U.S.-Brazilian relations
On the heels of my post yesterday on Brazilian diplomacy, the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed by Susan Kaufman Purcell that claims Brazil cannot be "relied on to deal with political and security problems in Latin America in ways that are also compatible with U.S. interests"
In other words, Brazil is not interested in doing what the U.S. wants. This should not be some sort of shocker. However, Purcell's argument goes even further with unfortunate logic:
It seems that a multilateral approach is antithetical to U.S. interests. Yet those procedures are critical to achieving substantive goals. The alternative is alienating everyone and thereby achieving no goals at all.Several conclusions can be drawn from Brazil's behavior. First, Brazil wants to prevent the U.S. from expanding its military involvement in South America, which Brazil regards as its sphere of influence. Second, Brazil much prefers working within multilateral institutions, rather than acting unilaterally.
Within these institutions, Brazil seeks to integrate all regional players, achieve consensus and avoid conflict and fragmentation—all worthy goals. But these are procedural, rather than substantive, goals.
14 comments:
I'd say you missed the key point.
Kaufman is pointing out that Brazil is more interested in form than in substance. They claim their problem with what happened in Honduras is due to concerns about democracy, yet want Cuba to join the OAS. UNASUR focuses on made-up concerns yet ignores real threats. So much for their "legendary" diplomats!
As Moises Naim pointed out many expected Brazil to become an important international player. Instead it's acting as an immature country with a chip on its shoulder.
The key question is how much of this is Brazil, and how much is Lula. Will a Serra administration change all this?
I'd say you missed the key point.
I'd say that Gabriel (or whoever this is) missed the logic train a long time ago.
Let's suppose that Gabriel's goal were to move Cuba toward greater political openness. Would an auspicious route to such an end be to exclude Cuba from the OAS and to try to isolate the country, just as the United States has done for the last 50 years?
Or would a more promising route be to have Cuba rejoin the OAS, thereby giving the Cuban opposition the ability to use the Democratic Charter to air its grievances and to pressure for greater political openness?
If an invitation to Cuba to rejoin the OAS is such a "threat" to democracy, why hasn't Cuba accepted the invitation?
It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that Brazil's approach to Cuba has much greater potential to bring about Gabriel's purported goals than the 50-year failure that he seems to advocate.
Now, given what we know, how exactly is an invitation to Cuba to rejoin the OAS more of a "threat" to the region than a Honduran coup that has involved the summary shutdown of opposition media, the execution of numerous political activists, and endless military curfews?
I'm oh-so-curious.
"Now, given what we know, how exactly is an invitation to Cuba to rejoin the OAS more of a "threat" to the region than a Honduran coup that has involved the summary shutdown of opposition media, the execution of numerous political activists, and endless military curfews?
I'm oh-so-curious."
Cuba's tyranny would be legitimized. Democracy delegtimized. Cuba's tyranny strikes at many more freedoms than those you mention for Honduras and then proclaims them the scientific truth. Cuba's system then says there is no way to escape as criticism within the revolution is the only form tolerated. Honduras' autocrats at least are working towards an end that promises the possibility of change and is "the coup" ends with a democratically elected government within 6 months. In short it is the difference between a failed totalitarian system demanding international legitimacy and a poor country responding militarily, unnecessarily in my view, to a reckless president and his radical allies.
Multilateralism is often the tool of weak countries. What alternative is there? Even Woodrow Wilson, the most idealistic of US presidents, sat down with the Big Four when it came down to doing something more than make speeches. Teddy Roosevelt and Otto Von Bismarck were perfectly capable diplomats because of their strength and sense of what was possible. In short realism based on strength triumphs frequently over idealism based in international institutions. The multilateralists fail to recognize an obvious truth, power matters and every state is not equal in diplomacy no matter how just their cause.
Cuba's tyranny would be legitimized.
Oh really? Well, if that were really the case, why doesn't Cuba accept the invitation to rejoin the OAS? Surely it would like its form of governance to be legitimized, wouldn't it?
The problem is that your arguments are logically vacuous.
power matters and every state is not equal in diplomacy no matter how just their cause.
Well, duhhh. Who here is contesting that point? Of course power matters.
And any realist who's worth his salt will tell you that there are limits to American power. If the United States refuses to throw some bones to lesser powers like Brazil, there will come a day when Brazil will join with other lesser powers to effectively counter-balance against American power.
Has it occurred to you that the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have close to half the world's population, massive oil resources, nuclear arsenals, and rapidly advancing industrial and technological capacities? Has it occurred to you that the United States is in massive debt to China and that the BRIC countries could send the dollar into a tailspin at their collective whim by simply switching reserve currencies?
If the folks in the Washington establishment don't wake up to these basic facts and start playing ball with lesser powers, they will one day wake up to find that the monster of all counter-balancing alliances has them (and us) by the balls.
Do the math, smart guy. Your version of "realism" is completely outdated.
Here is the math, smart guy.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/think_again_asias_rise?page=full
It is hard to believe you call yourself a scholar when all the evidence you ever cite is just warmed over anti-American gruel. Trendy, but intellectually bankrupt.
Notice, anonymous, that you're incapable of logically addressing (much less refuting) one specific point I've made.
The only genuinely "realist" theorist of international relations at Foreign Policy is Stephen Walt. That's an example of a scholar. The kind of people you idolize --people like, say, Moises Naim-- are little more than neoliberal ideologues who don't even understand the basic nuts and bolts of international relations.
You wanted numbers. I gave you numbers. Now you want something else. You can't be pleased because you're full of yourself and a know-it-all. No other scholar has ever worked on these issues until you came along and lit up academia with your theory of American decline and the rise of BRIC. Again, this is trendy and vastly overstated. Everyone who disagrees with you is part of the neoconlib cabal or whatever ridiculous name you give to the dark forces.
