Colombia and China

In the midst of all the "Donroe Doctrine" hype I am staying focused on how Latin America maintains and deepens ties with extrahemispheric countries, which would supposedly violate the doctrine. For example, Colombia is deepening technology ties with China with a ministerial visit, following up on Gustavo Petro's visit last year. This includes connectivity, data infrastructure, and AI, plus satellites.

China's relationship with Latin America is embedded within countless contracts and agreements. Chinese and Colombian companies are working together--this isn't just talk between two governments. And it's necessary when the United States is openly an unreliable partner and reneges on agreements. Latin America has no choice but to play the field and at this point they've been doing it for a long time.

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The Political Center in Colombia

The Canadian Council for the Americas held a webinar on the political center (sorry, centre!) in Colombia and whether it can unite. There was former Vice President Humberto de Calle (under Ernesto Samper, and he was also the head of the negotiating team with the FARC*) and then a bit later also Colombian journalists and a financier, moderated by Ken Frankel.

The quick answer is that it's really tricky.

De la Calle's main point was that, unlike Colombian political tradition, the center needed to start with a basic program rather than choosing a person to rally around. He gave various indicators, based on local election results and polls, about an appetite for centrist positions and parties. Centrist policy positions included agrarian reform, tax reform, pension reform, and crop substitution.

But that is where the conversation got more difficult. Responses included asking where was the focus on women and youth? If the right dominated non-urban areas, how was this going to function? What are some concrete objectives? Doesn't this seem too top-down? And, fundamentally, what is the "center" anyway?

Unless I missed it toward the end, when I had interruptions and missed chunks, the political mechanics of all this was missing. Who gets the ball rolling, which means controlling the message at the beginning? De la Calle advocated for self-exclusion, meaning no one would be rejected as long as they broadly accepted the program. But that depends on who defines the program.

I've written before about how the FARC really screwed the democratic left in Colombia, because it's too easy to connect the left to the FARC (and nowadays also to Venezuela, though I don't know how much that actually convinces people). But I hadn't thought as much about the center. This discussion demonstrated to me how tough such a project would be. The essential question "can it unite?" just kind of hung there. Fear has served the right very well, and it's hard to overcome.

* His overall political biography is really interesting.

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Completely Broken Immigration System

I watched WOLA's webinar on immigration: "Stranded Between Borders: Draconian Responses to a Regional Migration Crisis." Adam Isacson moderated, with the following guests:

Gretchen Kuhner, Institution for Women in Migration (Mexico),

Marco Romero, CODHES and Professor at the National University of Colombia

Ursula Roldán, Institute for Research and Projection on Global and Territorial Dynamics of the Rafael Landívar University (Guatemala)

It was particularly worthwhile because it didn't in fact focus on Trump per se, but rather the responses and realities in the Latin American countries.

The overall message is that the immigration system is utterly, terribly, broken. The Trump administration is not only anti-immigrant, but it reneges on agreements. AMLO bows down to Trump just to avoid being attacked, and his own anti-immigrant policies are fine with his base in Mexico. Colombia has nothing but short-term, emergency responses when it needs much more. Immigrants live precariously at borders with no solution in sigtht. Covid-19 hovers over all of this, because vulnerable migrants find themselves infected and bureaucracies have ground to a halt.

Tied to that, there is so little hope for meaningful change. No current president is willing to build a long-term humane system, and is generally doing the opposite. Even if Joe Biden wins the presidency, it will take a long time to undo the damage that the Trump administration inflicted on immigration policy and immigrants.

The only positive note was that remittances to Guatemala were up in July. I can't even imagine how that is possible, but it is.

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Plan Colombia is Problematic

Michael Shifter writes of Brent Scowcroft in glowing terms for his role in promoting Plan Colombia. One thing I've noticed over the years is that advocates know Plan Colombia had some massively negative consequences, and so feel obligated to at least make some mention, but without going into detail and then head straight back to compliments. Examples from his short essay:

• "however seriously flawed"
• "Criticism centered around human rights concerns"
• "failed to achieve its highest priority objective"
• "for all of its flaws in conception and implementation"

That's a lot of qualifiers. More specifically, let's look at the most recent data from the International Displacement Monitoring Centre:

This is Plan Colombia in action--it created a disaster along Syrian lines for millions of Colombians, but they just don't get much attention. President Alvaro Uribe, who was largely responsible for implementing it after he took office in 2002, is a thug who oversaw major human rights violations, and is currently under house arrest for bribing members of paramilitaries so that he wouldn't be implicated for his involvement with them.

