. More specifically, I like the lack of a one-size-fits-all grand strategy, a focus on positive day-to-day relations on the ground, and hesitance to act too quickly. This does not mean I have agreed with everything the administration has done and I've written about that too. In his speech today at West Point, Obama summed up what I consider the basic reason I approve of his approach:

On a trip to Asia last month, Mr. Obama described his foreign-policy credo with a baseball analogy: “You hit singles, you hit doubles; every once in a while we may be able to hit a home run.” But, he added, the overriding objective is to avoid an error on the order of the Iraq war.
 In private conversations, the president has used a saltier variation of the phrase, “don’t do stupid stuff” – brushing aside as reckless those who say the United States should consider enforcing a no-fly zone in Syria or supplying arms to Ukrainian troops.


The saltier version is "don't do stupid shit," and I like the sound of that. Time and time again, the United States has done really stupid shit in Latin America and it's nice to have someone in office whose goal is to avoid it. Stupid shit does sometimes happen--the NSA flap being a recent one--but at least it seems to stay contained.

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Tuesday, May 27, 2014

Don't Copy Cold War Policy in Latin America

At Shadow Government Ethan Kapstein asks and then answers a question that is not well thought through. Summed up:

Q: How can the U.S. achieve its interests abroad without going to war?
A: Use the same tactics it employed during the Cold War in Latin America

By promoting land reform and industrialization in East Asia and Latin America, for example, the United States helped to create entrepreneurs and new economic interests that sought growth and political stability over peasant and proletariat revolution. 

One problem here is that the United States was vehemently opposed to the vast majority of land reform efforts in Latin America during the Cold War. Remember how it responded to land reform that affected United Fruit in Guatemala?

Similarly, President John Kennedy played an active role in America's involvement in Venezuela during the early 1960s, when that country was threatened by a communist-backed insurgency. The United States provided financial support to the regime of Romulo Betancourt for a wide range of social programs, while it backed negotiations with other elite groups -- including the military, Catholic Church, and petroleum interests -- who opposed the government's reform measures. Again, military assistance was provided to the government, but mainly in the form of technical support and training.

To be fair, yes, Kennedy supported Betancourt and the latter was good for Venezuelan democracy. But as Giglio and Rabe point out, that case was exceptional. For Kennedy and other presidents, ideology was everything and elsewhere they supported dictatorships. What Kapstein is really getting at is the Alliance for Progress, which did not last long and from the Latin American perspective was unsuccessful. As Chilean President Eduardo Frei (who received a ton of Alliance aid) wrote in 1967 in Foreign Affairs:

Many Latin American governments have used the Alliance as a bargaining lever to obtain increases in U. S. aid precisely so as to avoid changing their domestic situation. These governments have committed themselves to internal reforms which later they knowingly allowed either to become a dead letter, or worse, to be completely controlled or used for the benefit of those in power.

So this is not exactly a model we should revive and use again. What you could potentially argue is that is the United States should follow the model it used with the Alliance for Progress under Kennedy (but not LBJ) in some Latin American countries (but not all) and try to recreate the idealism instead of the concrete reality of failure.

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Kennedy, Congress, and Cuba

Asa McKercher, "Steamed Up: Domestic Politics, Congress, and Cuba, 1959-1963." Diplomatic History 38, 3 (2014): 599-627.

Abstract:

Studies examining the initial response of the United States to Cuba’s revolution largely ignore the role of Congress, an oversight reflecting both a scholarly trend emphasizing the actions of the presidency in regards to American foreign policy making and the separation of powers in the U.S. constitution. Redressing the balance, this article examines how members of Congress reacted to the course of U.S.-Cuban relations throughout the crisis years of 1959–1963. Illuminating Cuba’s place in domestic debates about foreign affairs it also looks at the politics surrounding the American response to the Cuban revolution. Lawmakers quickly emerged at the forefront of those calling for a strong stance toward Cuba. In turn, congressional pressure to confront Fidel Castro both helped and hindered presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy. For Kennedy, in particular, domestic politics and actions by Congress were major concerns that tempered his actions in dealing with the Cuban revolution.

