Abolishing Term Limits

Kristin McKie, "Presidential Term Limit Contravention: Abolish, Extend, Fail, or Respect?" Forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies (early view).

Abstract (gated article):

Since presidential term limits were (re)adopted by many states during the third wave of democratization, 221 presidents across Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia have reached the end of their term(s) in office. Of these, 30% have attempted to contravene term limits, resulting in either full abolition, one-term extensions, or failure. What explains these divergent trajectories? I argue that trends in electoral competition over time best predict term limit outcomes, with noncompetitive elections permitting full abolition, less competitive elections allowing for one-term extensions, and competitive elections leading to failed bids. This is because electoral trends provide informational cues to the president’s co-partisan legislators and constitutional court judges (the actors who ultimately rule on constitutional term limit amendments) about the cost/benefit analysis that voting to uphold or repeal term limits would have on their own political survival. These findings suggest a linkage between political uncertainty and constitutional stability more generally.

This has been a major issue in Latin America over the last 15 or so years, and of course was central to the 2009 Honduran coup. A slew of presidents tried, either successfully or not, to abolish term limits. What McKie argues is intuitive: competitive political systems are less likely to allow it. She extends the analysis to judges, who calculate whether they will survive politically.

First, low or declining electoral competition creates the perception among these actors that the ruling party will continue to win elections into the foreseeable future. This reduces any fear they may have that lifting term limits could inadvertently advantage an opposition party, because the low level of electoral uncertainty makes an opposition win highly unlikely. As such, the ruling party no longer needs the “insurance” that term limit laws originally provided at the time they were adopted (namely, that an opposition party would not enjoy unlimited incumbent advantage), and thus the term limit rule becomes expendable. Alternatively, a higher level of electoral competition compels ruling-party allied parliamentarians and judges to keep the insurance of term limits in place. 

However, even if term limit rules are no longer needed, this does not guarantee that ruling party legislators and affiliated judges would automatically vote to scrap them. Here, a second, interrelated causal mechanism linked to low electoral competition comes into play—the leverage the president and the party have over ruling party legislators and constitutional court justices. An electorally dominant party can threaten legislators with being “de-campaigned” in the next election or judges with being dismissed from the court if they do not vote the party line.

This is all about horizontal accountability. Democracy requires that different branches of government are independent. If judges feel they can make decisions without losing their jobs, they will not bow down to the executive (which is the whole point of lifetime appointments when they exist).