Joseph Nye's Soft Power
I read Joseph Nye's Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), a book I had been meaning to read for some time. Very often, diplomacy or negotiation (as opposed to force) is popularly referred to as "soft power" but that is a misuse of Nye, who first coined the term almost 2o years ago. His definition is the following:
It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies (p. x).
The idea is quite interesting. But the analysis is, well, soft. He argues that soft power rests on three resources: "its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)" (p. 11). This certainly describes the problems the U.S. has had in Latin America in recent years, where for example the message of democracy is combined with policies that have serve to undermine it. It is also problematic, as Nye himself notes, that the U.S. pushes free trade in places like Latin America while maintaining agricultural subsidies.
But beyond that simple argument, Nye never lays out how these three variables interact, and what outcomes we should expect as a result. Instead, he offers fairly generic assertions like "To the extent that official policies at home and abroad are consistent with democracy, human rights, openness, and respect for the opinions of others, America will benefit from the trends of this global information age" (p. 32). Or that Yao Ming "could become another Michael Jordan" (p. 88) and this could mean something, though I never quite understood what.
The overall policy message is that the U.S. government needs to keep soft power in mind when dealing with other countries and not to pretend it doesn't matter. Nye's analysis is bland but that message bears repeating. In the case of Latin America, the current U.S. response in Honduras may well be squandering the small reserves of goodwill President Obama had generated. Soft power cannot be created quickly, but it can be negated easily. In Latin America, the U.S. government tends not to understand (or care much about) that.
17 comments:
There's no evidence whatsoever that Obama's approach to Honduras will have any lasting impact on US-Latam relations. Chile and Brazil may well have right-wing governments next. Mexico couldn't care less. Argentina's Kirchner's are on their way out and Reutemman or whoever succeeds them will not worry about this. Colombia? No. Maybe Peru, depending who wins there next? That's about it.
The only ones that care are the usual left-wing ALBA losers, who are becoming more and more authoritarian and generally less and less relevant.
And right-wing Governments don't care about coups and democracy in their region? Could have fooled me give the unanimous reaction from the region in support of Zelaya. But your assertion is good to keep in mind, anonomous. Perhaps you are right. And I guess the US improving their relationship with the ALBA countries is not worth anything? Silly me, I thought Obama made it clear he wanted to improve things in the region. If he only wants to be friends with right-wing governments, that would be alarming news.
The only ones really worried about an Honduras repeat are the authoritarian ALBA nations. I suspect Ortega is the one most at risk, especially after he stole last year's municipal elections. The rest of the region realizes that there's zero risk of a repeat since their presidents, unlike Zelaya, are not busy destroying the country's institutions.
The US shouldn't antagonize the ALBA nations for the sake of it, but neither should we care too much. They are basically irrelevant and have managed to do little other than to destroy the long-run future of their economies.
Obama probably wants to be friends with countries that are part of the 21st century. That includes most of Latin America.
It's strange when the Paraguayan Senate is the institution giving lessons on democracy to the rest of the region, by refusing to accept Venezuela as part of Mercosur.
Does Nye offer any examples of any countries that have successfully used this implemented this theory of "soft power" - besides postwar US? Or is it this just another part of this notion of American exceptionalism? Does he offer States any way to increase their cultural magnetism, or is this just a gift of the US role in the natural free marketplace? Most importantly, does Nye really think the main US problem is the TYPE of power employed, or is this really only another way to justify US hegemony (vs. the dreaded declinists)?
To me, this talk about soft power (vs. hard) attempts only to hide the much more important points. Does the US have too much power in international relations? Does the US intend to play fair or cheat any system of relations? What is US power being used for? And if the essential foreign policy aims of the US does not change, who cares about what type of power is employed?
Greg is right in noting you really have to walk the walk if (as a matter of fashion) you intend to employ this concept with seriousness. Sophisticated foreign actors (like foreign ministers) will not be fooled. They pay attention to actions in the end. If the actions, attitudes and aims don't change, the proportion of of carrot vs stick will not matter much.
They are basically irrelevant and have managed to do little other than to destroy the long-run future of their economies.
Long run, eh? Very coy, because you certainly can't be talking about the economic performance in recent years or the present. Do you know what country is pegged to lead the region in economic growth this year? Bolivia. Do you know what countries led the region in growth in recent years? Venezuela and Argentina. Do you know what countries are suffering worse under this crisis? Mexico and Brazil I believe (after years of very little growth during the boom times). Peru's economy has tanked faster than anyone else's.
Bolivia's, Ecuador's and Venezuela's economies are basically a function of commodity prices. This is particularly true for Venezuela. So short-term economic growth depends on external factors, not on anything any of those countries do. Long-term though the government's actions do have an impact, through production. PDVSA used to be the best run state company in Latin America. Today it's a disaster that can't even pay its suppliers.
It's surprising how many misconceptions leftists have of what's going on in Latin America.
I read Joseph Nye's Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), a book I had been meaning to read for some time. Very often, diplomacy or negotiation (as opposed to force) is popularly referred to as "soft power" but that is a misuse of Nye...
Indeed, Greg, it IS a misuse of Nye. May I remind you that I was the one who informed you that you had misused the concept of "soft power"?