The key argument is that studies of early U.S. policy toward the Cuban revolution focus on the executive, so this is opening that up. The ultimate conclusion is not too surprising.

Thus, the executive found it necessary to look tough in standing up to Castro. However, as President Kennedy’s comments to the press in September 1962 indicate, he was focused not only on avoiding the appearance of appeasing Castro but on resisting congressional pressure to take precipitate action against Cuba.

I enjoy these sorts of studies because even as a political scientist I like diving into archival records. We tend to get stuck on the idea that presidents intervene without providing the context for it. With Kennedy we know very well from the Cuban Missile Crisis that he was not anxious to get involved, so it makes good sense to look more closely at the congressional side.

If you're wondering, the conclusion here is that Congress was committed to sanctioning Cuba as much as possible, a pressure Kennedy had a difficult time resisting. The debate sounds eerily similar to the one going on now with Venezuela, though the stakes of course are far lower so it remains largely peripheral to the public eye.

It would benefit a bit, though, from more attention to work by political scientists. In my graduate U.S.-Latin American Relations course I use Michael Grow's U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions, where he looks at domestic opinion--generally driven by congressional leaders--as a main explanatory variable for understanding presidents' decisions to intervene.

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Monday, May 26, 2014

Bachelet and Radicalism

An article in The Santiago Times takes Andres Oppenheimer to task for his recent anti-Bachelet article. I did the same on Twitter when I first saw it.

Notwithstanding Oppenheimer’s piece in El Mercurio, people who live in Chile and read the non-corporate press (El Mostrador, The Clinic, Radio Bio Bio, La Cooperativa) know Oppenheimer’s characterization of Bachelet is phoney. Her open-minded, conciliatory May 21 address emphasized the continuity of her agenda, while at the same time standing firm in her allegiance to Chile’s democracy.


I actually had a similar conversation with a Chilean academic while at the LASA conference. Bachelet may at times talk like she is seeking grand reforms but in general they're not radical and are even incremental. What the right and the corporate media (both of which feed Oppenheimer's columns) fear is that somehow there is a hidden agenda and the "real" Bachelet will deliver the country into the arms of Nicolás Maduro and Raúl Castro. Since Bachelet is a known quantity with four years of a presidency to look at as evidence, it's difficult to fathom how deeply held those suspicions are.



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Sunday, May 25, 2014

The CIA and the Chilean Coup

Former CIA agent Jack Devine just published an article in Foreign Affairs about the Chilean coup that is getting attention because he argues the CIA was mostly clueless about the details of the coup and therefore was not successfully plotting as often portrayed. The CIA had the desire and the resources but the Chilean military was a tough nut to crack.

A few thoughts:

First, can we stop saying "what really happened" about anything? He gives us one viewpoint and so it is only what "really happened" to him, or at least his version of it.

Second, his version is basically what I've been teaching in my classes for a long time and I think has already settled into scholarly conventional wisdom. Every single indication is that the CIA was trying hard to support a coup but was mostly in the dark.

Third, not being directly responsible for the coup is not the same as not being responsible at all. The Nixon administration played an important role in making it happen. In class I discuss what Kathryn Sikkink has called "green lights," whereby the signals of approval the U.S. gives are critical for assuring coup-makers that they'll be supported if successful. So:

Washington hailed Allende’s demise as a major victory. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, were pleased. So was the CIA: against all odds, the Santiago station had helped create a climate for the coup without tainting the effort by becoming directly involved.


Public statements, covert meetings, throwing CIA money, and the like are not plotting with the military but are powerful tools nonetheless for creating a coup climate. And, of course, they are also major violations of sovereignty.

Fourth, the persistent belief that the U.S. was more actively involved in making the coup happen stems in part from the also persistent U.S.-centric assertion that the United States government drives just about all major events around the world. Latin American agency disappears. Chileans wouldn't possibly do this on their own!