I'm afraid Justin is no scholar. He's one of those eternal students that love to pontificate but can't get anything actually done.
No other scholar has ever worked on these issues until you came along and lit up academia with your theory of American decline and the rise of BRIC.
Actually, if you knew something about international relations theory, you would know that the foremost realist theorists in the United States --Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt-- have been warning about the dangers of imperial overstretch for years. I invite you to read up on what Walt and Waltz have to say. Waltz has specifically warned about the possibility that a U.S. push into Eastern Europe and some of the former Soviet Republics could cause Russia and China to form a counter-balancing alliance.
Walt and Mearsheimer focus on how U.S. adventurism in the Middle East are likely to spell real long-term national security problems for the United States.
All three scholars warn that U.S. policy is generating real risks of large-scale counter-balancing. And, by the way, anonymous, we're not talking about "anti-American" scholars here. These guys are run-of-the-mill realists. The fact that you don't know what they're saying says quite a lot.
Your own logic is based on a red herring. According to your logic, the unipolar moment will persist because no single state can challenge American power alone. But that's not the real issue. To understand the problem with your logic, one need only look back to the last two world wars. On the eve of World War I, no single great power on Earth matched the military might of Germany. That wasn't the decisive fact, though. The decisive fact was the combined power of the Allies.
Counter-balancing is no joke, anonymous. If the U.S. foreign policy establishment ignores the risks of its own behaviors, it will do so at its own peril.
What's "trendy" and "intellectually bankrupt" is the neolib-neocon cabal that anonymous champions. The rest of us are just trying to undo the damage.
With great confidence in the 1980s the prophets of America's decline wrote about the upcoming Japanese role in world affairs. As they bought Pebble Beach and Rockefeller Center, as the price of real estate in Tokyo eclipsed all records, as the Nikkei hit 35,000, all right thinking people understood the message. The era of American dominance was over. Not so simple then, nor now.
The prophets ignore the self-correcting measures of democratic capitalism. They fail to see the contingent nature of history and using the rhetorical tropes of 17c Puritans, they advance their theories based on what they hope will happen to the wicked. The successes of US diplomacy over the last 60 years abound throughout the world, yet they see none.
The Chinese due to their economic growth rates are assumed to be the leaders of the 21st century. Yet China has not resolved the enormous domestic challenges ahead. Take a look back at what early industrialization engendered in other countries--strikes and labor problems, endless rounds of struggle for democratic practices, foreign imperialism as a mask for covering up domestic tensions, the undoing of traditional social roles etc... Capitalism and industrial development destroys old ways of doing things. The major error of the gloom and doom prophets is to assume a seamless trajectory for China.
The United States is in relative decline as it should be. It has been in relative decline since the ahistorical apex of 1945. That does not mean we have ceased to create wealth, improve our living standards and maintain a disproportionate influence in world affairs. We will continue to lead, not as a unipolar hegemon, but as the most important country with the most important allies and the best ideas. There have been and will continue to be major mistakes along the way. Our decline is overstated, China's rise will not be seamless.
The era of American dominance was over. Not so simple then, nor now.
I've never said American dominance is over. I've said it is declining, which is an objectively observable fact. I agree with you that American dominance has been gradually declining ever since the end of World War II. And by the way, I think Europe's power (relative to the rest of the world) is also in decline.
We may not know exactly when the tipping point from unipolarity to multipolarity takes place, but I think it's safe to say that it's not very far off.
The broader point is that, as the tipping point approaches, everyone is likely to be better off if we cooperate more with lesser powers like Brazil (so as to avoid long-term conflcts that won't serve anyone's interests).
As they bought Pebble Beach and Rockefeller Center, as the price of real estate in Tokyo eclipsed all records, as the Nikkei hit 35,000, all right thinking people understood the message.
But notice how you try to turn this into an ideological issue rather than a simple discussion of objective realities. This is not a question of ideology. Where one falls in the debate about the actual distribution of power in the world is a matter of how we measure power, not what ideology we may or may not subscribe to.
The prophets ignore the self-correcting measures of democratic capitalism.
But I don't see American foreign policy as "self-correcting." That's an idealist concept, not a realist one. I don't see how a system that contributes massively to the speedy industrialization of China is "self-correcting." The short-term interests of U.S.-based multinationals --as well as the interests of a few other powerful interest groups-- are the driving force behind U.S. policy.
Having foreign policies that have literally nothing to do with American national security is not the sign of a "self-correcting" power. It's the sign of a power that is beholden to special interests rather than common interests.
Well, here are some self-correcting and practical examples from US foreign policy. FDR Good Neighbor policy and revocation of Platt Amendment. Pan Americanism. Internationalism overcomes isolationism. Truman--containment not atomic victories nor retreat in the face of USSR's aggression in E. Europe and Korea. Eisenhower--Suez Crisis Nixon goes to China. Ford--Helsinki Accords. Carter and Panama Canal treaty and human rights. Reagan negotiates with Gorbachev after 1985. GHW Bush goes to Security Council for authorization of war against Iraq. Clinton Bosnia and Kosovo humanitarian interventions on behalf of Muslim populations after fiascos of Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda. Obama revisits Iraq and Guantanamo and promises to work towards greater multilateralism.
Yes, you could argue the continuities are much greater than the deviating aspects. I would agree. Yet, the idea that presidents can and do adjust foreign policy for pragmatic reasons is also true. The long arc of American foreign policy will always include the tension between ideals and outcomes, unilateral actions and international cooperation and stability versus support for change. National security, domestic political considerations and economic self-interest will always be part of every country's foreign policy formulation.
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