I understand fully that Plan Colombia served to ramp up the government's side in the civil war, and as a result it was able to weaken the FARC sufficiently to force it to negotiate, which stabilized the country. I am not trying to pretend that didn't happen. But it definitely needs to be seen as only side of a violent coin.

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Colombia Ambassador Talk

I watched a talk by Colombia Ambassador Francisco Santos Calderón, organized by Global Atlanta. Yes, that Santos family--he was Vice President under Alvaro Uribe and related to past presidents. You can, then, guess what kinds of things he would emphasize. The discussion was aimed at investment, but a few things caught my attention. I actually had tuned in because I was interested in hearing about the response to Covid-19, but that didn't get discussed a lot.

He was asked about the peace deal, and said that the "short-term issues are being done very, very well" even though some long-term issues might be delayed. He specifically referenced the Kroc Institute, which recently released a report on it. So I went to check out the report. It is, in fact, very carefully worded by clearly negative.

The report presents a quantitative analysis that shows that at the end of the third year of implementation, according to the methodology used by the Barometer Initiative, 25% of stipulations have been fully implemented. Another 15% of stipulations are at an intermediate level of progress, meaning that they are on their way to being fully implemented in their corresponding timelines. A further 34% of commitments are at a minimal state of implementation, having started but made marginal progress. The remaining 26% of  commitments have yet to be initiated. 

This is definitely not "very, very well." Or even "well." His observation was that "you need accountability from the other side." 

Another of his arguments was more accurate, but I don't often hear it mentioned in such a positive manner: there is a lot of investment opportunity in Colombia because it is so highly integrated with the U.S. military, second only to Israel. I am not sure exactly what he had in mind, but it likely does not dovetail well with success implementation of the peace agreement.

As for investment, "let's make the Americas great again!" 

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Colombia in the OECD

Colombia joined the OECD, which was news I hadn't even noticed. Sara Danish and Norberto Martinez write about it at Global Americans.

Membership carries real weight and gaining entry requires more than currying favor with a few key “sponsors.” Beginning in 2013, Colombia underwent technical reviews by 23 OECD committees spanning topics from trade to environment to public governance and justice, a process that prompted various reform measures, including the 2014 Transparency and Access to Information Law and 2011 Anti-Corruption statutes to prevent, investigate, and punish corruption. 

I won't argue with the notion that it's positive, but I do wonder how much. Perhaps it is possible (though not measurable) to say a country would be worse off without it, but Mexico became a member in 1994 and the rule of law has suffered terribly since then (the 2019 OECD report on Mexico discussed failure a lot). Chile joined in 2010, and the past decade has seen protests, corruption charges, and other problems. Having a big USAID presence doesn't necessarily make anything better, either.

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Colombia and Covid-19

The Atlantic Council hosted a talk by Colombian President Iván Duque to discuss his government's response to the coronavirus. They seem to be doing reasonably well, though like with many places there are lots of questions about whether in the absence of testing we really know the true magnitude. (For a critical view of his response, see here).

From his perspective, the government acted early to mitigate the effects. I winced when he said something to the effect that the quarantine was maybe the hardest decision ever made by a Colombian president because I am tired of hearing the constant self-aggrandizement here. He estimated that 70-80% of the population has received some sort of service, such as through conditional cash transfers or food.

That's where I had a question, and I submitted it but there was limited time. He kept the discussion at the national level, so I wanted to know how successful the government had been in providing assistance in rural vs. urban areas. If we accept 70-80%, then where are the 20-30% receiving nothing? The Colombian state is famously absent in chunks of the country, and so how are those areas doing?

