Dynamics of the Venezuelan Amnesty

The recently passed Amnesty Law in Venezuela is generating almost as much controversy as relief. There have already been over 1,500 requests for amnesty that have been filed. I want to focus on just one problematic aspect. The following points to it:

Amnesty is not automatic under the law: petitioners must ask the court handling their cases.

The problem is that many Venezuelans who have sought political asylum in the United States don't have a court hearing any case. They are people who were targeted by the Venezuelan government for participating in protests or even just pointing out government deficiencies or criticizing it. They would be beaten up, detained, their phones taken, and sometimes colectivos would follow them or show up at their homes. They don't have a registered "case" and haven't been charged with a formal crime. They have been terrorized to keep their mouths shut and to avoid protesting.

So this amnesty appears not to help them. As I've mentioned before, we don't currently know what the colectivos are doing. We don't know if it's safe for people to return to the country. There are many thousands of Venezuelans who committed "crimes" just by speaking their minds and were attacked for it. The government knows who they are but hasn't filed formal charges. So there's no amnesty for them.

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Venezuelan Public Opinion in the Aftermath

Yesterday I watched an Atlantic Council panel on public opinion in Venezuela, which I definitely recommend. You can watch it here. Mark Feierstein's discussion of his firm's poll results (which were taken in January) was particularly interesting (as was the occasional polite disagreement from Venezuelan panelists).

I won't rehash it, but there is one point that didn't get much attention that I think is definitely worth keeping in mind. It's about what has sometimes been called the "ni-nis," meaning people who are neither with the government nor the opposition. They are a plurality in Venezuela. I screenshotted this from the presentation:

Independent: 42%

Opposition: 37%

Chavista: 17%

I think it's reasonable to assume that independents want free and fair elections, and may well have voted for González/Machado, but aren't tied to MCM ideologically. There was a discussion about when she should come back to Venezuela and I will be interested to see what happens when she shifts from what she's against (the dictatorship) and what she's for. I would guess the latter will be focused largely on the economy, which according to the poll is the highest priority for Venezuelans. But there is a lot of other stuff to deal with as well.

Anyway, just a friendly reminder that Venezuela is not a binary government/opposition. And a friendly reminder that MCM does not perceive Venezuela as safe to return to, though it is also entirely possible she wants to return and test repression but the Trump administration is convincing her to wait.

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What is Repression Like in Venezuela?

Something I am particularly interested in is the effect of the political change in Venezuela on repression. We have scattered signs of protests happening and individuals saying they feel less threatened, but we also have the re-arrest of one prominent political prisoner and others who are not being released. There are so many questions. For example, is the government still monitoring those protests, keeping track of who participates? We know they routinely do that and colectivos later show up at people's doors to threaten them. Where are the colectivos right now? With no evidence, it does not reasonable to assume they just gave up the whole endeavor.

We don't have answers. My impression is that Venezuelans themselves don't know. Some are testing the waters to see what happens and only time will tell us more. But I recommend an article that Human Rights Watch just released. They call on the government to dismantle the repressive apparatus. Venezuelan repression is based on a wide variety of laws intended to criminalize all free speech.

These laws date back over 15 years and actually overlap. The 2014 Hate Law alone allows the government to criminalize practically anything. After the fraudulent 2024 presidential election, more laws were put in place just to remind Venezuelans they were not allowed to make any statements critical of the government, not even humorously.

What this means is that the government can unleash violence at any time. By this time, such violence is a natural reflex when people criticize the government and especially when they protest in the streets. It is entirely correct that no one can be truly safe until those laws are revoked. Interestingly, HRW says "amend or repeal" though I cannot imagine how these can be amended without remaining undemocratic. All countries need laws governing security but Venezuela should draft new ones, not use dictatorial remainders.

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China's Web of Relationships in Latin America

R. Evan Ellis has an interesting article about China's relationship with Guatemala. Here is the takeaway, which I think is essential for understanding what's going across Latin America:

China and China-based companies have made substantial progress in advancing their position through a web of business and personal influence relationships, opening the door to Beijing’s influence and digital access. 

Note that this isn't about specific trade deals, or port deals, or investments. It's about the painstaking process of building personal relationships over two decades or so. It's the long game. What that means is that even when a high profile deal is squashed, plenty of other quiet ones still happen. In fact, a lot of deals were squashed in the past without U.S. pressure. That's business.

During prior administrations, China-based companies unsuccessfully sought to acquire land on both the Atlantic and Pacific for port facilities. Chinese ZPMC cranes, scanners, and other digital equipment are reportedly used by Guatemala’s private port operators, such as APM and Chiquita Brands. 

