Thursday, March 05, 2026
Rebellion in Cuba and Venezuela?
To be sure, many Cubans would likely perceive their government’s acquiescence to U.S. demands as an erosion of Cuban sovereignty, even a reversion to the island’s pre-revolutionary status as a U.S. client state. A rebellion by the military and parts of society cannot be ruled out.
Wednesday, March 04, 2026
What if María Corina Machado Returned?
“With respect to her life, we do not understand why there is so much commotion,” Rodríguez said. “As for her return to the country, she will have to answer before Venezuela. Why did she call for a military intervention? Why did she call for sanctions against Venezuela? And why did she celebrate the actions that took place at the beginning of January?”
Friday, February 27, 2026
Anti-Terrorism Courts in Venezuela
The International Commission of Jurists just released a report on the use of anti-terrorism courts in Venezuela to, frankly, terrorize the population. The anti-terrorism code got going 20ish years ago under Hugo Chavez and conveniently did not define the term. So it simply came to mean regime opponents, same as many other Venezuelan laws intended to attack the population. Subsequent laws provided some more definition, but it could mean anything the regime wanted since the courts did whatever it wanted.
Wednesday, February 25, 2026
Dynamics of the Venezuela Amnesty (Part 2)
La amnistía objeto de esta Ley abarca a toda persona que se encuentre o pueda ser procesada o condenada por delitos o faltas, cometidos y acaecidos en el marco de los hechos objeto de amnistía, siempre que esté a derecho o se ponga a derecho luego de la entrada en vigencia de esta Ley.
Here are some examples of what's excluded from the law:
Estarán igualmente excluidos de la amnistía prevista en esta Ley, las personas que se encuentren o puedan ser procesadas o condenadas por promover, instigar, solicitar, invocar, favorecer, facilitar, financiar o participar en acciones armadas o de fuerza contra el pueblo, la soberanía y la integridad territorial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, por parte de Estados, corporaciones o personas extranjeras.
Tuesday, February 24, 2026
Countering Chinese Influence in Latin America
Monday, February 23, 2026
Dynamics of the Venezuelan Amnesty
Thursday, February 19, 2026
Venezuelan Public Opinion in the Aftermath
Wednesday, February 18, 2026
What is Repression Like in Venezuela?
Friday, February 13, 2026
China's Web of Relationships in Latin America
China and China-based companies have made substantial progress in advancing their position through a web of business and personal influence relationships, opening the door to Beijing’s influence and digital access.
Note that this isn't about specific trade deals, or port deals, or investments. It's about the painstaking process of building personal relationships over two decades or so. It's the long game. What that means is that even when a high profile deal is squashed, plenty of other quiet ones still happen. In fact, a lot of deals were squashed in the past without U.S. pressure. That's business.
During prior administrations, China-based companies unsuccessfully sought to acquire land on both the Atlantic and Pacific for port facilities. Chinese ZPMC cranes, scanners, and other digital equipment are reportedly used by Guatemala’s private port operators, such as APM and Chiquita Brands.
The lesson here is not to be immediately swayed by headlines. There is a lot going on under the surface.
Thursday, February 12, 2026
Annulling the Monroe Doctrine
Wednesday, February 11, 2026
Government Intervention in the Economy
Despite diplomatic controversies caused by Trump’s economic agenda in Brazil, Bessent supported the use of tariffs as part of a broader effort to reindustrialise. He noted that while tariffs generate short-term revenue, the long-term goal is to encourage companies to move production to the United States, shifting government revenue towards domestic economic activity.
The idea was that to reduce dependency on imports, the state would direct, encourage, and subsidize targeted domestic industries, whose products would substitute for foreign goods (p. 136).
Tuesday, February 10, 2026
Americans Don't Care Much About Venezuela
Friday, February 06, 2026
How Latin American Presidents Deal With Trump
She seldom challenges Mr. Trump. When she does, she believes that, to be effective, any outrage must be felt quietly, any response conducted through back-channeled phone calls and peppered with words of admiration for the president.
