US Defense Policy in Latin America

Jorge Heine critically analyzes the speech given by Under Secretary of Defense/War for Policy Elbridge Colby at the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas in Cusco. Heine's basic take is that the Latin American audience wasn't buying it. I read the speech and it's logically incoherent and often untrue.

Hard-left regimes that enable narco-terrorists multiplied across our Hemisphere from Maduro's Venezuela to Ortega's Nicaragua to Evo's Bolivia.  These same governments and their allies in the region enabled unchecked mass migration by failing in their own countries and then exporting that failure to our country. 

Neither Ortega or Evo have had anything to do with mass migration. Maduro certainly did but the effects were felt primarily in neighboring countries, not the U.S. There is much more migration from Mexico and other parts of Central America, none of which are "hard left."

We will not treat the ISIS, the al Qaeda of this Hemisphere, who menaces American lives with kid gloves rather than the forcefulness the threat requires simply because they are in the Western Hemisphere rather than the Eastern.

This is what Heine focused on in his essay. Latin American official don't view drug traffickers like Middle Eastern terrorist groups. They're different animals with different goals and tactics.

As an aside, the grammarian in me couldn't stand that sentence, which makes it sound like terrorists "menace American lives with kid gloves." Those kid gloves are scary.

This is why, historically, Latin countries frequently understood America's role to be the enabler not the suppressor of their independence. 

This is nuts. The Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions happened only--only--because the U.S. made it clear that it suppressed independence.

Well, to be very candid, the fact is that America doesn't need your assets or your dependency.

This even more nuts. The Financial Times, which is no liberal mouthpiece, had a headline just yesterday that read "The US Has Collected About $13bn of Venezuela's Oil Money. Where Is It?" Trump talks endlessly about Venezuela's oil. It's not even hidden.

Our people are dying in large numbers because of the drugs that come into our country and the crime that accompanies them.

As is often the case, he looks only at supply and not demand. This is a fundamental disconnect. Latin Americans see a huge rich country with an insatiable appetite for illegal drugs. Stop buying the drugs and the problem goes away.

Third and finally, it is critical that you invest more in your own defense.  There is no reason why any country, particularly those facing significant narco-terrorist threats, should spend so little on defense...This is possible here, too. Take Peru, for example, which just made one of the largest purchases of F-16's in the world. 

Also nutty. After strongly emphasizing that Latin America's primary defense challenge is drug trafficking, he says the way to solve it is by buying F-16s. He does not explain how F-16s address drug trafficking. If you read all the press releases about the purchase it's clear that the main goal is to remain close to the U.S. military. Having F-16s is both symbolic (hey, we're a prosperious and strong country with new military gadgets!) and practical (we will be sending soldiers to the U.S. and buying U.S. parts).

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Daniel Ortega: No Elections For You!

I am reading Fabrice Lehoucq's book The Coup Trap in Latin America for a journal and it immediately came to mind when I saw that Daniel Ortega announced the end of elections in Nicaragua. Among other things (you'll have to wait for the review for more), Lehoucq argues that one way out of the coup trap is for a dictatorship to sever any ties between the military and potential civilian coup plotters. That is relatively rare and requires a lot of violence--you have to crush the disloyal. You have to be in power for about 20 years before the chances of a coup go from positive to negative. Ortega has been in office for 19.

That said, Nicaragua is a weird case because Ortega has not been a dictator for that whole time. Like with other cases of electoral authoritarianism, his crackdowns emerged gradually, becoming increasingly violent. But it does seem a case of successful killing, imprisoning, and exiling your way to political stability. Ortega is looking ahead to the 2027 elections, a time when according to Lehoucq we would expect an increased chance of a coup, and like so many other dictators is getting his affairs in order to avoid any real political challenge.

It's also a weird case because it's a co-presidency where octogenarian Ortega barely ever shows his face. This doesn't necessarily change the coup calculus because he has a co-president wife and an entire repressive apparatus to keep things humming along. It just makes the whole situation more sad and pathetic, the worst possible conclusion to a political career that began by trying to overthrow a dictator. He actually said he had to abolish elections to make sure Somocistas could never return to power.

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New State Department Report on Cuba

The State Department released a report on how Cuba has infiltrated the United States. I assume the authors see this as a transformational document. I also assume it will be cited in the case of a U.S. invasion. To give you sense, it uses the word "reportedly" 20 times. It purports to situate Cuba within every protest movement in the U.S. Jumping back and forth chronologically, it basically says there are few original protest ideas in the U.S.--they all come from Cuba. Fringe Cuba-linked groups control anti-ICE protests, that sort of thing. Overall, it's regurgitated McCarthyism.

Who's implicated?

--Professors (naturally!)