He ended with a call (or hope) that I thought was interesting. He said the U.S. should "decouple" from Asia and focus more of its economic attention on Latin America. The premise--I suppose it's that Asia is more "dangerous"--is pretty objectionable, but I guess he figures it's the only kind of message someone like Trump might listen to.

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Declaring Hezbollah a Terrorist Threat in Latin America

Three Latin American countries in particular want something from the United States.

--The Colombian government wants recognition that its fighting coca cultivation sufficiently, which the Trump administration has questioned.

--The Honduran government wants recognition for its acceptance of migrants seeking asylum in the United States and continued opposition to combating corruption (correct, opposition to combating it).

--The Guatemalan government wants the same as Honduras.

Given how unpredictable Trump is, there is no way to know exactly how to secure these things. Directly and publicly doing something Trump likes, especially if it gets on to Fox News when he's watching it, is one potential way.

Labeling Hezbollah a terrorist organization fits this model. Mike Pompeo applauded these three countries for doing so. I doubt they are thinking a whole lot about Hezbollah, as their problems are much bigger and complex than that, but this is an entirely cost-free way of pushing into Trump's good graces. Colombia just adopted the entire U.S. list. Juan Orlando Hernández made his announcement directly after a meeting on immigration with the acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf.

Especially with Central America, the administration is essentially pummeling them into submission.

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Reality & Rhetoric in Colombia

President Ivan Duque on Colombian security:

“Our goal is to keep deepening our security agenda in rural areas,” Duque said. “Our responsibility is first to dissuade and at the same time break up, confront and make an example of these criminal structures via sentencing.” 

... 

“I think we are on a good path - I don’t want to be triumphalist or euphoric. We are on a good path, we have been able to take very important steps in these 17 months.”

The United Nations on Colombian security:

 "We are deeply troubled by the staggering number of human rights defenders killed in Colombia during 2019," agency spokeswoman Maria Hurtado said Tuesday. 

There were 107 activists killed in Colombia last year, she said, with 13 other cases under investigation that could bring the total to 120. The year before, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights confirmed 115 killings of human rights activists. 

"This terrible trend is showing no let-up in 2020, with at least 10 human rights defenders already reportedly killed during the first 13 days of January," Hurtado said at a briefing in Geneva, Switzerland. 

"The vicious and endemic cycle of violence and impunity must stop," she said. "Victims and their families have a right to justice, truth and reparations."

Not exactly the same message. The Colombian government's "good path" is not working terribly well. As the Washington Office on Latin America pointed out in December with regard to the peace accords:

President Iván Duque’s administration has defunded and, in some cases, derailed key aspects of the accords, such as the transitional justice mechanisms that are key to guaranteeing justice and non-repetition of war crimes. Demobilized fighters have not received the promised support and resources to help them reintegrate into mainstream society; nor has the government followed through on promises to support small farmers and provide viable alternatives to growing illicit-use crops. 

Most concerningly, violence is on the rise, with human rights defenders, environmental activists, and land rights claimants facing threats, attacks, and killings. Many of those targeted are from Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities; impunity for these threats and killings remains the norm. 

People in cities can feel safer but not in the countryside. This is the eternal problem if "security" is defined entirely in militarized terms.

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Jaime Manrique's Like This Afternoon Together

I read Jaime Manrique's new movel Like This Afternoon Forever, a novel about homosexuality, the priesthood, and drug politics in Colombia. Descriptions of it refer to the issue of false positives, though in fact that's just one part of the narrative. Two Catholic priests, Ignacio and Lucas, meet as children, fall in love, and eventually end up in Bogotá together.

The book's style is very straightforward, which belies the complexities of what's occurring. There is of course the fact that two priests are a couple, though in fact that is not so uncommon. But there is also poverty that drives them to deep frustration, doubts about God, the challenge of AIDS, alcohol and drug abuse, and Colombian politics. The government, the military, the police, the drug traffickers, and the paramilitaries are all complicit in the same game, all to the detriment of most Colombians.* That's the backdrop for the dramatic end of the novel. In and out itself, the prose is not so memorable but the story and images will stick with me.

