Will Russia Do Anything For Cuba?

I had not thought all that much about what Russia would do if the U.S. attacked Venezuela and/or Cuba. I have countless posts about how Russian and Iranian influence was far lower than alarmists wished to portray. That said, the Russia-Cuba relationship is very old and deep, so I might have expected more than zero. But with Venezuela, it was zero.

And for Cuba it has been pretty much zero up to this point. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement about Cuba and it is pretty vague:

"There has been a deliberate effort to ratchet up the atmosphere of confrontation," the ministry said in a statement on its website.

"Against this backdrop, Russia reaffirms its unwavering solidarity with the Cuban Government and its brotherly people. We firmly condemn attempts to grossly interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, intimidate it and engage illegal unilateral restrictive measures," it said.

It noted that Cuba today faces unprecedented challenges created by the long-standing trade, economic and financial embargoes imposed by the United States. "For our part, we are providing and will continue to provide Cuba with the necessary support, including material assistance," it said.

The main material assistance is needs now is oil and a commitment to defending Cuba militarily. The latter has not happened and I can't imagine it happening for a variety of reasons. Oil is more doable but hasn't happened yet. There appears to be a Russian oil tanker on its way but we'll have to see what happens. The rubber hits the road when the U.S. and Russia face off directly.

Cuba just doesn't have allies willing to deal with the U.S. A big part of it is that the revolution is long dead. It's very similar to Venezuela in that ideals were once real and now are just pantomime. It's all just clinging to power at this point. Cuba was once widely admired in Latin America but that's a long time ago. Miguel Díaz-Canel is an uninteresting bureaucrat who does not generate even a modicum of admiration anywhere. Who would want to risk U.S. retaliation for that?

Read more...

CHina Supplants Midwest Farmers

Keep looking beyond the big headlines to see what happens with China in Latin America. One such example is that farmers in the midwest are concerned by how China has shifted away from buying U.S. soybeans and instead is buying even more from Latin America, where it now has long-standing relationships and infrastructure.

And the farmers know why. It's not complicated Here is a quote from one:

For her, the changing politics and policies have made the United States an “unreliable trading partner.”

“The only way that we become their top choice would be if our soybeans were far cheaper than South America’s.”

China has been strategically investing in infrastructure, especially after 2018 when the Trump administration's trade war policy heated up. The U.S. slaps tariffs on China, which reciprocates. The reciprocation means that U.S. farmers get shut out because Brazil doesn't impose such tariffs. It's how global capitalism works. You can't count on unreliable trading paretners so you do your best to work around them.

What this does, of course, is to cement exactly what the Trump administration claims it doesn't want, which is increased Chinese investment and involvement in Latin America.

Watch for more of this all the time. It's been ongoing.

Read more...

Human Rights Still Abused in Venezuela

 A UN fact finding mission went to Venezuela and one of its members discussed ongoing human rights abuses for the period going back to September 2025.

First of all, she noted the very obvious holes in the amnesty law:

It applies only to criminal offences (and not to civil, disciplinary, administrative or other types of proceedings) and only to a closed list of events. It excludes a large number of individuals detained in relation to other incidents, including alleged “armed or forceful actions” against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country—an accusation frequently used by authorities to detain military personnel, ex-military members and civilians.

Further, people are still being detained. I had been wondering about the colectivos, which are specifically mentioned:

Information available to the Mission confirms that “colectivos”—armed civilian groups— continue to operate. Civic and democratic space remains severely restricted. Civil society organizations, the few remaining independent media outlets, and political actors continue to face attacks, harassment or intimidation. The prospects for full guarantees necessary for free and democratic elections remain remote.

It notes that all of the laws used to repress people remain on the books. The fact is that while there appears to be a lot of cautious optimism, the entire repressive apparatus and the people who run them remain exactly as they were before the invasion. There are a million ways this could go, but elections are the clearest way to repeal all of that.

Read more...

Cartel Proclamation

Donald Trump issued a proclamation in conjunction with his Shield of the Americas initiative.

