With all the news about hostage release in Colombia, I started wondering what the official U.S. position was. The fact that Hugo Chávez arranged it, and Alvaro Uribe is being marginalized, can’t sit too well with the Bush administration. On top of that, and rarely remarked upon, is the fact that Chávez also arranged to include governments close to him, namely Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador and France, four of which currently have terrible relations with the United States.
I’ve been looking all around, and am coming to the conclusion that the U.S. government is trying to pretend that it isn’t happening. You can’t really say anything bad about it, but your head might spin and green vomit might spew if you say something complimentary about Chávez.
I found two older references--at a late November conference on the topic, the State Department spokesman was asked about the situation, and he refused even to say Chávez’s name, instead just talking vaguely of letting Uribe do what he felt was necessary. Condoleezza Rice did the same in October.
If anyone sees any current official reactions, I’d be interested to see them.
33 comments:
The fact that Hugo Chávez arranged it, and Alvaro Uribe is being marginalized, can’t sit too well with the Bush administration.
Indeed.
Back in November, the Wall Street Journal's ultra-rightist commentator Mary Anastasia O'Grady suggested that Chavez had the most to lose from mediating the hostage negotiations. Not surprisingly, the Council on Foreign Relations (i.e. the U.S. foreign policy establishment) just lapped up O'Grady's words.
Somehow they just didn't get that this was always a win-win for Chavez.
I don't think it was too controversial (or particularly rightist) to argue last month that Chavez had the most to lose. They argued that failure would damage Chavez's credibility, which is reasonable. What they did not add, however, is that he had a ton to gain with success, which is where we are now.
They argued that failure would damage Chavez's credibility, which is reasonable.
I'm sorry, Greg, but that's just poor analysis. Even moderate critics of Chavez in Washington and Bogota haven't blamed the Venezuelan President for the breakdown in negotiations. Read what the Center for International Policy has to say about the issue, or what Daniel Samper Pizano has to say.
Michael Shifter, another critic of Chavez, wrote all the way back in October that "Chavez will probably emerge a winner in many South American eyes regardless of the outcome of the hostage talks."
There's little point in sticking up for the Council on Foreign Relations types when their analysis is driven by wishful thinking.
Who's talking about blaming Chavez for anything? He said he could get the FARC to the table, and failing to do so would've damaged his credibility. He had more to lose than Uribe.
Who's talking about blaming Chavez for anything? He said he could get the FARC to the table, and failing to do so would've damaged his credibility. He had more to lose than Uribe.
Let's be honest here, Greg. Your response to me is completely reflexive because you have to show your audience that you're not a left-winger like me. That makes perfect sense. If I was an editor of a scholarly journal like yours, I'd probably do the same thing. Better to stay on good terms with the Council on Foreign Relations than with me. A good career choice, no doubt.
But I'm afraid your analysis on this issue is just plain lame. The proof is in the pudding, Greg. Even with one measly gesture from the FARC (three hostages), Chavez's public stature on this issue is presently ascending while Uribe's is clearly not. So obviously Chavez doesn't have to get much from the FARC to come out looking better than Uribe on this particular score.
Moreover, you're completely ignoring the fact that, even prior to the announcement of a hostage release, Uribe (not Chavez) was under fire from the hostages' families. That's not to mention the fact that the French president was implicitly criticizing Uribe's decision to end Chavez's mediation role.
But, hey, don't take my word for it. Just read the damn title of AP's report: "Colombian hostage release isolates Uribe"
He said he could get the FARC to the table, and failing to do so would've damaged his credibility.
He said he could get the FARC to the table, and failing to do so would've...
Woulda, coulda, shoulda, Greg.
The fact of the matter is this: "Colombian hostage release isolates Uribe"
The test of one's analysis is not what one claims would have happened under another scenario. The test of one's analysis is whether or not the predictions offered prove accurate.
Shifter's predictions proved accurate. Those of the Council on Foreign Relations did not.
I will now just let readers untangle the logic for themselves.
I will now just let readers untangle the logic for themselves.
Good.
As usual Justin is simplistic and ilogical.
This hasn't been a win win for Chavez. Indeed he already lost a lot out of this. I just had access to a piece of research on Chavez's and the lost referendum and the argument with Colombia did have a negative effect on his image. This cost him a good 5% of votes and you know what the final outcome of the referendum was.
I just had access to a piece of research on Chavez's and the lost referendum and the argument with Colombia did have a negative effect on his image. This cost him a good 5% of votes and you know what the final outcome of the referendum was.
Well, I have no idea as to how one calculates how many votes the Colombia dispute cost Chavez. It's certainly possible that it cost him some votes, but (1) that's not Greg's argument and (2) the domestic effects should be distinguished from international effects.
Greg's argument is that Chavez would have been the big loser if he didn't bring the FARC to the table. The problems with these kinds of arguments are multiple. Firstly, the argument is --in the jargon of social science-- unfalsifiable. It's based on a nonexistent hypothetical.
It would be like me trying to argue that Muhammad Ali would have beaten Larry Holmes if he hadn't been so fat. It's not the kind of argument that social scientists usually make because such arguments are impossible to prove.
It's very easy to come up with hypothetical scenarios, but the ultimate test of one's analysis is whether it predicts the actual outcome correctly. What it predicts for each hypothetical scenario is immaterial in the face of empirical facts.