Fifth, the CIA does enough--and Devine notes how he tossed money around, even claiming credit for the women banging pots--that conspiracy theories of major plots all over the place are just believable enough. He lauds covert operations but the CIA has done tremendous damage to U.S. credibility, U.S. moral authority, and sometimes even U.S. national security.

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Friday, May 23, 2014

Gap Between Academia and Policy for Latin America

I was pleased with the roundtable we had at LASA about the disconnect between academia and the policy world with regard to Latin America. It was a lot of fun and I think sparked some great discussion. The panelists were Chris Sabatini, Shannon O'Neil, Bill LeoGrande and Frank Mora.

We did note that many policy makers remain hostile or just indifferent to academia, especially at high levels. As scholars, we can't control that but we can take some of our own steps.

We've made too little progress and the gap remains unbridged to a significant degree. In some ways, political science as a discipline has moved away from policy even as the possible means of dissemination through social media has expanded. For that reason, individuals must be entrepreneurial, knowing they may not receive much (or any) credit toward the goals of tenure, promotion, and merit raises.

Here are some concrete suggestions that came out of the discussion. We covered a lot and this is not exhaustive but it provides a sense of what we (and the audience) were thinking about.

1. Learn to write in different ways. Speak the language. Strip out the jargon and get straight to the point. Side note: this is one way in which The Monkey Cage is a great venue, as it essentially translates academic work into something more accessible.

2. Shop that writing. You can blog, of course, but you can also write op-eds. Plus, you should contact people in thinks tanks and introduce yourself, which can often even be done via Twitter. Write for Americas Quarterly or Foreign Policy. Communicate with reporters and get quoted, which then raises your profile and allows you to get your voice heard, even if just a little bit.

3. Try to exhort a little less. We all have opinions, sometimes very strong, but you need to convey information, not just how much you want a policy changed. Latin Americanists are often tagged as adversarial, which may be true in many policy areas but your voice is stronger if you make your case without too much ideology.

4. Learn the policy process. It is very easy to demand change but recognize the obstacles to policy reform when you're making a case. It is easy for policy makers (or say, staffers who may read these articles and discuss them) to dismiss analyses they believe naive.

5. Be aware of what you don't know. Even if you understand the policy process pretty well, you do not know the inner workings of different parts of the government. Who is in, who is out, what personal differences there are, etc. At least recognize that your policy prescriptions may not even be possible (or at least need more nuance) under given circumstances.

6. Incorporate it into your classes. One great idea (I need to give Shannon O'Neil credit here) is to arrange for policy analysts to Skype into a class and talk to students. Have students write op-eds and policy briefs. I am going to think about all of that as I prepare my Latin American Politics syllabus for the Fall 2014 semester.

It's true that these and other issues are not entirely new. Alexander George in particular had grappled with them years ago. But one point that came up several times is that the difference now is social media. You do not need to go to DC to meet people. In fact, I had not yet met my fellow panelists in person even though I had been in touch with them in various ways over time through blogging, Twitter, and email.






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Thursday, May 22, 2014

Aswany's The Yacoubian Building

Alaa Al Aswany's The Yacoubian Building (first published in 2002) takes a Cairo building as a microcosm of Egyptian society just after the launch of the first Gulf War, showing how the country has slid into decay. The disillusioned youth who moves toward radical Islam, the class differences, manipulation (and sometimes abuse) of women, the corruption and gaming of the system, and more.

What struck me was how this could've been a novel of authoritarian Latin America. In place of radical Islam put Marxism, where young people try unsuccessfully to engage with the corrupt system so then fight against it and the hegemon they see behind it. It's a society warped by autocratic rule and is leading nowhere good as a result. So it is engaging but will certainly not uplift you.






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Wednesday, May 21, 2014

Yoani Sánchez's Newspaper

Yoani Sánchez started an online newspaper in Cuba called 14ymedio.com. Apparently so far it has not been blocked by the Cuban government.