*This is also a major theme about El Salvador in Sandra Benitez's excellent novel The Weight of All Things, where all sides in political conflict are bad for the ordinary person.

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Russia Expands its Reach in South America

Just a few days ago, President Trump hammered Colombia President Iván Duque:

"I'll tell you something: Colombia, you have your new president of Colombia, really good guy. I've met him, we had him at the White House. He said how he was going to stop drugs. More drugs are coming out of Colombia right now than before he was president — so he has done nothing for us," Trump told reporters in Florida.

This is the same language he used to verbally abuse Mexico and Central America:

“Mexico is doing NOTHING to help stop the flow of illegal immigrants to our Country,” he tweeted. “They are all talk and no action. Likewise, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador have taken our money for years, and do Nothing.”

It shouldn't surprise us too much, then, that shortly thereafter Russia saw its opportunity to flex its rhetorical muscle.

The Federation Council, the Russian equivalent of a senate, wrote a letter to Colombian Congress in which it accused the country’s government and other allies of the United States of trying to “provoke a civil war” and a possible “military intervention in this state” whose disputed President, Nicolas Maduro, is an ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

A lot is happening at once here, and all of it emphasizes U.S. weakness.

First, Russia is expanding its influence in South America without being countered. Mike Pompeo tweets just don't count.

Second, U.S. domestic interests aren't just influencing foreign policy, they are obliterating it. Intermestic policy is the norm, especially with drugs, but in the past it has not actively undercut allies. Trump's tweets are talking to his core U.S. base. Vladimir Putin saw the insults as an opening to assert Russia's interests.

Third, it is a reminder to Latin America that the Trump administration demands quick and easy solutions to long-standing and complex problems and does not recognize slow and steady progress. This further reduces U.S. influence.

Fourth, it comes on the heels of constant Trump administration threats toward Venezuela that are not followed through. I am in fact glad that the administration is not using force, but it should never have issued threats to begin with. It is now hamstrung--either invade (which would have disastrous consequences) or look weak to Russia (which would have negative consequences).

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Duque Woos Trump

There is a stir in Colombia stemming from Iván Duque's comment to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that the founding the fathers of the United States were "crucial" to Colombian independence (he said the words that he tweeted after the hug). Supporters and critics are going at one another on social media (naturally). The discussion goes into the meaning of neutrality but also the Monroe Doctrine.

Now, it's worth mentioning that at the time many Latin American leaders did view the Monroe Doctrine in a positive light, precisely because they thought the U.S. would protect them from European powers. That soured over time as it became clear first that the U.S. invoked it quite selectively and then expanded it in a decidedly imperial manner.

But let's set that aside to look instead at the optics of Duque's statement right now. These days the Monroe Doctrine is widely--almost universally--viewed in Latin America as negative. It became the foundation for U.S. intervention for decades. Invoking it will get you positive reviews only from the United States government and its closest allies (like Alvaro Uribe, who has been tweeting approvingly). The message was intended for Donald Trump.

Duque wants Trump's approval, which has been slow in coming. Trump cancelled two visits to Colombia in 2018 and periodically emits critical tweets or statements about Colombia's failure to address the flow of narcotics. This is from September 2018:

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  What I want — what I want and what we’ve discussed, and one of the reasons I was so happy to see the President’s victory — that was a great victory and there was a very worldwide, world-renowned victory because of his strong stance on drugs. 

Now, if he comes through, we think he’s the greatest.  If he doesn’t come through, he’s just another President of Colombia.

Duque's simple message (and all messages to Trump must be simple) is that we love you, we love your history, and we will even give you a lot of the credit for our own independence. Just please be my friend.

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Pompeo's Latin America Trip in Six Tweets

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo sent six tweets in the past 24 hours about his trips to Brazil and Colombia.

The first praised Brazil's "thriving democracy" even as it removed a president by questionable means not so long ago.

The second said he hoped to strengthen "reciprocal" trade with Brazil, as if there was some other kind of trade.

The third was about meeting Jair Bolsonaro to discuss their "shared commitment" to human rights, something both governments are intent on violating.

