Chances of US Armed Intervention in Venezuela

I am quoted in this Deutsche Welle article about the possibility of U.S. intervention. See my post yesterday on how there is no good policy options as well. As of now, I see all of the following as true.

1. Intervention is more likely now than it was before February 23. The aid gambit failed and the Trump administration is on its heels. As I've written a number of times, my main fear is what Trump will do if seen as weak (especially if combined with #7).

2. Latin America does not want armed intervention. The Lima Group said so explicitly. Brazil and Colombia--key U.S. allies--were clear on that.

3. Europe does not want intervention. The European Union has been clear on this.

4. The United Nations does not want military action.

5. The United States has a history of intervening unilaterally (or mostly so) in Latin America and elsewhere even without support.

6. Given the lack of support, land invasion is very unlikely. Aerial bombing is more so as a way to frighten the Venezuelan military into defection.

7. A spark can throw all the above into disarray. For example, famed Univision reporter Jorge Ramos and others were detained and their equipment because he didn't like their questions (more specifically, they showed Nicolás Maduro images of Venezuelans eating from garbage trucks). This reinforces what I already thought, which is that Maduro is not a particularly smart person and could easily do something that gives a perfect excuse for military action. This has a long history in U.S.-Latin American relations.

8. However, Mike Pence made a statement with the Lima Group and promised only sanctions while asking other countries to freeze assets. It was definitely un-warlike.

In sum, chances of armed intervention are not high, but they are very real and highly contextual, in the sense that an unexpected and unintended spark can start a fire.