--Barack Obama (they had to get him in there somehow)

--Zohran Mamdani (ditto)

--anyone who doesn't approve of ICE tactics

--Black Lives Matter

--George Floy protests (which are labeled "uprisings")

--any kind of university protest (labeled "pro-terrorist activism on American college campuses")

With all the chronology jumping, it fails to show how support for the Cuban model is greatly reduced. In the past, yes, it was real and widespread, but that's not the case now. It also fails to acknowledge how you can simultaneously oppose the U.S. embargo and the dictatorship.

There are very, very few Communists anymore, but this report seeks to make it seem like there are. How much traction that gets remains to be seen. That may not matter anyway if the purpose is to justify foreign policy.

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Latin American Views of the US and China

The Pew Research Center has a new poll on Latin American views of the United States and China. Views of the U.S. have worsened while China's have remained more or less the same. Results vary depending on the country, but it's obvious the Trump administration is needlessly squandering goodwill. The thing is, Latin Americans don't love Xi Jinping at all. China's advantage is mostly just not being overtly intrusive.

This just repeats what we know: Latin Americans play the field. They work strategically with different countries, without necessarily aligning with any of them. You don't have to love a leader to do business with their country, but the less confidence Latin Americans have in the U.S., the more they will seek alternatives.

Probably the saddest indicator is that fewer Latin Americans believe the U.S. respects personal freedoms. Mexicans believe China respects them far more than the U.S. 

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Freedom of Expression in Venezuela

Luz Mely Reyes, Co-founder and editor of Efecto Cocuyo, submitted testimony on freedom of expression in Venezuela to the House Foreign Affairs Committee Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Hearing on "Human Rights in Venezuela: Status and Opportunity." As you might guess, freedom of expression is most definitely not respected.

In particular, the Hate Law is still on the books and it can encompass pretty much anything the government wants it to, even on WhatsApp. Further, at least 43 media outlets, both national and international, are blocked in the country. Some journalists have been freed from prison but others remain. Journalists have been harassed trying to report on the earthquake. "Official rhetoric not only revictimizes them but also encourages further attacks against those who remain in the field of journalism."

It's clearly not something the Trump administration cares about.

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Is Latin America Caught Between Rebalancing and Hegemonic Erosion?

Andres Malamud and Luis Schenoni recently published an article about Latin America being caught between strategic rebalancing and hegemonic transition:

The current international landscape lends itself to two competing interpretations. One understands it as a process of strategic rebalancing: a temporary hardening of U.S. leadership aimed at managing the decoupling from China in a bipolar world. The other conceives it as a hegemonic transition, in which U.S. primacy is being structurally eroded by China’s rise.

I find this binary approach a bit frustrating. As I've argued, Latin America has increasingly played the field and does not have to choose between alignment or non-alignment. Javier Milei loves Trump and also works closely with China. I guess it depends on what we mean by "alignment." No matter how much Trump (or Marco Rubio) talk about China, we are not in another Cold War. It's not all or nothing. 

I don't think it's useful to view hemispheric relations in terms of a U.S.-China rivalry. Autonomy doesn't mean choosing sides--it means diversifying. As they write:

As one Latin American foreign minister confided to us, “active non-alignment or strategic autonomy sound very appealing and entertain academics, but the truth is that these concepts are beyond our grasp. We are vulnerable, and all we can do is try to play the game of political maneuvering”.

This nails it perfectly. There is no alignment or non-alignment. There is strategizing for your country's interests. Now more than ever, even with Trump, there is more room to do that. 

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Postponing Venezuelan Elections

To the surprise of no one, the Venezuelan regime says it can't even discuss elections anymore. It would distract from saving Venezuelans from the earthquake and would even be downright disrespectful.

In the short term, the earthquake works well politically for Delcy and Jorge Rodriguez precisely because they can wrap themselves in a cynical show of concern for the Venezuelans they've long neglected and postpone giving up power. But there are already complaints about corruption in the form of stealing goods meant for the victims (a la Anastasio Somoza). Unless the situation changes drastically, Venezuelan support for the regime--which is already deeply unpopular--will worsen.

The Trump administration seems totally uninterested in elections so this works just fine for them too. This all boils down to the Venezuelan people themselves. At what point do they get fed up and test the repressive institutions of the regime? It's also not at all clear how Maria Corina Machado will fit into this. At a certain point, which is impossible to determine ahead of time, Marco Rubio will have to either allow elections or actively go against the Venezuelan people. He's getting closer and closer to the latter.

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Historical U.S. Policy and Current Realities

On his blog Henry Ziemer makes what he calls his most controversial opinions. One is "It's all the United States' Fault, That Matters Less Than You'd Think." In sum:

Everywhere you look in the region, the scars of past U.S. interventions and policy failures are painfully obvious. Still, I don’t think it follows that U.S. engagement today is by necessity pernicious or counterproductive. Nevertheless, I often find myself encountering a certain type of commentary that substitutes historical grievances for an actual understanding of current events.