Thursday, February 05, 2026
Cuba Has a Secret Plan
Apuntó que, además de esas manifestaciones de solidaridad, «hay más cosas, cosas que no podemos hoy explicar abiertamente, porque el enemigo está en una persecución de todas las luces que se le pueden abrir a Cuba, de todos los caminos que se le pueden abrir a Cuba; pero sí les puedo asegurar, con todo sentido de responsabilidad, que Cuba no está sola.«En un momento como este hay mucha gente, gobiernos, países, instituciones, empresas que están dispuestos a trabajar con Cuba y que ya nos han hecho llegar vías, mecanismos, intenciones de cómo podemos hacer.
Friday, January 30, 2026
The Key Problem with Maria Corina Machado
Thursday, January 29, 2026
Controlling Another Country's Money
Trump's Policy Toward Latin America and China
Wednesday, January 28, 2026
Latin America's Response to Mark Carney's Speech
Tuesday, January 27, 2026
Delcy Rodriguez's Public Face
Friday, January 23, 2026
Don't Make Sweeping Generalizations About Latin American Politics
Wednesday, January 21, 2026
Mark Carney's Speech and Latin America
Tuesday, January 20, 2026
Colombia and China
In the midst of all the "Donroe Doctrine" hype I am staying focused on how Latin America maintains and deepens ties with extrahemispheric countries, which would supposedly violate the doctrine. For example, Colombia is deepening technology ties with China with a ministerial visit, following up on Gustavo Petro's visit last year. This includes connectivity, data infrastructure, and AI, plus satellites.
Friday, January 16, 2026
Five (Problematic) Assumptions We're Making in Venezuela
Tuesday, January 13, 2026
Contradictions in Venezuela Policy
Monday, January 12, 2026
U.S. Framework for Venezuela
Thursday, January 08, 2026
China After the Venezuela Invasion
Wednesday, January 07, 2026
What Does It Mean for Cuba to be "Next"?
Tuesday, January 06, 2026
Venezuela Invasion FAQs
2. Did Venezuela steal U.S. oil and property?
Monday, January 05, 2026
Viceroyalty Office in Venezuela
Sunday, January 04, 2026
U.S. Remote Control by Kidnap in Venezuela
Friday, January 02, 2026
Maduro and the Art of the Deal
I get the strong sense that Nicolas Maduro is trying to speak to Donald Trump in his own language. He is now basically saying he's ready to make a deal. Does Trump want oil? Then let's talk oil. You concerned about drug trafficking? Let's work together on it!
Monday, December 29, 2025
Did the U.S. Attack Venezuela?
Here's a scenario I hadn't thought about. Donald Trump announced that he launched an attack on Venezuela, which "knocked out" a "big plant or big facility" which is "where the ships come from." The twist is that no one--in either the Venezuelan or U.S. governments--confirms this. An attack on Venezuelan soil would be a big deal and would mark serious escalation. Pretending to do so without actually doing it is a liminal area that won't provide much benefit.
Friday, December 26, 2025
Can An Oil Quarantine Work Against Venezuela?
Friday, December 19, 2025
Peaceful Transition in Venezuela?
A stable transition depends, therefore, on the military’s willingness to accept civilian, democratic rule and confront irregular forces, including those with which it has previously collaborated.
Thursday, December 18, 2025
Latin American Response to Potential U.S. Invasion of Venezuela
Wednesday, December 17, 2025
The U.S. Armada in Venezuela
Tuesday, December 16, 2025
José Antonio Kast and Autonomy
Monday, December 15, 2025
Why is Trump Focused on Venezuela?
Friday, December 12, 2025
Repression in Venezuela
An important point in the debate over U.S. policy toward Venezuela is that although invasion is seriously problematic in both practical and legal terms, opposing it is not the same as supporting the government. In that sense there are echoes of Iraq. For example, the UN's Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela released a new report detailing the horrific human abuses being committed by the Maduro regime.*
It viciously attacks protests and the abuses have worsened since July 2024, when the government blatantly stole the presidential election, and certainly is worse still in the context of possible invasion. It engages in unlawful detention, torture, killing, you name it. The regime goes after the opposition or anyone "perceived as such" (p. 44). Participating in a protest makes you perceived as one even if you are protesting in favor of democracy and against deprivation.