(1)  Criminal cartels and foreign terrorist organizations in the Western Hemisphere should be demolished to the fullest extent possible consistent with applicable law.

There is nothing new here, except maybe the use of the word "demolish" to be dramatic.

(2)  The United States and its allies should coordinate to deprive these organizations of any control of territory and access to financing or resources necessary to conduct their campaigns of violence.

This is already a goal, even with countries not part of the initiative. If there is enhanced regional coordination that would be great.

(3)  The United States will train and mobilize partner nation militaries to achieve the most effective fighting force necessary to dismantle cartels and their ability to export violence and pursue influence through organized intimidation.

In general this is not new. How it gets carried out may well be. More coordination isn't necessarily a bad thing, though I don't know if that's what they have in mind (to be fair, they may well not know what they have in mind). But you can't help but think about Operation Condor kind of stuff.

The biggest problem here is that this is pure military, in a way that echoes the worst parts of the Cold War. No mention of civilian authorities, democracy, governance, etc. So what will the training consist of? If it means blowing up boats, it can get dicey. In any event, blowing up boats doesn't do anything to dismantle cartels or reduce violence.

There are longstanding debates about the role of the military in Latin America, which I've been part of and don't need to rehash here. Suffice it to say that military autonomy when it comes to using force is problematic. But I also know the administration doesn't see it as a problem.

(4)  The United States and its allies should keep external threats at bay, including malign foreign influences from outside the Western Hemisphere.

This is straight-up Cold War, so what's old is new again. Obviously this is aimed at China, though secondarily to Iran and its allies, which are an age-old boogeyman for the U.S. right. The difference with the Cold War is that China has been deeply involved in Latin America for almost 30 years, which was certainly not the case with the Soviet Union.

And I'll say, over and over, that if the U.S. wants to keep China at bay it needs to offer itself as an alternative, which is in conflict with an "America-first" attitude.

Read more...

The Venezuelan Opposition and Presidential Election

When the U.S. announced its re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Venezuela, it included mention of a "phased process" toward "a peaceful transition to a democratically elected government." Meanwhile, there is an opinion piece at Caracas Chronicles that calls for a primary to determine a single opposition candidate.

The twist is that María Corina Machado is clearly the opposition leader with the most political momentum (though she is now out of the limelight) but Trump consciously sidelined her and brought Enrique Márquez, another opposition leader who also ran in the 2024 election and was an opposition member of the CNE for several years, to the State of the Union. That gives us two high visibility candidates, which is exactly what Delcy Rodríguez would want and the regime wanted for many years before that--opposition division. So a single candidate makes sense if they can agree to it.

But there is also the question of what their platform will be. People will want to know what the opposition will do better and be reassured that the social services they have won't be removed. The country is already selling oil to the U.S. and Delcy talks very nicely about Donald Trump so you can't promise better relations. You can't really promise trials or accountability. You can talk about free market capitalism but you'll want to be very careful with that.

Delcy Rodríguez did a verbal 180, or close to it, so it's hard to be her opposite, whereas just in December it would've been easy. So it gets easier for people to choose her and avoid the unknown.

Read more...

Shield of the Americas Summit

Donald Trump is pulling an Hugo Chávez. Chávez thought the OAS was too pro-U.S. so he created CELAC, which was more leftist. He also created UNASUR, which did a few things and then disintegrated. Right-wing governments created PROSUR, which as far as I know hasn't done much of anything and likely barely exists. CELAC still exists but mostly disagrees, which frankly is a lot of what the OAS does as well.

So now Trump is creating the Shield of the Americas, a disparate group of countries whose sole thing in common is that their current government is on the right*. The formal announcement comes Saturday so we don't yet know details but it is hard to imagine it being significantly different from all the others. He just learned that Kristi Noem will be the U.S. "special envoy," which means ideology will be front and center, and reality several steps behind. It also signals this institution is not super important to him because he's putting someone in that he just fired.