My controversial take is that I don't find this very controversial. I think it would have been much more controversial to say in the past. When I started my dissertation research, Augusto Pinochet was still Commander in Chief so the 1973 coup remained very present. And don't get me started on how U.S. influence in that coup was actually much lower than is often assumed anyway. But it's not so present 30 years later.

Additionally, it's clear that especially in the post-Cold War era, sometimes U.S. policy is a positive force. The U.S. engineered the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 but also was a driving force (starting under George W. Bush) behind CICIG, an anti-corruption effort that was bearing fruit until another U.S. president, Donald Trump, looked the other way when corrupt Guatemalan officials got rid of it. In other words, the fact of the 1954 coup isn't related to policy decisions today, even though we may say it contributed to (but did not create) a long-term culture of authoritarianism and impunity.

My sense is that we see fewer op-eds these days that start by using the examples of 1954 Guatemala and 1973 Chile, which were often staples. U.S. policy toward Venezuela has no particular historical referent at all. Cuba policy may be an exception because the embargo actually started in the early Cold War and never stopped. There is more acknowledgment of Latin American agency, which is a welcome change.

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The U.S. and Maria Corina Machado

María Corina Machado wants to come back to Venezuela even more badly now because of the earthquake, which also largely coincides with the Trump administration trying to shove her to the side. The administration is not happy.

U.S. officials say they are frustrated with María Corina Machado, the exiled Venezuelan opposition leader, for requesting help facilitating her return to Venezuela in the aftermath of two devastating earthquakes, according to two White House officials.

They said Ms. Machado’s multiple requests were ill-timed, and one official called them a “political stunt.” The United States, as well as dozens of other countries, has been focused on giving aid to Venezuela on Saturday.

There are several things to untangle here.

First, I hate, and I mean hate, when politicians accuse other politicians of politicizing something. This earthquake is extremely political and deserves to be politicized. Usually this is meant to stop debate or change. In any event, she's been wanting to go back for months--it's not as if this is the first time she's pushed to do so.

Second, MCM is the most popular politician in Venezuela and so it is entirely reasonable for her to return as soon as possible. The U.S. wants long-term authoritarianism to give space to reap benefits from the oil industry while not having to worry about the messiness of democracy.

Third, giving her strong signals not to return is entirely imperialist. I am curious about what precisely U.S. officials have told her beyond vague discussions of waiting for more stability. That's been working up to this point but it's starting to show signs of strain. At a minimum, her return entails figuring out a passport because hers is expired and also having private security.

Fourth, if the Venezuelan regime response continues to be a problem, such as blocking private aid and preventing journalists and others from traveling freely, MCM's arrival could be hastened. Indeed, a transition could be hastened.

As always, things can change quickly.

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Political Fallout of the Venezuelan Earthquake

The huge earthquakes that hit Venezuela would be devastating under any circumstances, but they come in a country whose leadership has dismantled infrastructure while the U.S. had also been dismantling its own systems of humanitarian aid. The political fallout will be unpredictable and ongoing, but Marco Rubio has already said something concerning:

Mr. Rubio said that the earthquakes, which have killed at least 164 and destroyed hundreds of buildings, represented a “setback” for Washington’s multiphase plan to recover Venezuela’s moribund economy and ensure democratic elections.

Don't be surprised if Delcy Rodríguez latches onto this argument, namely that the already vague last part of the "plan" (which must be put in quotations to indicate that it is not exactly a plan) can be postponed in the name of rebuilding. You can't have elections until we get things back up to speed, that sort of thing. 

Both the U.S. and the Venezuelan regime have been cagey about elections because neither want them very much. Both are getting what they want--oil, money, and power. Having elections means giving up some or all of the three.

It is impossible not to think of the 1972 Nicaragua earthquake, which helped spark rebellion because of the Somozas' naked corruption. Venezuelans were already wondering when they were going to benefit from the U.S. invasion and they're now going to need rapid and effective (and even mostly corruption free!) response, which Maduro/Rodríguez are definitely not known for.

All of this is so awful for the Venezuelan people, who are getting hit from all sides.

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Modest Control of Venezuela

There is a line in an opinion piece in The Economist from late May that I just happened to see and really caught my attention. The argument is that an attack on Cuba is a bad idea.

Cuba is not Venezuela. Its dictatorship is more deeply entrenched and ideological. Perhaps Mr Trump might be able to replace the top communists with more pliable leaders, but even the modest degree of control he has established over Venezuela would be difficult to replicate.

The word "modest" grabbed me and despite all appearances it feels right. On January 2 Venezuela was a dictatorship with a high level of poverty and a lot of despair. Now in June none of that has changed except the despair is exacerbated by unfulfilled hope. U.S. control has been narrowly focused on funneling Venezuelan oil profits into a Citibank account in the United States.