The lesson here is not to be immediately swayed by headlines. There is a lot going on under the surface. 

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Annulling the Monroe Doctrine

 A group of 18 House Democrats introduced a resolution entitled, "Calling for the annulment of the Monroe Doctrine and the development of a "New Good Neighbor" policy in order to foster improved relations and deeper, more effective cooperation between the United States and its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors."

Its introductory part, with all the "whereas," is actually one of the most concise yet comprehensive histories of U.S. intervention in Latin America. Kudos to them for that.

The core of the resolution, that "the Department of State should formally confirm that the Monroe Doctrine is no longer a part of United States policy toward Latin American and the Caribbean" is obviously just symbolic and actually a bit silly. As the intro notes, John Kerry already proclaimed it dead once and it didn't matter all that much.

The other part of the resolution calls for a "New Good Neighbor Policy," I think forgetting that part of the Good Neighbor Policy entailed the installation of some really terrible dictators and then letting them do what they wanted (Nicaragua is still dealing with the aftermath!). I would suggest a different name instead of being stuck forever in the past.

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Government Intervention in the Economy

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent was in Brazil discussing trade and this quote popped out at me.

Despite diplomatic controversies caused by Trump’s economic agenda in Brazil, Bessent supported the use of tariffs as part of a broader effort to reindustrialise. He noted that while tariffs generate short-term revenue, the long-term goal is to encourage companies to move production to the United States, shifting government revenue towards domestic economic activity.

This should sound familiar to anyone who has looked at Latin America from the 1950s-1980s. Import substitution industrialization was a large-scale effort to industrialize, encourage local production, and shift government revenue to domestic economic activity, all through the use of tariffs. As Mike Allison and I wrote in U.S. and Latin American Relations:

The idea was that to reduce dependency on imports, the state would direct, encourage, and subsidize targeted domestic industries, whose products would substitute for foreign goods (p. 136).

It's so similar, but not identical. At least as yet, we're not seeing the same level of state investment in industry (e.g. ownership, even if partial). The irony is that Latin America was doing it in large part to protect itself from the United States, which in turn exerted tremendous pressure to liberalize and open markets up to U.S. products. Now the script is flipped.

The irony is extended further since in the same interview, Bessent said we had a “generational opportunity to strengthen ties with governments that support market-oriented reforms.” At the moment, however, the U.S. is not such a country. "Market-oriented" means that the market determines outcomes with a minimum of government manipulation. Recent reforms in terms of government intervention in the economy is decidedly not market-oriented. In fact, Latin American countries have been pursuing free trade agreements elsewhere.

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Americans Don't Care Much About Venezuela

There is a new Pew survey showing Americans* don't have much faith in Donald Trump when it comes to "wise decisions" toward Venezuela, that they're split on U.S. access to Venezuelan oil and the use of force to remove Nicolás Maduro, and that the splits run a lot along partisan lines. Politically, I don't think it matters much because the poll does not measure intensity.

About a month ago, I gave a surprisingly lengthy interview for local TV news. I ended up getting a lot of positive feedback because so many people just didn't have any idea what was happening. But what occurs to me is that the appetite for knowing more has mostly evaporated. What people really pay attention to is the use of U.S. force that might involve U.S. casualties. In my opinion, although people might be aware of killing people on boats and commandeering oil tankers and many might even oppose those actions, they don't assign much importance to them. If we ever get to a point where U.S. troops enter Venezuela, then that can change quickly.

What that means is that until that time, U.S. public opinion likely won't have much impact on U.S. policy toward Venezuela, which will continue to go along the president's whims.

*Yes, I am aware of the problematic nature of the term but it's much easier shorthand than "people in the United States." I wish we had something better.

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How Latin American Presidents Deal With Trump

In an article about Senator Katie Britt, a New York Times reporter noted something that caught my attention:

She seldom challenges Mr. Trump. When she does, she believes that, to be effective, any outrage must be felt quietly, any response conducted through back-channeled phone calls and peppered with words of admiration for the president.

This is a great way to way to frame oppositional Latin American presidents' response to Donald Trump as well. It was widely reported that Trump took offense to Nicolás Maduro dancing around in response to U.S. threats. So after the Venezuela invasion, Gustavo Petro switched from highly inflammatory to a White House visit where he had Trump sign The Art of the Deal. Claudia Sheinbaum has been similarly careful albeit perhaps less effusive, but manages to get Trump to say positive things about her publicly.

I am sure everyone has noticed that co-dictators Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo are very quiet. Nicaragua was not on the list of countries being decertified as not cooperating in anti-narcotics efforts (Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela were) so are less likely to get his attention. So they stay vewy vewy quiet and stay off Trump's radar. 