What I find particularly interesting about it is that it is not opposition per se. Think Venezuela, with all the insults and slurs. Instead, it is a collection of different types of stories that transcend politics. Instead, you get this indirect digs, quick indications of a state that has pretty ossified. Take this story about baseball versus football in Cuba:

La mayor pesadilla del fútbol cubano estriba en tener al enemigo dentro y disfrutando, además, de una estrecha complicidad con el Instituto Nacional de Deportes y Recreación (INDER). Esta entidad se muestra preocupada hasta el desvelo por salvaguardar la prevalencia del béisbol en tanto "deporte nacional", como si las preferencias deportivas fueran un tema de seguridad nacional o una cuestión de Estado.

This isn't about politics, but it reveals how far the state has extended its control to impose even particular sports on the country. Everything down to the most trivial is somehow a matter of national security, and this publication pokes fun at it. This is more likely to generate sympathy than a sledgehammer strategy, and of course is less likely to be censored. It's calling for a rethinking of what has been taken for granted, not for regime change.

We know there are clear limits but not necessarily where they are. Yoani Sánchez has been masterful at becoming known globally and it is therefore harder for the government to crack down on her. But if she pushes too far, they will, but right now we're in uncharted waters.

Update: The Cuban government blocked access to it after I posted. Seems times haven't changed at all and the waters are quite well charted!

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Tuesday, May 20, 2014

Using Cuba in Venezuela Talks

Juan Gabriel Tokatlian argues that the United States and Cuba could work together to stabilize Venezuela.


Maybe, and just for a brief window of opportunity, there is some room for a concerted, quite diplomacy between the United States and Cuba regarding Venezuela. UNASUR, the United States and Cuba all have certain legitimate national interests at stake there and not many of them are incompatible. A combination of incentives and restraints, patience and demands, political carrots and diplomatic sticks can be designed over the medium and long term. There is not a quick fix, nor a magic bullet when dealing with the Venezuelan crisis. The core issue at this moment should be respect for human rights, the establishment of a realistic political dialogue, and the commitment of all domestic parties to democratic strengthening and against authoritarianism. [emphasis mine]

I appreciate the creativity--which the Venezuela crisis could use--but something puzzles me. Cuba does not respect human rights, has no political dialogue, and is opposed to democratization. So how can it help in promoting those things in Venezuela?

Further, economically the Cuban government is desperately dependent upon the continuation of a Chavista government so it really cannot act as a neutral arbiter in any case. Its goal will be to neutralize the opposition and prop up the government.

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Monday, May 19, 2014

Letter to Obama on Cuba

A high profile group has sent President Obama an open letter (text here) calling for liberalization of Cuba policy. It focuses on removing travel restrictions, financial restrictions, and high level dialogue in areas of mutual interest, all of which can be achieved by executive order. In short, it advocates common sense. It does not call for ending the embargo, but baby steps are fine for now.

But timing matters and this window of opportunity may not remain open indefinitely. At the same time, the U.S. is finding itself increasingly isolated internationally in its Cuba policy. In the current political climate little can be done legislatively, but the Obama Administration has an unprecedented opportunity to usher in significant progress using its executive authority at a time when public opinion on Cuba policy has shifted toward greater engagement with the Cuban people while continuing to pressure the Cuban government on human rights.

The signatories range from business, the (retired) military, the Democratic Party, business, and think tanks, but John Negroponte also signed it, and he is not what you'd call liberal.

This is about chipping away. The general public has supported opening up for years, though few see it as a pressing issue. Meanwhile, even Republican governors have traveled to Cuba to engage in cash-based trade. So the public opinion piece is there and so is the economic piece. What remains is the ideological piece, which is centered in Florida and absolutely set on blocking any and all of these reforms.

Slowly adding people like Negroponte to the mix can have an ideological impact because he enjoys tremendous respect within the conservative ranks, basically for the same reasons he enjoys the exact opposite within liberal ranks (including, for example, his support for the Contras and looking the other way at serious abuses in Honduras). If any conservatives are on the fence, he is someone they can publicly refer to.

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