One could reasonably argue that it's not inability to control but rather indifference about controlling. I have to chew on that but I don't think the U.S. can control an election campaign once it gets going. Or rather, it can throw its weight around but it'll be really hard to control the pent up desires of millions of Venezuelans. And at some point the Chavista rift will blow open and that won't be controllable either, except by brute force.

In other words, at this moment U.S. control is more tenuous than it seems and is based a lot on acquiescence, a "wait and see" attitude by everyone, a sort of honeymoon. Honeymoons end and reality sets in. When that happens we'll really see how strong U.S. control is.

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U.S. Manipulation in Venezuela

The latest U.S. effort to maintain control of Venezuela is to shove Maria Corina Machado aside and instead favor Dinorah Figueroa, who is president of the unofficial National Assembly elected in 2015. She is a legitimate member of the opposition but very clearly not the head of that opposition. Figueroa admitted she has differences with MCM. But now she's negotiating with Jorge Rodriguez. Further:

“María Corina es la líder, pero aquí estamos hablando de institucionalidad y yo soy presidente de la Asamblea Nacional.”

Clear as mud, and she didn't refer to the Panama Manifesto, which gave MCM the role of negotiating with Delcy Rodriguez. So a big question now is whether MCM cedes that role, which is also admitting that the whole thing can be scrapped if the U.S. demands it.

This is a delicate game for the U.S. to play and obviously we can mostly expect blunt instruments from the Trump administration. Delcy Rodriguez is very unpopular and Venezuela is primed to unite behind a single candidate. The U.S. is introducing a split. They seem to see MCM as too divisive and that may well be linked to the notion that she is not manipulable. She has stayed publicly mum, which right now seems like a good idea.

Overall, we have an unstable combination of an increasingly divided Chavismo and a potentially divided opposition. The Chavista division is clear and driven by anger at the eager cooperation with the imperial power. Beyond personalities, we'll have to wait and see what drives the opposition's division or whether it can be bridged.

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Latin American Exports in 2026

It's 2026. In the context of 25 years of expanding its reach to the rest of the world and the U.S. proving itself an unreliable partner, and even sometimes a threat (both militarily and with tariffs) we should expect that Latin America would be strengthening its ties outside the region, with China a notable example. From the recently published IDB report on trade:

China’s imports from LAC are estimated to have increased by 5.1% on average in 2025 compared to 2024 as a result of a strong recovery in the second half of the year. In contrast, total Chinese imports remained virtually flat throughout 2025 (0.1%). In the first quarter of 2026, the country’s imports from LAC expanded by an extraordinary 29.3% year-on-year, while its total imports also grew vigorously (22.7%). LAC’s share in China’s imports reached 9.6% in the first quarter of 2026, slightly below the 2025 average of 9.8%.

US imports from LAC remained relatively stable in 2025, increasing by an average of 4.9% compared to 2024. Total US imports grew at a similar rate (4.4%). However, the first quarter of 2026 constituted a stark contrast: while total US imports contracted by 13.6% year-on-year, imports from LAC grew by 4.0%, raising the region’s market share from 20.2% in 2025 to a record high of 21.8%.

Stable trade with the U.S. (and the EU) but very strong with China precisely at the time the U.S. is flexing its muscles in Venezuela. Diversification is the name of the game.

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Shield of the Americas Backs Rodrigo Paz

The Shield of the Americas put out a statement about the Bolivian crisis through the U.S. State Department. Its source and wording suggests that the other governments had little (and perhaps nothing) to do with it. 

The member countries of Shield of the Americas denounce ongoing efforts to overthrow the legitimately and overwhelmingly elected government of President Rodrigo Paz in Bolivia. We stand with Paz’s democratic government as it fights back against attempts to drag Bolivia backwards through cynical efforts to prevent the delivery of food, medicine and other vital supplies to the Bolivian people through fake road blockades. Mob rule cannot replace the decision that a majority of Bolivians made at the ballot box to turn the page on two decades of corrupt governments. Those who are funding these protests with dirty money from drug trafficking and transnational crime should be held accountable. Those who have legitimate grievances should take advantage of the government’s willingness to dialogue, and denounce those who would abuse their causes to regain power.

I love the reference to "fake road blockades," which are somehow both fake and highly disruptive, and it's pure Trump. The Shield of the Americas is the exact mirror image as all the various and sundry leftist organizations that sprouted up under Hugo Chavez's era. It's right-wing, controlled by the United States, and will lose or gain members depending on elections. Its driving force is the U.S. while the old leftist ones were Venezuela. Even the inflammatory language is the mirror of Chavez's devil empire rhetoric.

As such, it will have a similar longevity as the others.

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