Miguel Díaz-Canel doesn't exactly go this route but his personality is very un-flamboyant so he greatly resembles it. He'll never visit the White House but he's not in the news much and does not make fiery speeches. But Cuba is Cuba, so he's on the radar no matter what. 

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Cuba Has a Secret Plan

From Granma: Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel says Cuba has lots of support and plenty of governments and institutions ready to help it, but he can't talk about it.

Apuntó que, además de esas manifestaciones de solidaridad, «hay más cosas, cosas que no podemos hoy explicar abiertamente, porque el enemigo está en una persecución de todas las luces que se le pueden abrir a Cuba, de todos los caminos que se le pueden abrir a Cuba; pero sí les puedo asegurar, con todo sentido de responsabilidad, que Cuba no está sola.

«En un momento como este hay mucha gente, gobiernos, países, instituciones, empresas que están dispuestos a trabajar con Cuba y que ya nos han hecho llegar vías, mecanismos, intenciones de cómo podemos hacer.

So sure, you wouldn't want to publicize any of this, but it's difficult to supply anything secretly to Cuba. The trick is that Cuba badly needs oil and the U.S. has promised tariff retaliation for selling to Cuba. You can't get oil there without anyone knowing.

Both Mexico and Russia have publicly said they'll keep sending it (even though Donald Trump said Mexico would stop). However, Claudia Sheinbaum suggested that she might not want to suffer the tariffs. The loss of Mexican oil would be huge. Russia's supply is much smaller but every bit counts because Cuba cannot produce enough for its own needs.

So perhaps there are plans afoot to get some critical goods to Cuba, which can slightly ease the pain inflicted by the embargo and threats. Certainly, the Cuban government enjoys a level of international respect that Venezuela lacked (or once had, then lost as it became clear that Maduro and much of the regime wasn't even slightly revolutionary). But it may well be that the most important assistance will have to be public because it's in bulk.

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The Key Problem with Maria Corina Machado

Marco Rubio's announcement that the Venezuelan regime will have to submit a monthly budget, which will then release money from a Qatari account*, just underlines a key reason that democratic transition in Venezuela is a problem for the Trump administration. Democratically-elected (or even just democratically-minded) leaders could not accept such an arrangement. No one in Venezuela gets a say in the country's most precious natural resource.

If María Corina Machado were to return, there would be myriad challenges, but let's focus on this one for now. The U.S. could not say they would overthrow or kidnap her if she didn't follow its orders. She would have independent legitimacy that Delcy Rodríguez completely lacks. With that legitimacy she could dictate terms even though she might feel indebted to the U.S. for getting her back in the country. She would have the right to say no. She would not want to ask permission from a foreign power to spend her own country's money.

This will come as no surprise to people who know Latin American political history, but it's far better for the Trump administration to have a pliable, vulnerable, and undemocratic president in Venezuela. It carries its own problems, but it's better. The U.S. might not even need any military force to remove Rodríguez if she doesn't act as Marco Rubio wants--just whisper to political rivals that she's out of favor. Remote control authority doesn't work with democracy (it's not clear how well it works with dictatorship, but it's easier).

The administration has made abundantly clear that democracy is definitely not a short-term goal and is only hazily a long-term one. Aside from the obvious problem of having groups that detest each other, democracy in the best of times is messy and unpredictable. For a foreign country wanting access to oil and money, messy and unpredictable is no good. 

*The term "slush fund" is not out of order here.

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Controlling Another Country's Money

 I was reading through Lars Schoultz's In Their Own Best Interest and found a fun citation in the Foreign Relations of the United States documents. It is Secretary of State Philander Knox speaking to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1911. The topic is Honduras but it could be Venezuela today.

We can not blink the fact that there is no hope for peace and prosperity for Honduras except through the United States. All she now asks is, Will you assist us to make the security good which we offer for the debt we are incurring, at a reasonable rate of interest, by helping us to secure an honest collection of our revenues, or will you, by withholding that assistance, drive us back upon the usurers and plunderers who have brought us to our present stagnation?

How will this be done?

The convention has been drawn for the purpose of giving security. That is, for the purpose of assuring the regular payment of interest and sinking fund upon the debt. Its provisions, briefly, are:

1. Honduras engages to place the loan in the United States.

2. Honduras pledges her customs receipts for the payment of the interest and sinking fund.

3. Honduras agrees to appoint a receiver from a list of names prepared by the fiscal agent and approved by the President of the United States.

4. Honduras agrees to afford protection to the receiver and that if necessary the United States may give such protection.

