More On Why Invading Venezuela Is A Terrible Idea

I have said and written lots of times that invading Venezuela is a bad idea. Now there is an article in Military Review, the U.S. Army's official journal, discussing the operational challenges (seven years ago I co-authored an article in that same journal outlining potential responses to a Cuban transition and I also said troops are a bad idea). The author, Jose Delgado, is director of the Counterintelligence Mission Center DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

He does not come out and just say it's a bad idea but the undertone is clear. He uses the Panama invasion as a basic comparison (because it is brought up in this regard) but brings in other invasions as well. I think this sums it up nicely:

Although the United States could easily overpower the smaller Venezuelan combatant forces, the tactics, techniques, and procedures that U.S. combatant units employed in other battlefield scenarios and environments may fall flat in Venezuela and unnecessarily prolong combatant and stabilization operations. Without exceedingly meticulous planning, intervention in Venezuela might quickly develop into an insurgency campaign that could drag on for decades.

The "meticulous planning" is virtually impossible because it is based on too many unknowns. The country is large--Caracas itself is large--and urban warfare would be a nightmare for all involved. Delgado notes that the army has no urban warfare units at all, and the government has been arming Chavistas for years.

How many times have U.S. policy makers falsely assumed military operations would be quick and easy? As Delgado points out, Panama--the ultimate example of that--does not fit the Venezuelan case. For this and many other reasons, the U.S. should not invade.