Part of the new institution's goal will be to push back on China. As I and plenty of others have argued, however, the U.S. needs to be a reliable partner to make this happen, and impromptu tariffs combined with reneging on past agreements make that challenging. Maybe you can push out Chinese investment to some degree if U.S. investors are ready but what about trade? 

I recommend Adam Ratzlaff's take on it. An additional point to make based on the experience of the other existing multilateral institutions is that governments change and a new leftist government will have considerably less interest. If it becomes ideologically obnoxious they may just leave it. That's the core problem of ideologically based institutions. Ideologies change. A Chilean president helped created PROSUR and a Chilean president suspended the country's participation in it. That's how it goes.

* Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Paraguay, El Salvador, Ecuador, Argentina, Honduras, Costa Rica, Bolivia and Chile. And I believe Panama.

Read more...

Rebellion in Cuba and Venezuela?

Rut Diamint and Laura Tedesco have an essay in Foreign Affairs about Cuba, arguing that the long-standing revolutionary model is ending and that we don't know what will replace it. There is one part that I wonder about:

To be sure, many Cubans would likely perceive their government’s acquiescence to U.S. demands as an erosion of Cuban sovereignty, even a reversion to the island’s pre-revolutionary status as a U.S. client state. A rebellion by the military and parts of society cannot be ruled out.

Is this true? In both Venezuela and Cuba we have a strong revolutionary past that has long ceased serving its own citizens. Further, the people in power aren't the original leaders, who had strong personal followings. Instead, there are annointed leaders who mostly make their citizens' lives worse. These revolutions are long dead.

I am dubious about the "reversion" argument because it's over 60 years ago so very few people experienced it. I can see military leadership feeling threatened (as targets) but would rank-and-file Cubans want to fight for this revolution? What would the goal of such a rebellion be? Put some authoritarian technocrat back in power?

Nationalism matters. A lot. U.S. protectionism will wear thin, perhaps quickly. But people want solutions to immediate problems. The Venezuelan revolution was starting to fail before the U.S. government turned the economy screws on it. The Cuba revolution had suffered the embargo for many years but is a dependent revolution so was hurt even worse by the fall of the Soviet Union and the gradual decline of Venezuelan oil production. Obviously the Trump administration made things worse but they were already bad.

Venezuelans and Cubans will certainly fight for their countries but I am not convinced they'll fight for these governments. I especially wonder because up to this point Trump has avoided occupying forces that could become targets. An occupying force would change everything but that's not where we are up to this point.

Read more...

What if María Corina Machado Returned?

María Corina Machado says she plans to return to Venezuela in a few weeks. The big question, of course, is what the regime will do about it. We have this:

“With respect to her life, we do not understand why there is so much commotion,” Rodríguez said. “As for her return to the country, she will have to answer before Venezuela. Why did she call for a military intervention? Why did she call for sanctions against Venezuela? And why did she celebrate the actions that took place at the beginning of January?”

It's a pretty funny statement when you think about it since everyone knows why MCM called for those things. Military intervention is what got this ball rolling.

What fascinates me are all the political calculations going on. I assume there are all kinds of discussions, including between MCM and Marco Rubio. The thing is, I don't see how they could arrest her without creating mayhem, which would lead to repression and some kind of U.S. response. I also figure the U.S. would prefer not to have to respond because it's clear Trump himself has zero interest in Venezuelan democracy. So there's a good chance she doesn't come back until she's received some kind of green light. On the other hand, she could chance it and just go.

But if they let her in without imprisoning her, then things will accelerate. She will have rallies and they will be large as people feel emboldened. The call for elections will get louder. That would not be allowed just a short time ago and it's unclear how the regime would respond to it now.

Read more...

Anti-Terrorism Courts in Venezuela

The International Commission of Jurists just released a report on the use of anti-terrorism courts in Venezuela to, frankly, terrorize the population. The anti-terrorism code got going 20ish years ago under Hugo Chavez and conveniently did not define the term. So it simply came to mean regime opponents, same as many other Venezuelan laws intended to attack the population. Subsequent laws provided some more definition, but it could mean anything the regime wanted since the courts did whatever it wanted.

