Micheletti and the OAS
Roberto Micheletti says the Latin American delegation from the OAS can come to Honduras if they want, but he will not allow Zelaya's return. He knows full well that no Latin American country has shown itself willing to back up OAS demands, so all Latin American diplomats can be safely ignored.
11 comments:
Your failure to acknowledge the inter-relationship between the US govt and the other goverments in the OAS, of which the US is a major member, makes this harping on the OAS tiresome and results in not-very-acute analysis.
As an example, in the last post on this theme, you criticized El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala for only maintaining the trade blockade for 48 hours. Do you see any connection at all between their failure to do so and the very clear signals from the U.S. that we would not be adding any real, concrete pressure on the coup government?
Greg, I'd be interested in your response to the suggestion that the U.S. could still have a tremendous positive effect by working with the OAS to issue a joint pledge that none of the member governments will recognize the results of the Honduran elections if they're held under the coup regime.
Obama's laughable equating of the U.S. living up to his lofty words with the ugliest kinds of interventions (in the NY Times article linked by leftside in a previous thread) needs to be called out by Latin Americanists. Unless you agree with him, in which case I'd be interested in reading your thinking on that.
Your failure to acknowledge the inter-relationship between the US govt and the other goverments in the OAS, of which the US is a major member, makes this harping on the OAS tiresome and results in not-very-acute analysis.
I was about to make the same point. Greg speaks as if the OAS were an exclusively Latin American organization and that its inability to end the coup can therefore be blamed exclusively on Latin America. That is absurd. The OAS is a hemispheric organization. It not only includes the United States and Canada but has also been historically dominated by the United States. (Perhaps Greg forgets that Insulza's accession to the leadership of the OAS was ultimately negotiated by the United States).
The bottom line is that Latin America doesn't have the kind of economic leverage necessary to end the coup. Latin America's weakness in this case is rooted in historical factors that have nothing to do with the level of political will in the hemisphere.
Greg has yet to offer one concrete proposal as to how he thinks Latin America is supposed to exert the kind of power that it does not have. Greg knows where the power lies in this case but nonetheless decides to downplay U.S. responsibility for what is happening.
Would Greg suggest that Brazil and Venezuela provide weaponry to the groups protesting the coup in Honduras? What is your proposal, Greg? You can't harp on Latin America if you have no concrete suggestions as to what you think Latin America ought to be doing to resolve this crisis.
As an example, in the last post on this theme, you criticized El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala for only maintaining the trade blockade for 48 hours. Do you see any connection at all between their failure to do so and the very clear signals from the U.S. that we would not be adding any real, concrete pressure on the coup government?
Indeed, no one can expect tiny Central American countries to commit economic suicide because the United States is not willing to play ball.
it bears repeating, thank god none of you are or will ever be, anywhere near a policy making position!
Where do you get such ideas?
it bears repeating, thank god none of you are or will ever be, anywhere near a policy making position!
I challenge anonymous to point to one statement in my comment above that he could coherently dispute. I won't hold my breath for a serious response.
Your premises are all wrong.
You don't accept that Zelaya repeatedly broke the law and created this mess. You don't think the fact that the other political institution in Honduras oppose Zelaya means anything.
You want the US to support the return of a president who repeatedly attacked his country's already very weak institutions. You don't realize just how much of a menace Zelaya is to his country.
You think military coups are the biggest threat to democracy in the region when it's clear to anyone willing to see that the biggest threat is the dismantling of already weak institutions by authoritarian populists (Chavez, Correa, Morales, Zelaya, Ortega, even the Kirchners to some extent).
That's why I'm grateful you don't have, and likely never will have, any say in actual policy making.
And you seem to be under the delusion that if the US doesn't actively work to get Zelaya back in power that it will somehow affect relations with Latin America? That's completely wrong.
Who is going to be upset if the US does little? Not Brazil. Certainly not Mexico, or Peru, or Chile, or Colombia. The only country even moderately important that will be upset is Venezuela, and who cares what Chavez has to say? Not even his fellow Latin Americans do. They did not even support him for the UN Security Council. Chavez is so unpopular in Latin America he tied Bush in regional approval in Latinobarometro.
In short, every one just wants Zelaya to go away. The more he continues to make a fool of himself, a la AMLO after his election loss, the more other governments will try to distance themselves from him.
I asked for a coherent response, anonymous. Most of what you write isn't even a response to my comment above.
Perhaps if I get bored tomorrow, I'll spell out --point by point-- just how incoherent and factually-challenged your arguments have become.
Write what you wish. So long as nothing of that ever becomes policy I'm OK with it.
To return to Greg's original post: today Micheletti changed position again and will not allow the scheduled OAS visit. He instead suggested he would be open to a rescheduled visit without Insulza, to whom he specifically took objection-- as he had earlier objected to any official of a member country in ALBA.
These are clearly more delaying tactics and propaganda moves for internal consumption in Honduras.
It's also an effort to prevent the OAS delegation from arriving on the day the demonstrations are planned in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula (people have been walking in from the countryside since Wednesday).
Greg, any thoughts on the inclusion of the Canadian foreign minister in the OAS delegation? He was the only representative at the July 4 meeting where they revoked the coup government's membership to speak against Zelaya, though he voted with the rest.
Canada's government would be just fine with the coup regime continuing and giving way to either Santos or Lobo; their gold-mining companies are specifically interested in silencing the communities that are protesting their depradations.
Here's a proposal for the foreign ministers who've already cleared their calendars to participate in this delegation: go to Washington instead. Use the time to put pressure on the U.S. State Department to come up with a common strategy and shared commitments for concrete actions to increase the pressure -- something a lot stronger than "we're still figuring out if it's legally a coup" and "we support the San Jose Accords and the [nonexistent] mediation process". Invite the newly legitimate Honduran ambassador to sit in, and to be part of the press and photo op when
the next steps are announced.
Call the Obama administration on its stated determination to "deal with this in an international context." Don't allow that fine principle to deteriorate in practice to mean "in an international context of the U.S.'s choosing".
The presence of the Mexican and Canadian representatives would be especially valuable in that context. Getting them to commit to some concrete actions along with the U.S. would free the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua to try trade shutdowns again, since they might actually do something if they weren't operating in isolation.
In Honduras, soldiers have been deployed to replace striking health care workers and striking air traffic controllers. Reservists are being called out. The economic pinch is increasing as time goes on. Of course it's falling most heavily on the poor, but they are the ones supporting Zelaya's return, and would be willing to endure a rougher couple of weeks if the outcome would be restoration and the end of the Micheletti-military regime.
Now is the moment to turn up the heat.
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