Moreover, in this case, Greg ignores other hypothetical possibilities that are just as plausible. How does he know that people wouldn't have blamed the intransigence of the FARC or Uribe in the event that the FARC didn't came to the table? He doesn't. And, in fact, if you look at the analysis of people knowledgeable about the hostage negotiations, they tend to be more critical of Uribe's handling of them than Chavez's. That goes even for a number of analysts who are otherwise critical of Chavez.
1) "They just didn't get that this was always a win-win for Chavez."
2)"It's certainly possible that it cost him some votes"
So?
1) "They just didn't get that this was always a win-win for Chavez."
2)"It's certainly possible that it cost him some votes"
Well, let's suppose you're correct that it did cost Chavez enough votes to swing the constitutional reform vote. A number of analysts suggest that, if the constitutional reforms had passed by a small margin, Chavez would have faced greater problems still. I would argue that that hypothesis (with regard to a hypothetical scenario) is much stronger than Greg's hypothesis that Chavez would have been the big loser if he hadn't been able to bring the FARC to the table. If the constitutional reforms had won by a small margin, the opposition would have undoubtedly screamed "fraud" (even though that's technically impossible with the voting system in place). If the recent history is any indication, sectors of the international media would have spread claims of "fraud." And, last but not least, Chavez would have had a weak mandate to push through a series of controversial constitutional reforms.
So, personally, I think that, if the Colombia dispute made the difference electorally, that could very well have been a blessing in disguise for Chavez because a tight electoral victory for him would have probably been pyrrhic.
"Woulda, coulda, shoulda,"
Good for you, not for Greg.
"Woulda, coulda, shoulda,"
Good for you, not for Greg.
Well, just so you know, it wasn't I who originally elaborated the argument that Chavez would have faced greater problems still if he'd won the constitutional reforms by a small margin. That argument was originally put forth by Chavez himself, as well as people like Greg Wilpert.
All I said in my last post is that I think that that hypothesis is much stronger than Greg's hypothesis that Chavez would have been the big loser if the FARC hadn't come to the table. I don't absolutely positively know which hypothesis is superior (because it's impossible to really know such a thing), but I do think it, and I've explained why I think it.
Greg, on the other hand, talks as if he knows that Chavez would have been the big loser if the FARC hadn't come to the table, but the fact of the matter is that he knows no such thing.
What about you, anonymous? Do you "think" whatever Greg thinks, or do you think for yourself?
Do you think a tight electoral victory for Chavez on the constitutional reforms would have been pyrrhic or not? Explain.
Don't get mad Justin, no need to take it personal.
My opinion:
-This is not a win win for Chavez at all. Indeed he already lost out of this.
-Chavez is losing his demoestic leadership, yet he is obsessed with his regional leadershipabout. He lost it a la Napoleon.
he already lost out of this.
Lost what?
You didn't answer the question of whether or not you think a tight electoral victory for Chavez on the constitutional reforms would have been pyrrhic.
To imply that Chavez lost something suggests that you think a narrow "victory" for him on the constitutional reforms would have actually served Chavez's interests. Is that what you think?
Hehe
Easy compañero.
I am not sure.
I mean, that question is totally out of context and to be frank, you sound emotional but... well, because I like you I will answer your question.
No, I think he would have been better off wining than losing.
But that doesn't really matter now. This is not about the outcome, it is about managing the outcome, and your master is not doing a good job at all.
Happy new year camarada
No, I think he would have been better off wining than losing.
My own thoughts are that Chavez needed to win by at least 10 points to really win the mandate he needed for the constitutional reforms.
I think a narrow victory would have been worse for Chavez than the actual outcome.
With the narrow loss, all the opposition's screaming about "fraud" over the years looks pretty silly now.
Looks like after all there won't be a release.
Chavez fails again.
Who called this a win win?
Chavez fails again.
It's a little early for the spin-game, anonymous. Best to wait and see why the hostage exchange broke down and what the prospects of a release in the very near future are.
I'll blog about it when the dust settles a little more. Right now the story is pretty strange (i.e. the story about the young child).
One thing is clear. This is not a win win.
One thing is clear. This is not a win win.
You don't have the information to say anything with clarity, anonymous. Best to wait and see.
And for the families' sake, you really ought not be cheerful about the breakdown of the hostage exchange, especially on New Years' day. The world does not revolve around the Venezuelan opposition.
Fact 1:
Chavez lost votes out of his Colombia stance.
Fact 2:
Chavez didn't deliver as promissed.
Fact 3:
The media circus ended up in fiasco.
How can this be a win win at all?
I stand by my previous post, anonymous.
Amazing
Amazing
What's amazing is how quick you are to start spinning the story without any substantive information about it.
Do you really think that this is a win win for Chavez?
Argue your case camarada.
Do you really think that this is a win win for Chavez?
That depends on whether or not a hostage release ultimately takes place with Chavez's assistance. If it does, it's a win-win for him. If it doesn't, I personally don't think he loses much at all because most people understand that it's very difficult to mediate anything between the FARC and Uribe, two highly intransigent foes.
The Colombian government is likely to try to sabotage any future Chavez-brokered hostage release because that would improve Chavez's image at Uribe's expense.
Post a Comment