The anti-terrorism laws were used extensively after the fraudulent 2024 election, with references to "treason" and "conspiracy" that had no real meaning. They also used the term "hate" since it had its own vague law.

The report notes at the end that it was largely written before the U.S. invasion and certainly well before the amnesty. It's not clear to me that supposed anti-terrorism charges would automatically be dropped due to the amnesty. All these laws need to be abrogated and anyone even remotely held under suspicion by the government should be allowed unconditional freedom (and ability to return to the country).

Read more...

Dynamics of the Venezuela Amnesty (Part 2)

Here is a link to the full text of the amnesty. Earlier this week I was thinking about how people who haven't been formally charged with anything could fall through the cracks. There's a lot that is open to interpretation.

La amnistía objeto de esta Ley abarca a toda persona que se encuentre o pueda ser procesada o condenada por delitos o faltas, cometidos y acaecidos en el marco de los hechos objeto de amnistía, siempre que esté a derecho o se ponga a derecho luego de la entrada en vigencia de esta Ley. 

The wording here is anyone "who is or could be prosecuted or convicted." So does the "could be" refer to people who the government is threatening but not formally charging? It sounds good but it's not entirely clear. For those people what is the "tribunal competente"?

Here are some examples of what's excluded from the law:

Estarán igualmente excluidos de la amnistía prevista en esta Ley, las personas que se encuentren o puedan ser procesadas o condenadas por promover, instigar, solicitar, invocar, favorecer, facilitar, financiar o participar en acciones armadas o de fuerza contra el pueblo, la soberanía y la integridad territorial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, por parte de Estados, corporaciones o personas extranjeras.

Does the infamous Hate Law fall under this? For example, you make fun of Nicolás Maduro on social media and get put on a list for it, meaning you get visited (often more than once) by colectivos who call you out. Perhaps even more to the point, you tell people (or write on social media) that you support sanctions against Venezuela. Is that "fuerza contra el pueblo"?

There is also the problem of the 13 time periods allowed by the law. Protests in 2018 are left out, for example. Or if you were protesting in 2022, are you out of luck?

Millions of Venezuelans left their country and many did so out of because they felt threatened. We can only hope this amnesty is interpreted broadly so they can choose to go home without getting attacked.

Update: I had missed that Jorge Rodríguez announced that the Hate Law would be "reformed." It should be completely scrapped but this is better than nothing.

Read more...

Countering Chinese Influence in Latin America

R. Evan Ellis, who has written a ton about Chinese influence in Latin America, is concerned that the headline-grabbing denial of certain investments to China makes us ignore the bigger picture. I think he's right.

The central point is that the U.S. is playing a very short game. You can strong-arm China out of specific deals but China is still engaging on an ongoing basis in countless ways. Even more importantly, the U.S. is not providing any alternative. If you don't want a country to trade with China, you can't impose tariffs and expect that to happen. He notes the need for "sustained economic engagement, institutional strengthening, transparency initiatives and coordinated diplomacy with like-minded partners." That's not happening much.

If you look at U.S. policy now and consider what Latin America might look like in 10 years, you see Latin American autonomy playing out in different ways given U.S. unpredictability. China will be right there because it's deepening ties while the U.S. hurls insults.

Read more...

Dynamics of the Venezuelan Amnesty

The recently passed Amnesty Law in Venezuela is generating almost as much controversy as relief. There have already been over 1,500 requests for amnesty that have been filed. I want to focus on just one problematic aspect. The following points to it:

Amnesty is not automatic under the law: petitioners must ask the court handling their cases.

The problem is that many Venezuelans who have sought political asylum in the United States don't have a court hearing any case. They are people who were targeted by the Venezuelan government for participating in protests or even just pointing out government deficiencies or criticizing it. They would be beaten up, detained, their phones taken, and sometimes colectivos would follow them or show up at their homes. They don't have a registered "case" and haven't been charged with a formal crime. They have been terrorized to keep their mouths shut and to avoid protesting.