You're right that Nye's general analysis is weak, but the concept of "soft power" is, nevertheless, interesting. The basic concept is better developed in a seminal work on international relations by Edward Hallett Carr. That book, originally published in 1939, is entitled The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations.
If you wanna read the good stuff, you gotta read the classics.
Bolivia's, Ecuador's and Venezuela's economies are basically a function of commodity prices.
And Peru, Chile, Colombia, Brazil and Mexico are somehow qualitatively different in that regard?
This is particularly true for Venezuela.
Norway, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia are just as reliant on oil as Venezuela, but they did not see anywhere near the growth rates Venezuela did (basically doubled their economy in 6 years).
So short-term economic growth depends on external factors, not on anything any of those countries do.
Actually Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia taking control of their hydrocarbons had pretty much everything to do with the dramatic growth in revenues, which then is used to pump economic growth. In Venezuela, industrial production grew far faster than oil sector growth.
Long-term though the government's actions do have an impact, through production. PDVSA used to be the best run state company in Latin America. Today it's a disaster that can't even pay its suppliers.
First off, PDVSA was never a beacon of efficiency. Second, the notion of big declines in production at PDVSA have been shown to be a big lie. After an independent audit, finally everyone realizes the PDVSA figures have been correct all along. Production levels today (3.1 mbpd) are roughly where they were when Chavez took office (3.2), despite the major OPEC mandated production cuts over the past year.
The debts you speak about (that got an inordinate amount of media attention) have been paid. The temporary cashflow problem was the result of the abrupt crash in prices but more fundamentally because (many) billions are now going to the benefit of the country. Of course, when PDVSA did little for the country they had more money laying around.
It's surprising how many misconceptions leftists have of what's going on in Latin America.
Actually you are the one who just unloaded a massive amount of misconceptions in just one post.
I had said I believed Brazil and Mexico were suffering worst under this economic crisis. That had been true in the 1q. But now I see that Brazil has apparently had an amazing turnaround in the 2q (after their worst ever first quarter GDP figures). The Mexican economy did shrink a jaw-dropping 10.3 percent in 2q. Venezuela was -2.4% - however after 2 quarters of deficits, the current account came in at $2.15 billion surplus. The economic crisis everyone was predicting for Venezuela will not seem to be appearing. But Mexico... ouch - 10% gone in a year. Maybe they will learn to look South a bit more than to el Norte for salvation.
Since you're interested in the concept of "soft power," Greg, you might also consider reading an article from International Organization entitled "Power in International Politics" (2005). It's by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall. I think they do a better job of developing the concept of "soft power" than Nye.
Thanks, though I am less interested in soft power per se than reading for myself what Nye had to say about the topic.
And leftside, I would just encourage you to get the book for yourself--it is a quick and easy read.
I am less interested in soft power per se than reading for myself what Nye had to say about the topic.
Why?
leftside,
As I wrote, so many misconceptions.
Yes, PDVSA was a beacon of efficiency pre-Chavez. Not by US oil company standards but certainly by Latin America standards. You could measure it in the traditional ways, such as production per employee, but also in other ways, such as the fact that PDVSA earlier this year managed its cash so badly it couldn't pay billions to this suppliers. This is basic cash management and if a oil company can't do that...
Please tell me you are not looking at Venezuela's growth post-2003, which is artificially high due to its recovery from the 2002-03 oil strike. It's the same reason Argentina grew so fast. What are they going to do now that is over?
There's nothing wrong with poor countries (or even rich ones) taking over hydrocarbons. The problems arise when you simply spend today and not think about tomorrow.
The problems arise when you simply spend today and not think about tomorrow.
All the investments being made (in Venezuela, for example) are all about the future. Investments in education, health, infrastructure and the hydrocarbon sector. You can't increase production if you don't invest. After years of the private sector leading growth in Venezuela, this year (under the crisis) the public is now taking the lead in keeping the economy going. That is what any good economist would tell Venezuela to do. The fact is that your side has been predicting an economic collapse in Venezuela for 10 years now. Instead, once the Venezuelan people got a hold of PDVSA's resources, it has been the most impressive periods of (econmoic and social) growth and the country has ever seen. To deny that this policy had anything to do with these results is just hard-headed.
I don't deny that some efficiency may be lost at PDVSA, as decisions are made with the whole country in mind - not just the company's bottom line. But the country's benefits from having that control can not be denied.
That would be true if there were investments. But private sector investment has collapsed and public sector investment is no substitute.
When's the last time you were in Caracas? In the middle of an oil boom its a crime infested dump. Compare with Panama.
There won't be an economic collapse in Venezuela. Oil will make sure of that. What you will see is a long-term decline, a la Argentina. The most productive and educated segments of the population continue to abandon the country taking their money and know-how with them.
Anon, all you are saying is that you value the amount of private investment more than any other measure of economic worth and value. While I believe an economy is measured by actual human progress - less poverty, unemployment, etc.
As far as brain drain, perhaps you can tell me what Latin country does not have brain drain problems? Certainly not Panama, where more than 30% of its college graduates live in the US (compared to 5% of Venezuelans - in a 2006 UN study).
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