One nice thing about this blog is that a good chunk of my intellectual history is retained here. I see that 11 years ago, just after Maduro took power, I wrote more and more about human rights abuses in Venezuela. What's happening now is simply a deepening of a decade-long process. Lacking Chavez's charisma and therefore any personal attachment to the Venezuelan people, Maduro has been forced to increase brute force over time. It's a terrible situation with no good solution.
* "Regime" is the word that comes immediately to mind as opposed to "government" because Nicolas Maduro so clearly stole the last presidential election and at this point would have no chance at all in a free election. The Venezuelan people do not get to choose who governs them.
Read more...Thursday, December 11, 2025
Trump's Options in Venezuela
Over five years later, I am back, at least periodically. We are witnessing some of the most fascinating events in the recent history of U.S.-Latin American relations and I can’t help but want to write about it.
President Donald Trump’s policy toward Venezuela is a gamble that has put him in a political bind.
If his goal is to reduce the flow of fentanyl and/or cocaine into the United States, then he cannot achieve it since neither comes in any quantity to the United States from Venezuela. Fentanyl comes primarily from Mexico and Asia, while Venezuelans mostly traffic cocaine to Europe and the Caribbean. Blowing up more boats may be dramatic, but it serves no obvious strategic purpose.
If his goal is to overthrow President Nicolás Maduro, he is raising the stakes while holding a weak hand. The core dilemma is that the United States has almost no leverage over Venezuela anymore. Since the U.S. has already imposed harsh economic sanctions, a wide range of individual sanctions against government officials, and has engaged in failed covert action, there are no more punitive actions available except armed force.
The president has four main options.
Force Maduro Out of Power Through Threats. It appears that President Trump hoped that threats of invasion, allegedly combined with a promise for Maduro’s safe exile in another country, would dislodge the dictator. This is not necessarily impossible, but there is no sign of it occurring. This tactic can continue for some length of time but eventually will require rethinking if it doesn’t achieve its goal because the credibility of the threats will disappear.
Back Down and Declare Victory. If President Trump chooses not to invade and to allow Maduro to remain in power, he runs the risk of appearing weak and indecisive both domestically and abroad, particularly given how heated his rhetoric has been. Nonetheless, he can declare that attacks on boats have achieved his goal of reducing drug trafficking. He can also declare victory on the “Cartel de los Soles,” which he claims Maduro operates, since it actually does not exist.
It is politically unappealing but has the benefit of being easy, and the president could simply pivot to another issue. He can wait for a short national political attention span to move on with him. After all, Venezuela is only in the news so much because of Trump’s threats. It is likely the least risky approach in the long run.
Airstrikes Without Invasion. The president could launch missiles into Venezuela, thus using direct armed force (and the threat of more) without committing U.S. troops to invasion. This could be combined with some type of additional covert action, which ironically President Trump has discussed publicly. Again, it is not impossible that Maduro would flee the country, but it is not likely. Instead, more Venezuelans would certainly leave (almost eight million have done so already), thus creating new humanitarian challenges.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration would face serious backlash in the U.S., where even Republican lawmakers are already investigating whether the attacks on Venezuelan boats might constitute a crime. It would also undermine relations with allies, including in Latin America.
Invasion, aka Boots on the Ground. If the president chooses invasion, U.S. troops will find themselves in a difficult situation even though there likely will be minimal military resistance. Over time, criminal groups have become deeply entrenched in Venezuela and will fight for their survival and profit. Countless security officials are complicit in regime abuses, making surrender less appealing. Plus, the regime enjoys substantial intelligence support from Cuba and Russia, making invasion and occupation that much trickier.
Such an invasion could generate immediate “mission accomplished” headlines, but would require months of troop presence, combined with substantial financial assistance for a new government. Some U.S. soldiers will lose their lives. During the 1989 invasion of Panama, a much smaller country, 23 soldiers died. That conflicts directly with President Trump’s own promises and the desires of his base, which is to limit sending U.S. dollars abroad and engaging in extended wars.
President Trump’s policy toward Venezuela is a gamble with long odds of winning. To paraphrase Kenny Rogers, we do not know whether the president will hold them or fold them. But even a “win” of forcing out Maduro will leave a host of new problems for the president to deal with.
Read more...