The fourth was more about Brazil's democracy, which is currently on weak foundations.

The fifth was about meeting Iván Duque to discuss "shared goals" that apparently do not include the peace process.

The sixth inexplicably called attention to the fact that he could not be bothered to spend more than two hours total in Colombia despite it being a "key U.S. partner." Dissing Colombia has become a habit for the administration.

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Trump and Colombia

Lara Seligman has a curious article in Foreign Policy about U.S. policy toward Latin America. The U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff was in Colombia, which was "part of a broader administration effort to reinforce alliances across Latin America."

All the U.S. did, though, was to complain. Is this what we call "reinforce" now? We're upset you're working with China. We're upset you're not buying our weapons systems. We're upset about the Russians. The article mentions "new alliances" but the U.S. does not appear to be pursuing any.

It boils down to the core idea that the U.S. is desperately holding onto existing military-military relationships so that they don't slip away entirely. The Colombian example is especially illustrative in this regard because it should be the simplest--the two countries and their militaries have been working closely together for many years. And yet even that one is more challenging these days.

Why is it so hard nowadays? Well, you know.

Donald Trump just recently cancelled a scheduled trip to Colombia, which is his second cancellation in a presidency less than two years old. Just a year ago he threatened to decertify Colombia for narcotics, which was a clear insult. Two months ago he mentioned the need for Colombia to combat the scourge of cocoa.

Diplomats, the military, and everyone else is fighting an uphill battle when the President of the United States has made abundantly clear that he does not particularly value the bilateral relationship. Perhaps the main goal for the moment is to maintain those personal relationships developed over years of such visits until someone else occupies the Oval House.

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Does Colombia Want to Invade Venezuela?

Rodrigo Palau at Caracas Chronicles writes about the Venezuela intervention vs. non-intervention debate in Colombia, which is divided (as it is in the United States). He concludes:

Making predictions is terrible business, but I still believe there are significant sectors of the government who will keep pushing for a more cautious approach. 

But, that doesn’t mean that talking out loud about an intervention won’t change things.

I am concerned that so much talk is normalizing the idea. What used to be verboten is now spoken freely, even if it might generate disagreement. What happens when pro-invasion Trump officials start talking with pro-invasion Duque officials, not to mention Luis Almagro?

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More Displacement in Colombia

A representative from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees says that forced displacement in Colombia this year have already surpassed all of 2018. Violence has actually worsened in several different parts of the country.

La situación es crítica en varias regiones del país, sobre todo en la costa Pacífica, en El Catatumbo y en el Bajo Cauca Antioqueño. En esas tres zonas del país el conflicto armado no cesó con el acuerdo de paz entre el Estado y las Farc. Actores armados con el Eln, el Epl, las disidencias de las Farc y grupos paramilitares hacen presencia en dichas regiones. En el 2018 se ha intensificado la guerra en esas zonas, por lo cual se ha incrementado el desplazamiento forzado. En departamentos como Meta, Arauca y Córdoba también se han presentado desplazamientos masivos.

Even worse, often they are going to the same places as Venezuelan refugees. That becomes one of now numerous incentives for the government--already less tolerant of Venezuelans than its predecessor--to cut the flow of those refugees.

It is always worth reminding everyone that Colombia right there with Syria when it comes to internall displaced people. The scope of the problem is enormous.

h/t Robert Karl on Twitter

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Venezuelan Immigrants in Colombia: Permanent or Temporary?

David Smilde has a rundown on recent Venezuela political news, including how Juan Manuel Santos gave Special Permission status to 442,000 Venezuelans, allowing them access to social services and the ability to work. Questions about it are so similar to the United States.

EP status provides beneficiaries with access to Colombian social services and allows them to legally work and freely circulate in the national territory. Activists applaud this measure but point out that it is less than optimal. First, the ambiguity of the census meant that many Venezuelan migrants were fearful and did not participate. Second, the PEP status is temporary and does not include any road to citizenship. Finally, as a presidential decree it can easily be undone by Santos’ successor. What is needed instead is actual legislation that regularizes the situation of Venezuelan migrants now and in the future.