So this amnesty appears not to help them. As I've mentioned before, we don't currently know what the colectivos are doing. We don't know if it's safe for people to return to the country. There are many thousands of Venezuelans who committed "crimes" just by speaking their minds and were attacked for it. The government knows who they are but hasn't filed formal charges. So there's no amnesty for them.

Read more...

Venezuelan Public Opinion in the Aftermath

Yesterday I watched an Atlantic Council panel on public opinion in Venezuela, which I definitely recommend. You can watch it here. Mark Feierstein's discussion of his firm's poll results (which were taken in January) was particularly interesting (as was the occasional polite disagreement from Venezuelan panelists).

I won't rehash it, but there is one point that didn't get much attention that I think is definitely worth keeping in mind. It's about what has sometimes been called the "ni-nis," meaning people who are neither with the government nor the opposition. They are a plurality in Venezuela. I screenshotted this from the presentation:

Independent: 42%

Opposition: 37%

Chavista: 17%

I think it's reasonable to assume that independents want free and fair elections, and may well have voted for González/Machado, but aren't tied to MCM ideologically. There was a discussion about when she should come back to Venezuela and I will be interested to see what happens when she shifts from what she's against (the dictatorship) and what she's for. I would guess the latter will be focused largely on the economy, which according to the poll is the highest priority for Venezuelans. But there is a lot of other stuff to deal with as well.

Anyway, just a friendly reminder that Venezuela is not a binary government/opposition. And a friendly reminder that MCM does not perceive Venezuela as safe to return to, though it is also entirely possible she wants to return and test repression but the Trump administration is convincing her to wait.

Read more...

What is Repression Like in Venezuela?

Something I am particularly interested in is the effect of the political change in Venezuela on repression. We have scattered signs of protests happening and individuals saying they feel less threatened, but we also have the re-arrest of one prominent political prisoner and others who are not being released. There are so many questions. For example, is the government still monitoring those protests, keeping track of who participates? We know they routinely do that and colectivos later show up at people's doors to threaten them. Where are the colectivos right now? With no evidence, it does not reasonable to assume they just gave up the whole endeavor.

We don't have answers. My impression is that Venezuelans themselves don't know. Some are testing the waters to see what happens and only time will tell us more. But I recommend an article that Human Rights Watch just released. They call on the government to dismantle the repressive apparatus. Venezuelan repression is based on a wide variety of laws intended to criminalize all free speech.

These laws date back over 15 years and actually overlap. The 2014 Hate Law alone allows the government to criminalize practically anything. After the fraudulent 2024 presidential election, more laws were put in place just to remind Venezuelans they were not allowed to make any statements critical of the government, not even humorously.

What this means is that the government can unleash violence at any time. By this time, such violence is a natural reflex when people criticize the government and especially when they protest in the streets. It is entirely correct that no one can be truly safe until those laws are revoked. Interestingly, HRW says "amend or repeal" though I cannot imagine how these can be amended without remaining undemocratic. All countries need laws governing security but Venezuela should draft new ones, not use dictatorial remainders.

Read more...

China's Web of Relationships in Latin America

R. Evan Ellis has an interesting article about China's relationship with Guatemala. Here is the takeaway, which I think is essential for understanding what's going across Latin America:

China and China-based companies have made substantial progress in advancing their position through a web of business and personal influence relationships, opening the door to Beijing’s influence and digital access. 

Note that this isn't about specific trade deals, or port deals, or investments. It's about the painstaking process of building personal relationships over two decades or so. It's the long game. What that means is that even when a high profile deal is squashed, plenty of other quiet ones still happen. In fact, a lot of deals were squashed in the past without U.S. pressure. That's business.

During prior administrations, China-based companies unsuccessfully sought to acquire land on both the Atlantic and Pacific for port facilities. Chinese ZPMC cranes, scanners, and other digital equipment are reportedly used by Guatemala’s private port operators, such as APM and Chiquita Brands. 

The lesson here is not to be immediately swayed by headlines. There is a lot going on under the surface. 

Read more...