5. The receiver is under obligation to report to the fiscal agent of the loan and to either Government regarding the discharge of his duties.

6. Honduras further agrees not to alter the customs receipts during the existence of the loan.

In essence, Honduras hands its economy over to U.S. officials.

The convention would have the effect of affording security to the bondholders; of assuring to Honduras the punctual and complete discharge of her obligations practically without cost to the Government; the enjoyment of continued peace, and the consequent internal development; and to the United States the saving in expense to this Government would alone seem to be a sufficient inducement.

Good for everyone. Except Hondurans.

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Trump's Policy Toward Latin America and China

I wrote a guest blog post for the University of New Mexico Press, which published my book on autonomy. It's not a new story for anyone reading this blog. Not even the Venezuela invasion will suddenly push China aside. Indeed, Latin America doesn't want to it pushed aside. Go read it and give them some clicks.

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Latin America's Response to Mark Carney's Speech

I was watching a webinar put on by the Canadian Council for the Americas, which naturally touched on Mark Carney's speech. Robert Funk, a Chilean professor (but also Canadian) noted how unusual it was to have people talking about a Canadian Prime Minister's speech in casual conversation. And I don't blog very much about Canada.

It resonated elsewhere and Claudia Sheinbaum praised it. Carney will spend a lot of the year traveling, which already includes Brazil and I imagine will include plenty more of Latin America. This isn't exactly new, but the sense of urgency is intensifying.

A question came up in the webinar about whether Canada would lead some sort of group of middle powers, which I think misses the core point. This isn't a "movement" per se but rather just the rational response by sovereign countries with options. There doesn't have to be a leader, which suggests common political views, policies, and the like.

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Delcy Rodriguez's Public Face

Delcy Rodriguez is widely quoted as saying she's had "enough" of U.S. interference and orders. Telesur, which I hadn't looked at in forever, really gets into it but it's getting play in all the major U.S. outlets as well. It is in fact getting so much play and so little official pushback that it feels planned. In that sense, Telesur is (unwittingly or not) following right along with U.S. policy.

She's obviously facing intense pressure from within the regime, but the rest of Venezuela didn't suddenly lose their sense of nationalism. They wonder whether the U.S. is simply sucking the oil and profit out of the country. She has to be allowed to give fiery speeches every once in a while to bolster an image of nationalism and sovereignty. This has plenty of precedent in Latin American history more broadly. Fidel Castro himself was consistently involved in quiet talks with the U.S. while explaining he had to give a certain kind of speech publicly. That could well be what's happening here.

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Don't Make Sweeping Generalizations About Latin American Politics

Michael Reid, who is a highly experienced observer of Latin American politics, should know better than to make sweeping generalizations about it, but he did. He says that the rightward trend in Latin America is different from past pendulums and is likely here to stay. Here are his two main reasons and the problems with them.

1. Latin American voters have been afraid of a repeat of Venezuela so vote for the right instead. The problem here is obvious--in 2022 neighboring Colombia voted in not just a leftist (the first in their history!) but a former guerrilla. The same year, neighboring Brazil chose Lula over a Jair Bolsonaro, who was both incumbent and close to Donald Trump. So this reason doesn't pass muster.

2. "Since the Covid-19 pandemic, which hit the region hard, voters’ focus has changed to the basics of life: finding stable work, putting food on the table and, perhaps above all, keeping safe." The entire first part of this puzzles me because Latin American voters have always, and I mean always, centered on finding stable work and food. That's what gave rise to Hugo Chávez in the first place. And it absolutely relates to incumbency because when the right or left can't fulfill those promises, voters look elsewhere. That said, his point about how drug violence has spread more than in the past is definitely true. But even in countries with serious drug trafficking (take Honduras or Mexico) voters have moved to the left and right.

After making the point that anti-incumbency is less likely now and so the right might well dominate, he hedges:

"In the end, the durability of Latin America’s latest shift will turn on how successful these leaders are in improving the lives of ordinary citizens, in making them safer and less poor and offering them better services like health care, education and public transport."

In other words, if incumbents don't fulfill promises, voters look elsewhere.

He does make the critical point that the current Latin American right is heterogeneous. Different approaches, different personalities, and different priorities. This is the most important takeaway of the piece because it tells us that sweeping generalizations will always lead you astray. What happens in Argentina--always so idiosyncratic--may or may not have significant impact elsewhere. If there is a regional or global recession (let's say the AI bubble bursts badly) then we might soon be talking about a resurgence of the center-left.*

* I do think the revolutionary left is so badly discredited that it will take decades for people to forget about its disasters. But they always do eventually!

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