Colombia needs a discussion right now of how it wants to handle Venezuelans. This is exactly like the Temporary Protected Status question in the U.S. The president alone decides, and what started as "temporary" was renewed so many times that people had deep roots here. The measure is generous but too much ambiguity will cause pain in the future. Does it end with the end of the current government? With some measurable improvement in Venezuela? Never?

With regard to making it more permanent with a law, it's hard to imagine the current congressional composition passing something very liberal, but clearly Santos was in no position to get something passed before the election. I have not seen whether Iván Duque has indicated his precise position on migrants within Colombia, though he has said he wants to tighten border security.

In general, this is a time of high uncertainty. Venezuela cannot support its own citizens, Colombia struggles to support its own challenges plus migrants, the international community is slow to respond, and the political landscape in Colombia has shifted.

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US-Colombian Relations Under Trump and Duque

The Washington Post has an article about how Iván Duque will automatically become the closest U.S. ally in Latin America.

Duque, a conservative, hopes to turn Trump’s concerns about drugs and safe borders into a stronger partnership with Washington while promising to revisit elements of a historic peace agreement with rebels struck in August 2016 with the vigorous support of the Obama administration. 

“When he is sworn in, Duque will overnight become the most pro-American head of state in Latin America,” said a senior U.S. official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to talk freely about U.S. diplomatic priorities.

A big question is how much Duque stays hardline after being sworn in. He is of course an Alvaro Uribe disciple and even is seen as a potential puppet (to the point that he actually had to say he wasn't a puppet). There are plenty valid of reasons to envision a major shift away from the Santos administration.

At the same time, this isn't the 1990s. Simply going back to aerial fumigation and old style punitive policies don't have the same national or regional support they did back then. Former presidents are calling for decriminalization. There is already precedent for a hardliner president to advocate for decriminalization. There is broader consensus that the U.S. drug war is largely a failure. And there is no more civil war.

Nonetheless, I would expect it to be relatively easy for Duque to the closest U.S. ally, in large part because the U.S. has no close allies at all at the moment. But will he bend to reach U.S.-determined goals of coca cultivation? Will he just redo Uribe's policies in a totally different environment?

Nikki Haley, who is attending the inauguration on Trump's behalf, published a carefully worded op-ed that did include a push for more eradication:

Working with Colombian police and military forces, the United States helped achieve record cocaine seizures in 2017, while Colombian forces eradicated over 125,000 acres of coca last year. But there is much more to do to achieve the goal set between our two countries to reduce by half coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia.

There is no mention of goals to reduce U.S. cocaine consumption, but that's a different story.

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Podcast on Colombian Presidential Election

Go check out Steven Hyland interviewing Steven Taylor on SECOLAS' Historias podcast. Among many other things, he talks about the Colombian left and offers a less optimistic view than I did. And there's the question of how independent Iván Duque will be from Alvaro Uribe. And of course there's Venezuela.

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Duque and Latin American Politics

Iván Duque defeated Gustavo Petro in the Colombian runoff election yesterday, 54%-42%. Boz has some good points about the outcome, including the importance of centrists. Adam Isacson also has a post worth your time on how this affects the peace agreement.

I'd like to chime in on the broader view. It will be tempting to view this as part of an overall conservative wave in Latin America, and I fully expect that kind of assertion to spread, especially since this was a clear cut contest between candidates who self-identified as left and right. It has already started, really.

But that is misleading and does not pay sufficient attention to the specific Colombian context. The FARC effectively prevented any real political left from developing in Colombia. It was too hard for the left to convince people it wasn't going to be soft on the FARC, or even tied to it. Look back at 2010, when Antanas Mockus ran and won only 27.5% in a runoff after being clobbered in the first round. It was just too easy to tie the left to the FARC, to Hugo Chávez, to Fidel Castro. Etc.

Petro was openly struggling against this. And the fact that he got 42% of the vote means he succeeded far more than anyone else in the past. Not enough to win, obviously, but enough to breath life into the aspirations of the left. It's fair to say that it won't be long before a leftist can win the presidency, and that's something that just has not been true before.

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